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LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANT MOTHERS IN SPAIN: PERCEIVED CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

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ABSTRACT *This paper reports on interviews with 13 mothers and expectant mothers who had immigrated from Latin American countries and were living in Asturias, Spain. The purpose of the study was to investigate the Latinas' post-immigration perceptions, attitudes, and experiences. Qualitative analysis revealed several themes in the women's interview responses. Two of those themes – post-immigration challenges and opportunities found in Spain – are the focus of this paper. Evidence of three main types of challenge and three main types of opportunity is provided based on the Latinas' responses. A discussion section follows, relating the women's perceptions of challenges and opportunities to circumstances in Spain and differences in Spanish and Latin American cultures and societies.*

KEYWORDS: *Spain, immigration, racism, education, crime, gender equality*

INTRODUCTION

In developed nations, the number of female immigrants has been on the rise since 1960; by 1990, nearly 52% of all migrants in Europe were women and girls (Zlotnik 2003). In Spain, the economic downturn that began around 2008 resulted in more emigrants leaving than immigrants entering the country; however, a reinvigorated Spanish economy has resulted in that trend being reversed. In the year 2013, there were 280,772 immigrants to Spain, but by 2017 this figure had increased to 532,482, with women accounting for 48.8 percent of that number (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2018). As of 2017, the total

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number of immigrants in Spain was almost six million, about half of them women (Eurostat 2019; Datosmacro.com n.d.)

Among the many countries of origin for Spanish immigrants, Latin American countries have contributed and continue to contribute a substantial number. In 2017, for instance, individuals emigrating from the Latin American countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru with Spain as their destination numbered 34,210, 31,468, 18,234, and 13,936, respectively (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2018). Though there are many differences among Latin American nations, the region in its entirety exhibits some broad cultural commonalities that tend to characterize immigrants that originate there. Similarities include a chauvinistic culture with a strong family orientation, and a culture that assigns a great deal of importance to strong family bonds. Emphasis is placed on the traditional family roles of motherhood, in particular those of marriage and childbearing, with Latin American women (Latinas) tending to transition from marriage to motherhood more rapidly than their European counterparts (Wildsmith – Raley 2006). For generations, it has been engrained in women that they are expected to fulfill the combined roles of being a good housewife, mother, and daughter. Traditionally, women are expected to stay home to attend to their children and provide them with social and emotional support; keep the home clean, tidy, and hygienic; do the necessary shopping for food and household items; and prepare the family's meals (Gonzalez-Juarez et al. 2014).

The similarities that characterize the cultural background of Latina immigrants, especially in regard to their strongly culturally determined marital and maternal roles, suggest the appropriateness of considering, as a group, Latina immigrants to Spain who are mothers and expectant mothers. This paper reports the results of a study in which a sample of 13 Latina immigrants to Spain who had given birth after their arrival or were pregnant were interviewed to investigate their post-immigration perceptions, attitudes, and experiences. The women were asked questions about their reasons for immigrating; birth-related decisions; their economic-, family-, and social situations; and their experiences since immigrating. The paper focuses on the post-immigration challenges the Latinas reported and the opportunities they perceived to be present in their new home country. It thereby provides a recent, evidence-based picture of Latina immigrant mothers and expectant mothers with regard to their perceived challenges and opportunities in Spain. Following this introduction, the paper is divided into four main parts: Methodology, Immigrant Latinas' Challenges, Immigrant Latinas' Opportunities, and Discussion.

METHODOLOGY

The criteria for inclusion in the study were defined as being a woman who had immigrated to Spain from Latin America, and who had given birth to a child in Spain or was pregnant at the time. The study used purposeful sampling to develop a sample that met the participant criteria and was potentially rich in the sought-after information (Patton 2002). The study took place in the Asturias principality of Spain. Study participants came from locations where immigrant women who were pregnant or had one or more young children were believed to congregate. These included organizations in three Asturias cities. In Gijon, three participants were located at Casa de Acogida Para Madres Getantes, a residence for unwed mothers run by the Catholic Diocese in Spain. In Aviles, nine participants were located at Centro de Acogida, where women seek resources and information regarding community services. In Oviedo, one participant was located at Red Madre, a nonprofit organization that helps expectant mothers and mothers of children two years old or less with social services and some material assistance. A total of 13 Latinas with a median age of 27 years made up the sample. These participants had immigrated to Spain from six different Latin American countries: Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru. Each of the women sat for one audio-recorded semi-structured interview, with the same set of questions guiding all interviews. Follow-up questions were asked in some cases. Sessions lasted from 30 to 45 minutes.

All participants underwent an informed consent process to ensure the protection of their identity and to explain the study's purpose. The participants were advised that they would remain anonymous and that they could stop at any time there was discomfort with the interview process. They were asked for and gave permission for their interviews to be audio recorded. To help motivate the Latinas, they were each encouraged to utilize the opportunity to share their personal story.

After the audio-recorded interviews were transcribed into hard copy format, qualitative analysis was conducted to determine codes and themes reflected in interview responses. Each interview was reviewed multiple times, using inductive analysis to determine codes reflected in the Latinas' responses (Creswell – Plano Clark 2007). Following the determination of codes, several additional reviews were then undertaken to detect themes the codes had revealed. Based on the codes, eight themes were identified in the Latinas' responses to questions. Two themes that are particularly relevant for the purposes of this paper are *Challenges in Spain* and *Opportunities in Spain.* These two themes are explored in the remainder of the paper.

CHALLENGES IN SPAIN

Qualitative analysis revealed that the interviewed Latinas had encountered a number of post-immigration challenges. The majority of those challenges fell into three main categories: personal and relationship challenges, economic challenges, and being subjected to racism and stereotyping.

Personal and Relationship Challenges

One of the most widespread difficulties mentioned by the Latinas was being a single mother and receiving no or little assistance from the biological father of her child or children. Only two participants lived with their child's or expected child's father. Participant 12 was one who indicated the difficulty she found in being a single mother alone in Spain.

> *P12: On occasions I get frustrated because I want to do everything right, but I don't have help from anyone…. I am alone and for me a lot of times it is difficult. I have to take care of everything myself.*

Participant 4 was also caring for her child without the father's aid. When talking about having learned that the father already had a family, she referred to how she had become resigned to having a child on her own.

> *P4: I met him at a party, and we started dating. Further along when I got pregnant, I found out how old he was and that he had a family in Colombia. That was very hurtful but there was nothing I could do.*

Participant 8 revealed that she had not initially been accepted by her husband's Spanish family and that her child's father had left them eight days after the child was born. When she was asked whether her partner was Spanish, she replied as follows.

> *P8: Yes. He's a Spaniard and his mother would tell him I was going to take advantage of him because I was foreign. The baby was born on [date redacted]. The baby was not even eight days old when he, my ex-partner, left the house. He, my ex-partner, put in the divorce petition and we separated. The baby has gone fourteen months without seeing his father. He does not know his father, and it hurts very much because his first word was "dad."*

Participant 10 also had a problem being accepted by her partner's family. She reported that though she was supported by her partner during her difficult pregnancy, she was not supported by his family.

> *P10: At six and a half months I went to the doctor and I was told there was a problem with the amniotic fluid. The baby was not growing like it should have. We had to spend a lot of money on private doctors and I got very worried. I was told the baby could be born with Down syndrome. It was a huge battle. I suffered a lot, because I did not have support from the father's family…. Things are better now but I went through a very hard time because I couldn't understand why the father's family would treat me so badly. I had to go to a psychologist…. If I had parents in Brazil, I wouldn't be here. I don't have a mother or father, only siblings. It is very difficult to live without any support in a country that is not yours. Now my mother-in-law likes my child, but not that long ago she would belittle him.*

Later, Participant 10 reported that at the time of the interview she was not living with her partner. Though her partner's family had accepted her child, they had not accepted her and would not allow their son to live with her.

Economic Challenges

Almost all of the interviewed immigrant women had encountered economic difficulties since their immigration. These included the three who were living at Casa de Acogida shelter, and most of the other Latinas were also economically struggling. The women who worked generally did so in low-paying jobs. This may be expected because many Latinas who immigrate to Spain do so to enter domestic service (Rodríguez-Ibáñez 2006). As of 2008, over 64 percent of female Latin American immigrants to Spain were employed in the generally low-paying areas of household services, accommodation and food preparation, and other tertiary services (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2008).

Some of the Latinas in this study were receiving public aid, while others reported being unable to qualify for such aid due to not having documentation. For instance, Participant 13, who lived with her mother and daughter, remarked on her lack of documentation.

> *P13: Living here is complicated. Work is a difficult subject and also obtaining documents. I asked for help, but they will not give me any because I do not have documents.*

As noted above, most of the Latinas were estranged from the father of their child or children. All of these women indicated that they received no or insufficient monetary assistance from the absent father. Participant 8, in response to being asked whether her former partner was helping her, stated:

> *P8: I don't have a stable job; I don't have a steady income … I have to find my way in life … He gives me 150 euros, which is what the divorce settlement stipulated. He thinks the baby eats air because 150 a month is nothing. The baby's food, diapers, and those things – that money is not enough for everything.*

Participant 10, who lived alone with her 14-month-old son, spoke of the difficulty of finding a job due to not having a vehicle and having no flexibility to work shifts due to having to take care of her child.

> *P10: It is also very difficult to find a job. Many require transportation, but I don't have a vehicle. Others require shift-related flexibility and I don't have much because of my child.*

Other participants told of working in what were very likely low-paying jobs. Participant 4 was one who had recently worked as a personal carer.

> *P4: I was working until three days ago, the lady I was taking care of passed away. I now have to look for another job to continue to take care of my daughter.*

In addition, Participant 7 stated, "If someone calls me for cleaning, I will do it." Participant 8 remarked, "I look for work too, whatever; clean plates, clean houses, clean the elderly…I don't care, whatever comes up." Participant 13 revealed that although she was undocumented, she had found a job caring for children.

Two of the interviewees spoke of the exploitation of female Latin American immigrants that also sometimes occurred. Participant 2 referred to the acceptance of work conditions by Latinas as a factor that makes them more vulnerable to exploitation.

> *P2: As a matter of fact, there are corporations that prefer Latin workers, and not because they pay less, but because we Latin women work better. We are fighters and don't complain, although truthfully this is also bad because we give them the ability to exploit us.*

Remarks by Participant 8 suggested that she may have been a target of exploitation at work.

> *P8: Sometimes for work, one has to turn the other cheek and continue. If you have a job and they exploit you, because sometimes you get exploited at work too, we put up with it because you have to support your household and your child.*

It was clear from the interviews that, in one way or another, the women had found ways to make do with what monetary resources they had. These ways included working at low-wage jobs, living in a residence supported by charitable donations, living with a mother or grandmother, receiving public assistance, and, in some cases, receiving some money from their child's father. Only two of the 13 Latinas that were interviewed seemed to have economic resources that permitted them to live at above subsistence level. For most, economic security appeared to be a daily challenge.

Racism and Stereotyping

Another challenge reported by several of the participants was experiencing prejudice in the form of racism and stereotyping. Participant 10, when asked whether Latin American women were stereotyped in Spain, answered as follows.

> *P10: Yes, many think we came to take advantage of them. Others insult you directly, and others take advantage of you, and when they don't need you anymore, they ignore you.*

Participant 11 had also encountered racist attitudes.

> *P11: There are racist people. Not that long ago I was at a bus stop and there were some guys who were passing out tickets to go eat at a pizzeria. The guys who were passing those things were only doing it among Spanish folks.*

Participant 8 believed that her mother-in-law's racist attitude toward her had resulted in her husband leaving:

> *P8: He's a Spaniard and his mother would tell him I was going to take advantage of him because I was foreign…. It's because the people from*

here are very racist. They see you are not from here and they won't accept you.

The Latinas' responses revealed that racism was more likely to be experienced by those with darker skin. Participant 13's words indicated that she thought racism was directed toward her due to her dark complexion.

P13: What I see here is that people are very racist. Here, I've had to stand in long lines at the bank while pregnant. In my country, priority is given to those who are pregnant. Spaniards see us as blacks coming to invade their country.

Participant 9 mentioned that a reason she had not experienced any racism since immigrating might be her lighter skin pigmentation:

P9: I have not had any problems. Maybe it has not occurred because of my skin complexion. If my features were more of those similar to what normally is associated with my country, maybe I would have been rejected.

OPPORTUNITIES

A notable outcome of the study was that, despite their diverse challenges, none of the Latinas indicated that she intended or even wished to return to her country of origin. On the contrary, all had apparently decided to stay in Spain. The women's responses strongly suggest that this was likely due to their believing that there were more opportunities for them and their children if they remained in Spain rather than returning to their Latin American country of origin.

Opportunities for the Latinas' Children

Several of the immigrant women mentioned the term *opportunities* explicitly. Three participants clearly indicated their belief that there were better opportunities for their children in Spain. Participant 6 stated:

P6: I always saw myself when older returning to the Dominican Republic, living in a wooden home, but not anymore. I have

two daughters and I know they can have better opportunities here.

Participant 9 revealed a similar belief:

P9: In Europe, generally there are more opportunities. For the good of my child, I think Europe is the best option.

Participant 7 specifically mentioned the availability of better educational opportunities for her children in Spain:

P7: Here, they [children] can choose different habits [pathways] depending on the education you give them; but in my country it does not matter how much education you give them, sometimes they turn and take a different route. I decided to stay here with them because I had two children here. One is ten years old and the girl is eight. Here, the education is different from my country.

Increased Safety

In response to questions about their reason for immigrating and their views about living in Asturias, a number of the Latinas referred to the lower level of crime in Spain compared to their country of origin. For instance, in responding to the question of why she had immigrated, Participant 2 stated the following.

P2: Because I have family here, and the situation in Peru is not all that good. There's a lot of crime, and my sisters did not want to see me involved in any of that.

Participant 7 also mentioned the amount of crime in her country of origin as a reason for immigrating to Spain:

P7: In my country [Dominican Republic] there is a lot of crime. Having children over there is a problem.

When asked if she felt at home in Asturias, Participant 3 responded positively, comparing her life in Asturias, Spain, to the situation in her country of origin in regard to violence:

P3: I feel very good in Asturias. The differences between the two countries are enormous. In Colombia there's a lot of violence. Here my life is more comfortable and peaceful.

Participant 5, in response to being asked whether she felt that life was good in Asturias, remarked:

P5: Yes, I've always liked living in Asturias. Here we can be out in the streets without having to worry. In other countries you always have to be watching who is coming behind you. Here everything is quiet and normal. There's everything [everything one needs], but you don't see the crime that there is in other places.

When asked if she thought her life would be better in her country of origin, Participant 10's response indicated that she felt it would not. She cited both the relative absence of crime and the better educational opportunities in Spain.

P10: If I had a father and mother, I would be very well, spiritually, but I will also tell you it is very difficult to raise a child in Brazil. There is a lot of crime and insecurity. Here, education is very good, and it opens a lot of doors. Here there are also a lot of bad people, but there are more opportunities.

Greater Personal Independence

A third type of perceived opportunity that was reflected in the remarks of several of the interviewed Latinas was the greater independence that living in Spain provided them in contrast to the relatively restricted roles available in their Latin American country of origin. The Latinas spoke positively of this relative independence. For instance, Participant 2 detailed her perception of being a mother in her country of origin compared to fulfilling the same role in Spain.

P2: Mothers in Peru are very submissive. I wouldn't like to be in their place. I am very proud to be Peruvian, but I do not like the role the mothers have in Peru. They are enslaved; they are only expected to take care of their children and their husbands. They are not permitted to have other ambitions. Here it is permitted. Here, women do other

things: they go to the gym, the salon, they go have drinks with their friends. In Peru you drop off the children at school and right after you have to return to the house to attend to the husband, make food, do laundry – you don't have time for yourself.

Participant 9 compared the role of being a mother in Spain favorably to the situation in Peru, her country of origin. Her comments suggested that she planned on using her relative independence to develop a career in Spain.

P9: In Latin America, a mother always has to be at home with their children. Here things are different. Women are more independent. Many don't have kids past thirty. Many have children, but that does not mean they have to give up their career. I am Peruvian, but I don't believe my life has to be focused on my children. I would like to be working and going to school too.

Participant 6 remarked on having taken advantage of her independence in Spain since she was a teenager.

P6: Over there, women are at home waiting for the husband to bring the money in. Here, I have been independent since I was seventeen years old. I believe men and women should contribute money to the household; nobody should have to depend on anyone else financially. I have a cousin who totally depends on her husband, but also does not want to change. She is very close minded. I don't like that.

Participant 5 also remarked on the difference between Spain and her country of origin in regard to women's independence, saying that Latin women were "very dependent on their partner." When asked what she would consider to be her ideal role, this participant reported her desire to be a woman who was not as dependent on her husband as was customary in her former country.

P5: Being independent, not depending so much on the husband and ... giving an example to the kids of how to be independent and not to depend on another person, that we can take care of ourselves.

A remark by Participant 4 made clear that she did not approve of her mother's negative attitude toward women being independent and having interests outside the home, suggesting that she was in favor of the greater independence for women offered by Spanish society.

P4: My mother is very close-minded. She believes women should be dedicated to the home and that going out to meet people is a form of disrespecting the family. She does not feel that getting to know people is normal.

When asked whether she believed that mothers in Asturias were more independent than those in Latin America, Participant 3, who was in school at the time of the interview, replied positively, suggesting that she considered her work at home to be due to free choice, not one that was culturally forced upon her.

P3: Yes. Over there, moms have to take care of the children, home, and their husbands – everything. Although I have not lived any of that [experienced any pressure like that]. Yes, I do take care of the chores at home, but no one obligates me to do so.

DISCUSSION

The interviews with 13 Latina immigrants to Spain revealed that these women faced diverse post-immigration challenges, while they also perceived that they benefited from various opportunities in Spain. Difficulties included personal and economic challenges. Some also reported being the targets of racist attitudes.

The women's economic challenges support Solé and Parella's (2003) finding that, in Spain, labor discrimination against immigrants occurs in terms of securing jobs, types of jobs, and working conditions, with discriminatory practices occurring regardless of immigrants' education, qualifications, or experience. Though immigrants to Spain have a relatively low risk of unemployment, they have a considerably higher risk of being employed in low-wage jobs than native Spanish citizens (Fellini 2017). Gaye and Jha (2011) note that immigrant women, who often have fewer job skills than non-migrants, tend to take low-skilled jobs in manufacturing or services, earning low wages, as was evident for several of the participants in this study. Being undocumented, which was mentioned by four of the interviewed Latinas, is another determinant that channels immigrant women into lower-paying jobs (Flippen 2014).

Working in low-paying jobs not only adversely affects immigrant women's empowerment but leaves them more vulnerable to work-related exploitation, which may have occurred to two women in this study who brought up the subject in their comments. Being an immigrant woman, especially one in a precarious

economic situation, is a risk factor that increases the probability of work-related exploitation. Such exploitation may include paying wages under the legal minimum or no wages at all, requiring very long working hours, providing no days off, or demanding the worker pay taxes that are the legal responsibility of the employer (Leotti et al. 2014).

Another type of challenge reported by the Latinas was experiencing racism. Racist attitudes and behavior are often directed at a nation's immigrants simply because their country of origin is different from the one they have entered. Racism can be connected to the concept of the nation-state and nationalism (Yuval-Davis, 1996). Being a citizen of a nation-state, which is defined by physical boundaries around a geographic region, promotes identification with and allegiance to one's own nation. This allegiance may foster prejudice toward minorities whose origin is beyond the nation-state, especially if they are perceived as being different from the norm physically or linguistically. For several Latina immigrants in this study, having darker skin than the norm was thought to be a feature that invited racist attitudes from native Spaniards.

One result of racism toward immigrants is their relative ostracization from society and exclusion from important resources (Yuval-Davis, 1996). Vásquez-Roa (2018) relates such exclusion to the concept of borders. Migrants who have crossed the physical border surrounding a nation may still encounter internal borders constructed by society. These internal borders may limit the exercise of rights by migrants, restrict their access to services, and make it difficult to move around in public space, thereby hindering their active participation in and integration into society. Internally constructed borders may especially affect migrants who have not gained legal status, as was the case for the study's four undocumented participants. Even traversing from one location to another may pose problems for migrants without legal residency due to fear of being apprehended and deported. For these reasons, irregular migrants may try to remain relatively invisible within society. Feeling restricted by society's internal borders may have raised further challenges for the undocumented participants in this study, though they did not give voice to such concerns.

The racism that several of the participants experienced or witnessed occurred in the form of remarks or other behavior. Others did not report experiencing or witnessing overt racist behavior. Unfortunately, we cannot conclude from the latter finding that these other Latinas were not subject to *aversive* racism. This more hidden type of racism may be exhibited by people who do not practice overt racism, and who claim they are not racist at all. Aversive racism was detected among a sample of Spanish university students who favored a native-born Spaniard over a Latino immigrant from Mexico in a résumé assessment exercise, even though the two résumés were alike (Wojcieszak, 2015). This

more subtle type of racism may be practically undetectable but could result in Latina immigrants being targets for unfavorable hiring practices even among employers who sincerely deny any prejudice against immigrants.

The interviews also revealed that the women believed that living in Spain provided advantages in comparison to living in their country of origin. These included better opportunities for their children, greater safety, and increased personal independence. The Latinas' perceptions of the greater opportunities of living in Spain likely explained their choosing to remain in their new country despite the challenges they encountered.

The perception that their children would receive a better education in Spain was one primary advantage that likely motivated the Latinas to stay in Spain. Their judgment is supported by data concerning the enrollment of children in schools in Spain in 2017 compared to recent figures in the interviewees' countries of origin, which indicate that children's education is more universally implemented in Spain. Whereas in Spain 97 percent of primary-school-aged children were enrolled in primary school in 2017, figures for Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru for 2017 or 2018 show that primary school enrollment was 96, 93, 93, 92, 97, 87, and 96 percent, respectively (The World Bank Group 2019a). Even greater discrepancies exist between Spain and the Latin American countries in connection to secondary education enrollment. In Spain, net secondary enrollment was 97 percent in 2017, while the latest secondary net enrollment figures (for 2017 or 2018) for Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru were 82, 77, 70, 85, 44, and 89 percent, respectively (The World Bank Group 2019b). Given these figures and the Latinas' remarks, a main problem with education in their countries of origin may have been that the social and cultural context made it more difficult for children there to stay in school.

Regarding safety, the Latinas' responses gave evidence of a strong desire not to be subjected to criminal activity. World Bank data for 2014 indicate that 8.1 percent of Latin American and Caribbean residents feel very unsafe at home, compared to 1.1 percent of residents in developed countries (Baliki 2014), and no region in the world has a higher homicide rate than Latin America (Imbusch et al. 2011). Though not all study participants compared Spain to their home country regarding safety, none suggested that they believed life in Spain was less safe or more violent than in their country of origin. It is understandable that living in a country less racked by violence and crime would be a strong motivator for these women.

The Latinas' comments indicated that nearly half of them felt that women had greater personal independence than in their home country. These women all embraced their freer role and indicated that in Spain they would not settle for

being limited to the traditional, Latin American restrictive definition of being a wife and mother. The finding that greater independence was perceived as an advantage by several of the participants agrees with the results of another study in which Latina immigrants recognized that their gender role in Spain had changed from the more rigid roles in Latin America (González-Juárez et al. 2014). In that study, researchers found that immigrant women felt there was greater freedom in Spain with respect to personal freedom, partner communication, and power in the family. These and the present study's observations are consistent with the results of a study by Campaña et al. (2015) showing that in Ecuador and Peru, the sending countries of six of this study's participants, women spent significantly more hours a week than men doing unpaid housework and caring for children. The differences occurred at three different education levels for women and men: primary (less than high school), secondary (high school), and more than high school, and for households both without and with children. In Ecuador, women with a primary education and children spent more time than men on such activity at a ratio of almost 5 to 1. In Peru, the ratio was 3 to 1. In Spain, the difference between women and men in terms of time spent on household work is considerably less, at a ratio of 1.9 to 1 (Gómez – Delgado 2018). The finding that Spanish men take on more unpaid household responsibilities may be attributed to the difference in the Spanish and Latin America cultures. In the latter, a predominant idea is that men and women have very different roles, with men going outside the home to work and women staying at home to care for the household and any children. Such a traditional view of the different roles of men and women can be expected to result in women spending more hours on unpaid household work than men (Balcells I Ventura 2009). In contrast, in Spain, there has been a strong movement towards greater equality between men and women over the past few decades. This has resulted in a law mandating that men should contribute equally to household chores and parenting duties (Nolan – Scott 2006). Though gender equality in terms of home-related responsibilities has not been achieved in Spain, the Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum (2020) lists Spain as among the top 10 nations for gender equity.

The findings of this study can be viewed from the perspective of the empowerment of immigrant Latina mothers in Spain. Generally, the empowerment of women can be considered as consisting of five types: economic, educational, social, political, and psychological (Mandal 2013). In regard to the first of these types, the majority of the study participants enjoyed little in the way of economic empowerment. Most of the Latinas who were working were relegated to low-paying jobs, which has a negative effect on economic empowerment (Gaye – Jha 2011). Immigrant women's economic empowerment is also adversely impacted by restrictions on the ability to secure

jobs experienced by those who are undocumented (Flippen 2014), as was the case for two of the women in this study. Being exploited at work, which may have happened to at least two of the interviewed Latinas, also obviously runs counter to economic empowerment.

As for educational empowerment, two of the immigrant women reported having completed or being currently enrolled in classes, but most did not. However, it was clear from various statements that the women believed that educational opportunities for their children were better in Spain than in their country of origin, and these Latinas presumably believed that their immigrating to Spain would help strengthen their children's educational empowerment.

Social empowerment, in terms of strength of social relations and social structures, did not appear to be great for the Latina mothers in this study, as most were dealing with economic issues and the necessities of caring for their child or children. Social empowerment was probably negatively impacted by stereotyping and racist attitudes towards the women who experienced such attitudes. As for political empowerment, there was no evidence that the Latinas in the study had any substantial involvement in political structures. Thus, their political empowerment appeared to be minor.

The single area of empowerment in which most of the immigrant women in this study arguably showed considerable strength is psychological empowerment. This is evident first from the fact that the women made the choice to leave their country of origin and migrate to a new land. In making that choice, they, like many other migrants, displayed courage, the ability to take risks, and the willingness to open themselves to new experience (Adler – Gielen 2003), which are all characteristics that can be considered to be psychological strengths. Also, in the face of the challenges they experienced, all of the Latinas displayed perseverance and resilience. Several of them reported that they were "moving forward" (*adalante*) to describe their situation, indicating their determination to make a life for themselves and their children in Spain. A factor that likely added to their psychological empowerment was the fact that they were mothers or expectant mothers with the important responsibility of caring for the well-being and future of their child or children. Their recognition of the increase in opportunities their children would enjoy in Spain and their understanding that Spain provided a safer environment in which their children could come of age very plausibly strengthened the women's psychological resolve to persist in their new land. Even those who had encountered racist attitudes – experiences that can adversely affect immigrant Latinas' self-perceptions (Telzer – Vazquez Garcia 2009) – appeared, from their comments, to have considerable resilience and perseverance. Further evidence of the psychological empowerment of several of the interviewed Latinas was the positive attitude they revealed toward

the greater independence for mothers and all women that they perceived was possible in Spain.

In summary, this study has offered evidence that many Latina immigrants to Spain encounter personal and economic challenges, as well as social challenges in the form of prejudice. However, the women believed that the opportunities of living in Spain, including expanded educational opportunities for their children, improved safety from crime, and the greater independence of women, exceeded those in their countries of origin. It is likely that the women recognized that, on balance, these greater opportunities outweighed the difficulties they had experienced and strengthened their resolve to remain in their new homeland.

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HUNGARIAN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS IN THE CARPATHIAN BASIN, 2011-2017

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ABSTRACT *International migration into Hungary is markedly differentiated into two types: that due to global migration, and that due to processes ongoing between Hungary and its neighboring countries, the latter which date back a long time. The main characteristic of international migration in Hungary is that the largest part of the immigrant population is of Hungarian nationality. Population movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s made it clear that the demographic processes taking place in the Hungarian linguistic community – despite the fragmentation occurring in 1918, and nearly 100 years of differentiated development – can only be fully understood if we examine them together as a single process. It is important to recognize that demographic processes within and outside of the current border are similar in nature. All that is happening in Hungary is only one part of the demographic processes of the entire Hungarian language community. The migration processes described in the paper would have a significant impact on the ethnic spatial structure of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin were the number of members of other ethnicities not similarly decreasing. Strengthening the number of people staying in their home country and increasing the number of return migrations and the fertility rate of local Hungarians could all be partial solutions to the problem of population decline.*

KEYWORDS: *Demography, International migration, spatial statistics, Carpathian-Basin*

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INTRODUCTION

Much more is being said about Hungary's emigrants these days (Blaskó et al. 2016; Siskáné et al, 2017; Egedy, 2017) than about foreigners arriving legally to Hungary, or about Hungarians emigrating from the other countries of the Carpathian Basin. This paper analyses the intersection of the two latter phenomena, focusing on settlers from the Carpathian Basin arriving to Hungary. The study zooms into the present situation of international migration in Hungary and introduces the foreign population living in Hungary in numbers, as well as relevant socio-demographic and economic characteristics from the perspective of the source and target territories, thereby revealing the source areas of migration and the impact on the Hungarian population in the Carpathian Basin. The analysis interprets those involved in international migration in broad terms; as such, it is not solely focused on the movement of foreign citizens, but rather examines the effects of migration in relation to naturalized Hungarians born abroad.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS, THE DATA SOURCES

There are several types of data sources about foreign nationals, mostly in the shape of administrative records. The latter include registers created by administrative organizations to support the implementation of their own statutory administrative tasks (Gárdos et al., 2008). In these cases, statistical and research needs do not primarily determine the concept and the content nor the reference time of data and definitions. Another difficulty is that the content and structure of such registers may suffer changes as a result of changes in legislation. All this means that, in some cases, it is difficult to obtain information directly from these data systems to meet statistical needs.

The advantage of census data over administrative data is that everyone can be linked to their habitual place of residence, along with all the variables included in related surveys. However, this information is not available as often as in administrative records. Surveys have also been carried out of Hungarian citizens who habitually live within the national territory, and of those who stay abroad only temporarily (12 months or fewer); moreover, foreign nationals and stateless persons who remain within the country's territory for a given period of time are also listed. Among the foreign nationals are not included the members of diplomatic bodies and their family members, members of foreign armed forces, as well as people visiting the country for the purposes of tourism, business meetings, etc.

In this paper, I have used these two types of statistical data sources. I worked with 2011 and 2017 stock data from the Hungarian migration databases as they are relevant to the topic (the Ministry of Interior's Records of Foreign Residents, and censuses). The data underlying the analyses were not directly available, thus I had to make use of separate classifications for the assessment of territorial impacts. Currently, country classification is automated in administrative sources, and the list of foreign settlements posed a number of challenges: typing errors, instructions, and city names in different languages made progress difficult.[2]

Both data sources contain information that is missing from the other file (the census contains data related to education and economic activity which are not part of the Ministry of Interior's database; however, the administrative database contains details of birth settlements). For this reason, it was necessary to link both files.[3] To this end, we employed a multistage key system using sex, year, and month of birth, name of settlement, public domain, and house number information. Where necessary, I used a rate estimate.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS LIVING IN HUNGARY

Quantities and nationalities

Current global migration trends have also been experienced in Hungary: the foreign population living in the country is composed of people from 175 different countries. The proportion of people from Europe is steadily decreasing: while 89% of foreigners arrived from the European continent in 1995, this proportion had decreased to 65% by 2017.

2 Just a few examples:
- The village of yore of Székelyhidegkút (*Vîdacutu Român* in Romanian, *Kaltenbrunnen* in German) is today a village in Romania, in Harghita County. It emerged from the unification of Magyarhidegkút and Oláhhidegkút in 1926. The northern part of the village is Hungarian — the western part of Oláh-hidegkút, currently a part of the Hidegkút settlement. Hidegkút (Vidăcut in Romanian) is a village in Romanian Harghita County. It belongs administratively to Székelyandrásfalva/Sacel.
- Horthyvára: Máriamajor (Степановићево/Stepanovićevo in Serbian; between 1941 and 1944 known as Horthyvára; in 1941called Bácshadikfalva for a short period) today belongs to the Újvidék/Novy Sad township in Serbia in Vojvodina, in the Southern-Bácska district.

3 Marcell Kovács, Director of the Population Census and Demographic Statistics Department, and his experts, Zita Ináncsi and János Novák, provided assistance essential to this work. I hereby sincerely thank them for their support.

At the same time, Hungary is not considered a typical host country in a global sense (Hatton et al. 2005; Krugman et al. 1996). On the one hand, the volume of migration and proportion in relation to the resident population is considerably smaller than it is in larger host countries; on the other, the prevailing global migration trends have only had a minor impact. Hungary (albeit to a decreasing extent) continues to be a target for Europeans, but rather as part of short-distance international migration.

Figure 1 *Proportion of population born abroad in individual countries, 2017**



*Source: OECD, SOPEMI, 2018; *: For Poland data is only available for the year 2011*

Within Europe, the importance of neighboring countries is tied to cross-border linguistic and cultural relations. Thus, the consequences of the peace treaties that brought an end to World War I and World War II are still decisive in the migration processes of the Carpathian Basin today (Tóth 2005). As such, one can distinguish between two layers of international migration to Hungary: global, and Carpathian-Basin-origin-based movements, each involving groups of migrants with different characteristics.

International migrants living in Hungary are often examined in simplified terms as foreign citizens residing in Hungary. Nevertheless, the population involved in migration is much larger and its structure much more nuanced.

If we examine the previously described population only, we find that the number of foreign nationals in 2011 (143,197) had increased by only 5.5% by 2017, when 151,132 foreign nationals were living in Hungary. Thanks to global migration trends, in 2017, for example, more Chinese citizens were residing in Budapest than Romanians. However, this data needs further explanation.

When examining the effects and extent of immigration, we must not forget the effects of naturalization: i.e. Hungarian citizens who were born abroad but who reside in Hungary. Their number significantly exceeds that of foreign nationals. Together, the two groups represent the target population to be examined: the population of foreign origin living in Hungary (the group is thus composed of foreign citizens and Hungarian citizens born abroad). Within this group, the number of foreign citizens is steadily declining: from 37% in 2011 to 29% in 2017.

In 2017, the "population of foreign origin" living in Hungary was 521,258 (an increase of 33% since 2011). Those emigrating Hungarians who had returned to live in Hungary (127,000 people) are not included in this figure for the target population. These numbers counter the statement that Hungary's international migration balance is negative (Melegh 2015; Juhász et al. 2017).

At the same time, it is important to note that the majority of naturalized migrants arrive from neighboring countries. In 2011, 288,024 people living in Hungary had arrived from the Carpathian Basin countries. By 2017, their number had increased by 22% (to 352,506 people, of which 313,000 were Hungarian). Today, the number of people born in Romania living in Hungary is greater than the total population of Debrecen, the second largest settlement in the country. During the period under review, migration from neighboring countries rose dynamically, the largest share of which was attributable to Ukrainian migrants (81%).

Table 1 *Hungarian citizens born abroad and foreign nationals by major countries and regions*

Country of citizenship/ place of birth	2011			2017		
	Foreign citizens	Hungarians born abroad	Total population of foreign origin	Foreign citizens	Hungarians born abroad	Total population of foreign origin
Romania	38 574	139 093	177 667	24 040	182387	206 427
Germany	16 987	7 294	24 281	18 627	16039	34 666
Slovakia	8 246	25 195	33 441	9 519	17376	26 895
Austria	3 936	2 897	6 833	4 021	7102	11 123
EU28	***85 414***	***183 761***	***269 175***	***76 270***	***248524***	***324 794***
Ukraine	11 820	23 953	35 773	5 774	59272	65 046
Serbia	7 752	21 306	29 058	2 312	37497	39 809
Europe total	**112 522**	**237 785**	**350 307**	**99 194**	**350756**	**449 950**
China	8852	939	9791	19 111	415	19 526

Asia total	**22 304**	**4 760**	**27 064**	**39 937**	**6539**	**46 476**
America total	**4 743**	**3 785**	**8 528**	**5 397**	**9149**	**14 546**
Africa total	**2 853**	**1 190**	**4 043**	**5 985**	**2398**	**8 383**
Australia and Oceania	**775**	**350**	**1 125**	**619**	**1284**	**1 903**
Total	**143 197**	**247 870**	**391 067**	**151 132**	**370 126**	**521 258**

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO)

Demographic, educational, and labor market characteristics

Most studies point out that, in Hungary, the foreign population is younger than the autochthonous, indigenous population (Gödri 2012); thus, migration has a rejuvenating effect. This statement is true of foreign citizens (38.8 years, average age), particularly for women. However, Hungarian nationals born abroad are older (on average, 43.9 years old) than local residents (41.7 years). During the years under review, the average age of the foreign-born population decreased significantly (from 47.1 in 2011 to 42.6 years old). Behind this is the gradual loss (caused by death) of immigrants who arrived after the regime change and who have since grown old. The population not born in Hungary has fewer children, and overall a greater proportion of people of an economically active age. This holds particularly true for foreign citizens.

Figure 2 *Resident population and the population of foreign origin by age group, January 1, 2017*



Source: Author's calculation, based on HCSO database

The level of education of the population of foreign origin is higher than that of those born in Hungary: in 2017, the percentage of foreigners (24 years old and older) having a higher education diploma was almost 46% and it was more than one third among Hungarian citizens born abroad. There are significant differences in education levels, which can be largely traced back to differences in age structure.

Figure 3 *Population of residents and those of foreign origin (25 years old and older) by education level, January 1, 2017*



Source: Author's calculation, based on HCSO database

An association can be made between the education level and the high employment rate of international migrants since the change of regime in Hungary. The tendency in recent years has been for the economic activity of the resident population to approach that of the population of foreign origin, their unemployment rate of the latter already being higher than that of the other two groups under examination. Within the group of dependents, one tenth of the population are full-time students, while the share of international migrants is significantly larger, ranging from 14 to 23%.

Table 2 *Distribution of 25–64 year old international migrants and residents by economic activity, 2017*

Economic activity	Foreign citizens	Hungarian citizens born abroad	Total of population of foreign origin	Resident population
Employed	81.3	80.2	80.5	75.1
Unemployed	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.5
Total. economically active population	85.1	83.9	84.3	78.6
Economically inactive	7.6	11.0	10.0	17.3
Dependent	7.3	5.1	5.7	4.1
Total. economically inactive population	14.9	16.1	15.7	21.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: HSCO

Territorial characteristics

In the case of internal migration, it is true that social groups with better labor market positions migrate to regions that feature stronger economic indicators, a better image, and a higher position in the settlement hierarchy (Bálint et al. 2017).

These findings are only partially characteristic of international migration. In addition to income opportunities, a more important role is played by the territorial location of destinations and the natural environment (Dövényi 2011). Therefore, the spatial distribution of the population of foreign origin is different to the distribution of the Hungarian-born population and their influence is greater in the areas they dwell in than in the national context.

Looking through the lens of migration, three regions stand out in which the aforementioned migrant groups are permanently present generally in larger numbers and proportions in Hungary: Central Hungary, the areas near the border, and the Lake Balaton region.

Budapest and Pest County attract people from a greater distance, and the majority of non-European foreigners live here. Many of them are employed, are younger on average, and more highly educated. It is thus primarily economically active, highly qualified foreign citizens who settle down here. Over the past ten years, Budapest has become a global destination for migration.

In Hungary, where the majority of foreign citizens still continue to arrive from neighboring countries, the location of target areas also plays a decisive role in the distribution of the foreign population. Therefore, in the choice of a new place of residence, *border regions* also play an important role, in addition to economic

centers. In these settlements, the composition of citizenship is not as diverse; rather, most foreigners simply arrive from the other side of the border.

Figure 4 *Distribution of population of foreign origin and resident population by current residence status, 2017*



Source: Author's calculation, based on HCSO database

The *Lake Balaton* region is mainly chosen by German, Austrian, Dutch, and Swiss pensioners; older people usually choose this area because their pensions provide them with greater purchasing power, as well as recreational opportunities and the value of a natural environment. In many cases, foreigners come as tourists before migrating (Kincses et al. 2014), and then migrate already having detailed information about the target areas. The volume of elderly migration increased significantly in the period under review.

Figure 5 *Proportion of population of foreign origin per 100 inhabitants*



Source: Author's calculation, based on HCSO database

THE TERRITORY SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TO HUNGARY FROM THE CARPATHIAN BASIN

Identifying source territories

Using official statistics, the data links and classifications described in the second section allow for the elimination of this omission, facilitating examination of wider migration processes, since demographic processes are not worth examining only within the current borders of the country. Since for the examination of the effects of emigration it is not relevant whether someone is a foreigner or lives in Hungary as a Hungarian citizen, I deal with the foreign-origin population collectively.

Migration processes are examined below according to the original place of birth and the demographic, sociological, and labor-market variables of migrants. The territorial level of the study is the county level (NUTS3). The latter territorial classification is applied in most neighboring countries, with the exception of Ukraine, where no such classification exists. The *oblast* level is more integrated, while the *rajon* is more detailed than this (Mezencev 2010). Since within Ukraine Transcarpathia plays the most notable role, I have used the most fine-grained classification.

In 2017, the population of foreign origin from Hungary's neighboring countries living in Hungary was 352,506. Of these, 7,131 were born in Hungary, and 560 of them had never seen daylight in their country of nationality (for example, Romanian citizens born in Germany, or Serbian citizens born in Sweden). Thus, 344,815 people who were born in one of the countries neighboring Hungary (regardless of nationality) were living in Hungary in 2017. This represents a 24% increase compared to 2011.

On January 1, 2011, the majority of the population born abroad but at that time living in Hungary had been born in the counties of Mures (27,879 persons), Bihor (27,374 persons), Hargita (26,439 persons), Cluj (21,667 persons), Satu Mare (17,102 persons), in the Nitriansky kraj (13,742 persons), Covasna county (10,821 persons), Berehove rajon (9,301 persons), Severnobački okrug (8,877 persons), Uzhhorod rajon (7,958 persons) and the Severnobanatski okrug (7,668 persons). These are the Romanian, Transcarpathian, Vojvodina, and Slovak areas where the proportion of Hungarian nationals is high (Kapitány 2015).

By 2017, only the order of the five major Transylvanian counties had changed (Hargita 35,613, Mures 32,433, Bihor 31,587, Satu Mare 20,075, and Cluj 19,540). The rest of the major source areas were Berehove rajon (19,429 persons), Covasna County (17,021), Severnobački okrug (12,769), Uzhhorod

rajon (12,410), Severnobanatski okrug (11,687), Vynohradiv rajon (11,628), and the Nitriansky kraj (10,286).[4]

Figure 6 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary by birth region*[5]



Source: Author's calculation, based on HCSO database

From the major source regions, the areas where the "emitting" (sending) role strengthened for the years under review were Transcarpathia (at the level of rajons: Vynohradiv: 259%, Berehove: 209%, Mukachevo: 177%, Khust: 159%, Uzhhorod: 156%, Tiachiv: 131%), as well as Bacau (243%) and Covasna (157%) counties.

For the following, more detailed, examinations, I have organized the regions of the surrounding countries into groups. I divided Romania's counties into three parts. The first group is located near the border counties (Arad, Bihor, Caras Severin, Maramures, Salaj, Satu Mare, Timis); the second group is composed of the Transylvanian regions (Alba, Bistrita Nasaud, Brasov, Cluj, Covasna, Hargita, Mures, Hunedoara, Sibiu), and the third is composed of other individual territories.

I have distinguished between three different groups in the case of Ukraine, covering all the Ukrainian settlements in a complete but disjointed mode. Into

4 Table 3 in the study contains the number of Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin by county.

5 The map displays the places of birth in the neighboring countries of citizens living in Hungary, while in the Hungarian parts one can see those who live in a given county but were born in a nearby country (I have used this approach on all the following maps included in this paper).

the first class, I categorized the districts near the border: the rajons of Berehove, Mukachevo, Vynohradiv and Uzhhorod. The second group includes the Carpathian mountain area, the mostly inhabited by Rusyn rajons of Velykyi Bereznyi and Perechyn, and the region of Boykos – including the rajon of Svaliava, Volovets, Irshava and Mizhhiria –, in addition to the Hutsul region – Rakhiv district – and the Maramures Basin – the Khust and Tiachiv rajons. The third group consists of Ukraine's internal territory, beyond the Carpathian Mountains.

I also divided Serbia into three units. The first category covers Severnobački, Severnobanatski, and Zapadnobački okrugs, all near the border; the second includes the areas of Južnobački, Južnobanatski and Sremski, while the third group consists of other territories, namely Serbian territories outside of Vojvodina.

I divided residences in Slovakia into two parts. The first includes the krajs near the border (Banskobystrický, Nitriansky, Trnavský and Košický); the second covers the rest of the areas (Prešovský, Bratislavský, Trenčiansky, Žilinský).

I distinguished three categories in Austria. The first is Burgenland, the second covers the regions near the border (Vienna, Lower Austria, and Styria), and the third includes the rest of the territory (Tirol, Salzburg, Vorarlberg, Carinthia, and Upper Austria). I used two categories for Croatia and Slovenia, respectively. In Croatia, the first group includes the border counties (Osječko-baranjska, Koprivničko-križevačka, Međimurje, Virovitičko-podravska, Vukovarsko-srijemska), and the second the rest of the territory. In Slovenia, the first group includes Pomurska County by the border, while the second includes the rest of the territory.

Demographic, labor market, and sociological characteristics of the population of foreign origin in relation to birth regions

The data for both 2011 and 2017 confirm that the average age of foreign citizens living in Hungary from western Slovakia, southern Serbia, and Romania (not including Transylvania) is among the highest, in many cases well above the 50-year average.

The proportion of people of over the age of 65 is highest in relation to those arriving from Slovakia, Romania (not including Transylvania), and the western provinces of Austria. The latter case is due to the higher purchasing power of pensions and the search for a more natural living environment (for example, Hévíz) (Illés 2008). Behind the other cases is the aging of immigrants, as well as the opportunity to access a higher level of social and health care in Hungary. The population aged 65 years or older arriving from Ukraine numbers more than 8,000. According to Hungarian law, these individuals are eligible to receive

their pension according to Hungarian pension calculations, resulting in larger pensions than they would receive in Ukraine (Gellérné et al. 2005). The greatest proportion of young people arrive from Austria, Ukraine, and Slovenia. This is partially explained by education-oriented migration. In the case of Austria, it is important to mention that the statistics are likely to capture the immigration of Hungarian children born abroad whose families had previously emigrated from Hungary, the former who later returned with their young children.

The proportion of working age people (from 25 to 64 years old) is largest with regard to those arriving from Transcarpathia, Transylvania, and Northern Vojvodina. It is generally true that among the migrants born near the border, more tend to be retired or young people, while migrants arriving from larger distances are more typically of working age.

Figure 7 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary by birth region and average age*



2011 *2017*

Source: Author's calculation based on HCSO database

The main feature of international migration to Hungary is that the majority of the immigrating population are either of Hungarian nationality or are native speakers of Hungarian. In 2011, the proportion of non-Hungarian native speakers from the countries of the Carpathian Basin was 14%; in 2017, this figure was around 3%. Behind this change may be the assimilation of non-Hungarian ethnic groups (namely, some of those who were already living in Hungary in 2011 did not declare themselves ethnically Hungarian at that time, but did so in 2017). It is possible to identify the demographic processes behind the phenomenon as existing in the period before 1918. The proportion of non-Hungarian native speakers is higher in relation to those arriving from Ukraine (not including the Transcarpathian regions), Northern Slovakia, Serbia (not including Vojvodina),

as well as Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia. In the case of Ukraine, the major proportion can be linked to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that has been ongoing since 2014, the economic and social crisis, and uncertainty (Karácsonyi et al., 2014).

Figure 8 *Distribution of population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary by age group and region of birth, 2017*



Source: Author's calculation based on HCSO database

Figure 9 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary by region of birth and proportion of Hungarian native speakers*



Source: Author's calculation based on HCSO database

Figure 10 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary by native language and region of birth, 2017*



Source: Author's calculation, based on HCSO database

In Hungary, international migrants have, on average, a higher level of education than the resident population (Rédei 2007). This is equally true of the citizens of neighboring countries. In 2011, more than half of the resident population aged 25 or older in Hungary had at least graduated from high school; this proportion was 68% for those arriving from neighboring countries. Educational qualifications are constantly increasing; however, there are no major territorial differences in the regional distribution of degrees.

Figure 11 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary of age 25 or older by higher education and region of birth*



Source: Author's calculation based on HCSO database

Today, it seems that the decades-old rule that the potential impact area of migration increases along with education has been partly overthrown (Rédei 2007). Nowadays, those with the lowest levels of education participate much more in long-distance migration than their counterparts who migrate from shorter distances.

Figure 12 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary of age 25 or older by education level and region of birth, 2017*



Source: Author's calculation based on HCSO database

Educational qualifications also have a decisive impact on labor-market characteristics. The employment rate for 25 to 64 year-old residents in Hungary born in neighboring countries was 79% in 2017. That is to say, more citizens of neighboring countries work than those of the resident population (75.1%).

According to birth region, those individuals with the highest employment rates are Serbian and Romanian citizens who migrated from areas furthest from the border, and the border regions of Croatia and Slovenia. This can be partly attributed to their higher education levels.

The highest inactivity rates are seen with people originating from Austria and Ukraine (not including Transcarpathia). Many of the former group are still students, or live off their own assets, while in the case of the latter country, many not have been able to enter the labor market force, or perhaps are not legally employed.

Figure 13 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary aged 25–64 years old by employment rate and region of birth*



Source: Author's calculation based on HCSO database

Figure 14 *Population of foreign origin from neighboring countries living in Hungary aged 25-64 years old by employment and region of birth, 2017*



Source: Author's calculation based on HCSO database

The impact of migration to Hungary on the population of Hungarians in source areas

The "third demographic disaster"[6] was a turning point in the development of the population of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. After the Great War, due to artificial intervention in domestic population trends, what had been until then the organic process of population development came to a halt (Tóth 2018). In fact, the present population development of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin is interrelated with this; it is a mutually supportive dual process. One element of this process was continuous population development determined by the fertility of the now ethnically unified Hungarians, modified by mortality. The other element of the process consisted of members of other populations assimilating into the Hungarian population. Within the framework of the "Hungarian Empire," the results of both processes ensured the thriving growth of the Hungarian population beyond the natural rate, which enabled Hungarians to overcome their demographic disasters by 1918.

The role of international migration in population replacement changed after 1918. As a result, the majority of "foreigners" migrating to the country (namely, the migration of Hungarians living in neighboring countries to Hungary) did not increase the number of Hungarians, but only the number of Hungarians living in Hungary (Tóth 2010, 2018).

My aim is to explore how migration into Hungary has shaped and continues to shape Hungarian ethnic spatial structure, the territorial composition of the Hungarian ethnic population, and its proportions in the Carpathian Basin. On the one hand, based on the 2011 population census, I make an estimate at a regional level for those ethnic proportions that would have existed in the neighboring countries in 2011 without migration to Hungary. On the other hand, I calculate how the migration trends between 2011 and 2017 shaped the ethnic structure of Hungarians abroad. I provide an estimate for the changes in the regional ethnic share in 2017 (assuming other ethnicities remained unchanged in number), which took place solely due to migration to Hungary.

The analysis does not cover the migration of Hungarians to neighboring countries; it focuses solely on the migration of the population of those of foreign origin. The 2011 census data of the surrounding countries was the starting point for the estimate. No census has been carried out in Ukraine since 2001;

6 The first demographic disaster was the Tatar invasion; the second was the Turkish occupation; and the third was the Trianon Peace Treaty and the "Great War"; while the fourth was caused by the loss of World War II. Following the 1956 Revolution, there was also a significant loss of population, but this was not as measurable as with the four demographic catastrophes listed above.

therefore, only information from 2001 was available. Instead of all of Ukraine, only Transcarpathia was included in the analysis. The set of questions on ethnicity is not mandatory in the censuses of any of these countries (in Austria and Slovenia no such questions are even asked at all), which makes it difficult to draw an accurate picture of the situation. The territorial distribution of the ethnic Hungarian population of the Carpathian Basin in 2011 – the starting point of my estimates – has been calculated according to the estimations in the literature (Molnár et al. 2005; Kiss et al. 2012; Kapitány 2015; Tóth 2018). I relied on a method created by Balázs Kapitány (Kapitány 2015) to determine the 2011 share of ethnic minorities. The essence of this method is adjusting the number of people who declare their nationality by classifying non-respondents proportionately in the given area according to the proportion of those who declare their ethnicity. This process refines the underestimation of proportions of Hungarians in the censuses of the neighboring countries, but even then, the results still underestimate the real number of Hungarians abroad.

The wider applicability of the results of the process is also limited by several factors. On the one hand, methodological differences can be observed in the practice of census-taking in individual states. On the other, Hungarian censuses may overestimate the proportion of the Hungarian ethnic population within the population of foreign origin (in Hungary it is perhaps easier for the former to declare themselves Hungarian). Thus, in the areas of emigration, it is possible to detect a higher number of Hungarian ethnic migrants than the reality. We do not have a precise picture of the assimilation process in Hungary (for example, if someone belonging to the Romanian ethnic group came to Hungary and later became Hungarian).

Table 3 *Territorial ethnic proportions and changes in the Carpathian Basin, 2011 and 2017*

Country. county in Hungarian	Country, (district. kraj. rayon. okrug. županija) internationally	Population (2011)	Number of Hungarian nationals (2011)	Proportion of Hungarian nationals (2011)	People living in Hungary who were born in the given area. 2011	People living in Hungary who were born in the given area. 2017	Theoretical proportion of Hungarian nationals. 2011*	Territorial differences. 2011 (percentage points)**	Proportion of Hungarian nationals. 2017 (changes due to emigration between 2011 and 2017)	Territorial differences. 2017 (percentage points)***
Romania										
Arad	Arad	430 629	39 298	9.1	4680	6028	10.1	1	8.8	0.3
Besz-terce-Naszód	Bistrita Nasaud	286 225	15 091	5.3	815	1119	5.5	0.2	5.2	0.1
Bihar	Bihor	575 398	147 607	25.7	21936	31160	28.4	2.7	24.4	1.3
Brassó	Brasov	549 217	42 880	7.8	2847	4177	8.3	0.5	7.6	0.2

Fehér	Alba	342 376	15 969	4.7	1601	2123	5.1	0.4	4.5	0.2
Hargita	Harghita	310 867	268 555	86.4	21055	35102	87.3	0.9	85.7	0.7
Hunyad	Hunedoara	418 565	16 976	4.1	3283	4411	4.8	0.7	3.8	0.3
Kolozs	Cluj	691 106	111 420	16.1	17362	19218	18.2	2.1	15.9	0.2
Kovászna	Covasna	210 177	157 062	74.7	8488	16740	75.7	1	73.7	1
Krassó-Szörény	Caras Severin	295 579	3 297	1.1	275	440	1.2	0.1	1.1	0
Máramaros	Maramures	478 659	34 945	7.3	4199	5276	8.1	0.8	7.1	0.2
Maros	Mures	550 846	212 801	38.6	22458	31875	41	2.4	37.6	1
Szatmár	Satu Mare	344 360	121 161	35.2	13922	19790	37.7	2.5	34.1	1.1
Szeben	Sibiu	397 322	11 683	2.9	1374	1643	3.3	0.4	2.9	0
Szilágy	Salaj	224 384	53 011	23.6	5219	8337	25.4	1.8	22.5	1.1
Temes	Timis	683 540	38 812	5.7	3387	3806	6.1	0.4	5.6	0.1
Transylvania. Hungarian/ Romanian borderland		6 789 250	1 290 568	19.0	132901	191245	20.6	1.6	18.3	0.7
Romania. other		19 897 257	17 339	0.1	8182	10814	0.1	0	0.1	0
Romania total		20 121 641	1 307 907	6.5	141083	202059	7.2	0.7	6.2	0.3
Slovakia										
Besztercebánya	Banskoby-strický	660 563	72 752	11.0	3192	3181	11.4	0.4	11	0
Eperjes	Prešovský	814 527	695	0.1	259	318	0.1	0	0.1	0
Kassa	Košický	791 723	80 444	10.2	3927	3980	10.6	0.4	10.2	0
Nagyszombat	Trnavský	554 741	129 997	23.4	4694	4302	24.1	0.7	23.5	-0.1
Nyitra	Nitriansky	689 867	182 386	26.4	11369	10056	27.6	1.2	26.6	-0.2
Pozsony	Brati-slavský	602 436	25 710	4.3	2860	2861	4.7	0.4	4.3	0
Trencsén	Trenčian-sky	594 328	858	0.1	344	310	0.2	0.1	0.2	-0.1
Zsolna	Žilinský	688 851	595	0.1	83	191	0.1	0	0.1	0
Slovakia total		5 397 036	493 437	9.1	26728	25199	9.6	0.5	9.2	-0.1
Serbia										
Észak-Bácska	Severno-bački	186906	80242	42.9	6247	12530	44.8	1.9	40.9	2
Észak-Bánát	Severnoba-natski	147770	72511	49.1	5330	11510	50.8	1.7	46.8	2.3
Dél-Bácska	Južnobački	615371	50347	8.2	4086	6222	8.8	0.6	7.9	0.3
Közép-Bánát	Srednjeba-natski	187667	24779	13.2	1144	2027	13.7	0.5	12.8	0.4
Nyugat-Bácska	Zapadno-bački	188087	18493	9.8	2076	3313	10.8	1	9.2	0.6

Dél-Bánát	Južnobanatski	293730	13882	4.7	494	843	4.9	0.2	4.6	0.1
Szerémség	Sremski	312278	3987	1.3	43	99	1.3	0	1.3	0
Vajdaság	Vojvodina	1931809	264241	13.7	19420	36544	14.5	0.8	12.9	0.8
Serbia. other		5255053	12763	0.2	495	1513	0.2	0	0.3	0.1
Total Serbia		7186862	277004	3.9	19915	38057	4.1	0.2	3.6	0.3
Transcarpathia										
Beregszász	Berehove	80616	53948	66.9	6440	19200	69.4	2.5	60.7	6.2
Huszt	Khust	128824	5511	4.3	1019	2446	5	0.7	3.2	1.1
Ilosva	Irshava	100905	114	0.1	216	650	0.3	0.2	-0.3	0.4
Munkács	Mukachevo	183080	19846	10.8	2630	7199	12.1	1.3	8.6	2.2
Nagyberezna	Velykyi Bereznyi	28211	15	0.1	74	126	0.3	0.2	-0.1	0.2
Nagyszőlős	Vynohradiv	117957	30874	26.2	3035	11503	28	1.8	20.5	5.7
Ökörmező	Mizhhiria	49890	8	0.0	161	223	0.3	0.3	-0.1	0.1
Perecseny	Perechyn	32026	78	0.2	90	175	0.5	0.3	0	0.2
Rahó	Rakhiv	90945	2929	3.2	298	653	3.5	0.3	2.8	0.4
Szolyva	Svaliava	54869	383	0.7	167	327	1	0.3	0.4	0.3
Técső	Tiachiv	171850	4991	2.9	1161	2252	3.6	0.7	2.3	0.6
Ungvár	Uzhhorod	189967	32794	17.3	5396	12257	19.5	2.2	14.2	3.1
Volóc	Volovets	25474	25	0.1	88	162	0.4	0.3	-0.2	0.3
Transcarpathia total		1254614	151516	12.1	20775	57173	13.5	1.4	9.4	2.7
Austria										
Őrvidék****	Burgenland****	286215	10000	3.5	336	2188	3.6	0.1	2.9	0.6
Austria. other		8349150	7270	0.1	1945	7581	0.1	0	0	0.1
Austria total		8635365	17270	0.2	2281	9769	0.2	0	0.1	0.1
Croatia										
Észak-Baranya	Osječko-baranjska	305032	8532	2.8	764	762	3	0.2	2.8	0
Croatia. other		3879775	5516	0.1	1469	1476	0.2	0.1	0.1	0
Croatia. total		4184807	14048	0.3	2233	2238	0.4	0.1	0.3	0
Slovenia										
Muramente	Pomurska	118988	4000	3.4	16	46	3.4	0	3.3	0.1
Slovenia. other		1955192	2243	0.1	354	417	0.1	0	0.1	0

Slovenia total	2074180	6243	0.3	370	463	0.3	0	0.3	0
Hungary									
Hungary total	9937628	9741112	98.0	-	-	98.0	-	-	-
Carpathian Basin									
Total Carpathian Basin (the former Hungarian Kingdom. without the former Croatian Kingdom)	26 020 572	11 963 406	46.0	200 940	313 157	46.0	-	-	-

**: The theoretical rates are those ethnic proportions that would be accurate in any given place if migration to Hungary were non-existent.*
***: The difference in the proportions without emigration and the actual ethnic situation.*
****: The differences in ethnic proportions between 2011 (adjusted) and 2017, taking emigration into account.*
*****: The study focuses solely on the migration of the population of foreign origin. It does not cover the migration of Hungarian-born Hungarians migrating to neighboring countries. The figures listed here are the calculations by Kapitány Balázs (2015).*

In 2011, 26 million people were living in the Carpathian Basin (on the territory of the historic Hungarian Kingdom, not including the former Croatian Kingdom); among them, 12 million – 46% of the people living there – declared themselves Hungarian. In 2011, 201,000 and in 2017, 313,000 (13% of Hungarians living abroad) individuals of Hungarian ethnicity who were born in the other countries of the Carpathian Basin were living in Hungary.

If we look at the entirety of international migration movements in Hungary in what was the country's territory prior to the Treaty of Trianon, we find that about half of the movement would count as internal migration. The consequences of the peace agreements that ended World War I and World War II and cross-border linguistic and cultural relations are still dominant in the migration processes of the Carpathian Basin (Tóth 2005). The data confirms that the migration trend that was occurring before World War I continued, whereby movements from the periphery to the center of the country were characteristic.

It is important to emphasize that migration from neighboring countries to Hungary has a significant influence on the ethnic spatial structure: locally, in the areas of emigration, schooling, labor market, cultural and social opportunities decrease in proportion to the number of Hungarians; ethnic relationships may narrow, and with scattering, assimilation may appear in parallel or become accelerated (Kocsis 2002, 2003, 2006, 2015; Kocsis et al., 2015; Tóth 2018).

According to 2011 data, the proportion of those with Hungarian ethnicity in Transcarpathia decreased mostly due to migration to Hungary (the latter 12.1% would have been 13.5% had 21,000 people not chosen to leave the region). In Transcarpathia, the rajons of Berehove and Uzhhorod were the most affected (the proportion of those with Hungarian ethnicity declined by 2.5 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively).

According to the previous census, without migration to Hungary, 21% of Transylvania's population would be Hungarian; taking into account migration activity, the proportion is now 19%. The most affected counties are Bihor (a 2.7 percentage point difference), Satu Mare (2.5), Mures (2.4), Cluj (2.1). Fifty per cent of Transylvania's Hungarians live in these territories.

In Slovakia in 2011, the proportion of Hungarians recorded in the previous census was 9.1%; without emigration, we would have seen a half-percentage point increase, to 9.6%. Here the biggest drop was in Nitriansky kraj (by 1.2 percentage points). In 2011, 11,000 people born there were already living in Hungary.

In the cases of Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia, there has been no significant change in ethnic spatial structure linked to the migration of the born-abroad Hungarian population. At the same time, nearly 100,000 Hungarians are working for our neighbor in the West, according to Austrian social security data.[7] A minority of this group emigrated from Hungary, while a larger portion were daily commuters. Thus, the overall presence of Hungarian nationals in Austria increased in the period under review.

Examining the period since 2011, it can be concluded that the decline of Transcarpathian Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin as a result of emigration is proportionately the most rapid. In 2017, the proportion of Hungarians was estimated at 9.4%, 2.7 percentage points fewer than the previous figure. The proportion of Hungarians in the Berehove rajon stayed at barely above 60%, in comparison to 66.9% in 2011, if we assume that the share of other ethnicities remained unchanged. At the same time, the relatively favorable demographic situation of Hungarians living in Transcarpathia and emigration in general tended to dampen the ethnic structural shift (Karácsonyi et al., 2014).

In Romania, according to estimates for 2017, the proportion of Hungarians decreased to 6.2% from 6.5% in 2011. This process mostly affected Bihor county, where the proportion of Hungarians declined to 24.4%, while according to the 2011 census, the proportion was over 25.7%.

Due to steady emigration flow from Severnobački and Severnobanatski, the proportion of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina may have decreased from 13.7% in 2011 to 12.9% in 2017.

At the same time, movements of Hungarians from Slovakia into Hungary stopped; instead, return migration was characteristic of this period. As such, the ethnic structure remained unchanged for 2017. The same holds true for the other countries under analysis that have not been mentioned so far.

7 http://www.hauptverband.at/cdscontent/?contentid=10007.754024&viewmode=content

SUMMARY

International migration into Hungary is markedly differentiated into two parts: a global migration effect, and flows between Hungary and its neighboring countries, which date back a long time. The main characteristic of international migration in Hungary is that the largest part of the immigrant population is of Hungarian nationality or speaks Hungarian as their native language. The strength of the linguistic and cultural relations extending beyond the border are the outcome of the peace treaties that ended World War I and World War II.

The reproduction of minorities living in neighboring countries is not just a matter of natural demographic processes. Migration also plays a significant role. Those arriving to Hungary reduce the numbers of the Hungarian population in the place of emigration, where in most cases, regardless of this factor, population loss is also taking place due to natural demographic causes. In turn, where the number of Hungarians is growing, migration in these cases eliminates this growth, at least in part. On the other hand, migration, an age-specific process, influences the socio-economic progress of the source territories through indirect effects (in relation to dependency rates, mean age, economic activity rates, etc.). Migration to Hungary from the other countries of the Carpatian-Basin does not change the total number of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin in the short term. However, in the long term the number of the latter number may decline, since migration has a significant influence on ethnic spatial structure.

Population movements in the late 1980s and early 1990s made it clear that the demographic processes taking place in the Hungarian linguistic community – despite the fragmentation that occurred in 1918, and the nearly 100-year-old process of "distributed development" – can only be fully understood if we examine them together, as a single process. It is important to recognize that demographic processes inside and outside of the current border are similar in nature. Therefore, what we see happening in terms of demographic processes in Hungary is only a part of the wider demographic change of the Hungarian language community, but it is not the same. The target might thus not only be stopping the shrinking of the Hungarian population in Hungary, but also in the Carpathian Basin too. Achieving this is not an easy task, as it may not be in line with the national interest of neighboring countries.

The migration processes described in this study have a significant impact on the ethnic spatial structure and numbers of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin if the numbers of other ethnic groups do not decrease in a similar fashion to that of the Hungarians. Increasing the number of people who stay in their home country and the number of return migrants, along with the fertility rates of local Hungarians could all be partial solutions to the problem. In this way, it may

be realistic to increase the proportion of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin to over 50% again. Currently, the biggest barrier to this process is population loss, which affects the Hungarian population of the Carpathian Basin due to low fertility and high mortality rates.

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PERSONALITY TRAITS, BIOGRAPHICAL VARIABLES, AND ATTITUDES TO MONEY AMONG AUSTRIAN STUDENTS

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ABSTRACT *Previous research in many parts of the world has linked personality traits and biographical variables to certain money-related-attitude factors, while the situation in Austria has hardly been investigated so far. The purpose of this study was to identify possible relations between personality traits, biographical variables (independent variables), and money attitude factors (dependent variables) in Austria.*

In this quantitative study, the NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI, measuring personality traits), the Money Attitude Scale (MAS, measuring money attitudes), as well as self-constructed biographical items were used. Data was collected through an online questionnaire, which was answered by 83 Austrian business education students. The results were analyzed with descriptive and inferential methods.

The personality dimensions "openness to experience" and "agreeableness," as well as the biographical factor "gender," significantly influence the money attitude "power-prestige." The personality dimensions "neuroticism" and "conscientiousness" are significantly associated with the money attitude "anxiety." Thus, gender and certain personality dimensions could act as predictive factors for pronounced power-oriented or anxiety-oriented money attitudes.

KEYWORDS: *money attitudes, personality traits, MAS, NEO-FFI*

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INTRODUCTION

Money (albeit lacking real intrinsic value nowadays) represents countless different objects; it can be exchanged into nearly anything else (Harari 2017). It generates various emotions, meanings, and feelings (e.g. evil, power, achievement, respect, anxiety, freedom, love, and security) in human individuals (Yamauchi – Templer 1982) as it is nowadays considered to represent the "most emotionally meaningful object" in our lives (Krueger 1986).

Research about attitudes to money ("money attitudes") has gained increasing attention over past decades. Two lines of research can be distinguished: One focuses on the development of psychometric instruments for measuring different money attitudes (e.g. Money Attitude Scale, Money Beliefs and Behavior Scale); the other examines the effect of individual differences (e.g. demographic variables or life experiences) as predictors of money attitudes (Lim et al. 2003). Previous research in many parts of the world (primarily in Northern America, Southern America, and Asia) has indicated that age, gender, educational level, and ethnic background could be considered relevant factors for predicting money attitudes (Li et al. 2009). There exists, however, sparse literature with a focus on relevant predictors in Austria (Furtner 2017; Nowak – Pani 2013), the situation which is addressed in this article. The findings are also compared to the results of related articles that focus on potential predictors in other countries.

The goals of this article are (a) to investigate if personality traits (neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness) or biographical variables (gender, age, net income, total budget, household wealth) predict money attitudes (power-prestige, retention-time, distrust, anxiety) for Austrian business education students, and (b) to point out possible implications of these results for business or personal purposes.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows: First, the related literature is summarized and the applied methodology is described. Then, results are presented and discussed. Finally, the article is completed with concluding remarks.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The economic and the psychological view of money

The traditional economic approach defines money as a medium of exchange and as a unit of account based on the axioms of homoeconomicus and the

expected utility model (functional definition). Money further acts as a form of value storage and as the standard of deferred payment. This concept presupposes dispassionate and logical-thinking agents, which in theory strictly aim at utility and profit-maximization in financial matters, e.g. in investment decisions (Furnham – Argyle 2013). Empirical studies about investment decisions show that those basic axioms are constantly violated; e.g. behavioral finance research has indicated the existence of irrational effects like framing and anchoring (Kahneman 2003).

Crucial weaknesses of the homo-economicus and expected-utility models are their disregard for relevant factors concerning the human perception of money and investment decision problems. These concerns influencing biographical factors (e.g. age, education), personality factors (e.g. illusion of control, personality traits), and cognitive factors (e.g. finance-related knowledge) as well as individuals' social networks (Adelt – Feldmann 2017; Günther – Detzner 2009; Harrison 1994; Müller 1995; Wärneryd 2001).

Money attitudes

Individuals generate a stable self-concept (or an identity) which represents a specific image (broader values, attitudes, and specific desires) about themselves (Sommer 2007) during socialization (Furnham et al. 1994; Mohamad et al. 2006). Attitudes are embedded in this self-concept in connection to an individual's emotional position, which is related to internal expectations and valuation, whereby the focus is on persons, ideas, or items (Six 2009). Those experience-based attitudes (states of readiness in a mental and neural context) influence an individual's view of related objects and situations (Allport 1935). They are learned predispositions that emerge as consistent and persistent responses to certain objects, either favorable or unfavorable (Fishbein – Ajzen 1975).

Several meta-analyses have indicated that attitudes are predictors of behavior in some cases, yet not always: The extent of the relationship depends on the attitude-behavior field that is analyzed (Ajzen – Fishbein 2014; Six 2009) and which is influenced by factors like prior experience, accessibility to attitudes, confidence, attitude change, attention, and exposure to information and past behavior (Albarracin et al. 2014). Fazio's MODE-model (motivation, opportunity, determinants) underpins these findings in theory (Ajzen – Fishbein 2014; Fazio 1990; Fazio – Olson 2014).

Attitudes represent multiple dimensions of positive and negative emotions (Medina et al. 1996) linked to money. Such money attitudes that refer either to internal aspects (feelings, strivings, emotions, fantasies, fears, wishes,

distortions, denials, and impulses) or to external forms of valuation (comparison, measurement, reference frame, social status) can be described as follows:

- Money is subjectively evaluated in the eye of the beholder: It is considered to represent status, acts as a measurement of achievement, or may even be perceived as an evil object (McClelland 1967).
- Individuals link money to different feelings, significance, and strivings. It is the emotionally most meaningful object for humans; only food and sex are close competitors (Krueger 1986). A wide range of emotion related nouns like respect, love, anxiety, happiness, helplessness, fear, and distrust are associated with money (Rubinstein 1981).
- Money also acts as a frame of reference when individuals examine their everyday lives (Tang 1992).
- Money attitudes cover social status and personal contentment and they influence individual behavior related to monetary decisions (Taneja 2012).
- Money attitudes are related to our individual fantasies, fears, and wishes. Therefore, money can be linked to distortions and denials; it is connected with our impulses or defense against impulses (Furnham – Argyle 2013).

Money Attitude Scales

Various scales for measuring money attitudes have been developed, while the most relevant contributions reach back to the 1960s (Taneja 2012). Famous examples include the Money Attitude Scale (MAS) (Yamauchi – Templer 1982), the Money Beliefs and Behavior Scale (MBBS) (Furnham 1984), the Money Importance Scale (MIS) and the Money Ethical Scale (MES) (Tang 1992), which have been widely applied in relevant research activities during the last decades (Jhang 2018). Although the abovementioned scales have gained numerous applications recently, a further focus is on reviewing work related to the MAS, and this goal forms one pillar of this research project.

Yamauchi and Templer developed the MAS as a standardized instrument for measuring money attitudes on a seven-point Likert scale. Based on the work of widely accepted psychotherapists and economists (e.g. Freud), three broad content areas of psychological money aspects (security/insecurity, retention, power-prestige) were identified, leading to 62 subsequently developed items. The first scree test indicated five substantive factors, which explained 33.6% of variance (power-prestige, retention-time, distrust, quality and anxiety). After removing the quality dimension from the test (quality items and power-prestige items showed no significant difference), 29 items remained. In total, the MAS showed a Cronbach's α value of 0.77, while retest reliability was measured at 0.88

(Yamauchi – Templer 1982). Later repetitive MAS testing indicated acceptable levels of reliability (Engelberg – Sjöberg 2006).

The characteristics of the four MAS-related factors can be summarized as follows (Blaszczynski – Nower 2010; Yamauchi – Templer 1982):

- Power-Prestige: Money is perceived as a tool of power, which is used to impress and influence others; it also works as a measure of success.
- Retention-Time: The use of money is planned and monitored carefully with a strong future-oriented focus.
- Distrust: Money-related situations are connected with hesitancy, suspicion, and doubt.
- Anxiety: Money acts as a source of anxiety and as a means of the prevention of anxiety.

Although the original MAS was tested on a seven-point Likert scale, five-point Likert scales (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) have also been used in quantitative studies (Chi – Banerjee 2013).

Predictive factors in relation to money attitudes

Regarding money attitudes, the predictive factors age, gender, educational level, and cultural background have been identified (Li et al. 2009). Besides these biographical factors, personality and attitudinal factors are also of relevance (Mitchell – Mickel 1999). The current study focuses on biographical (gender, age, net income, total budget, household wealth) and personality factors (personality traits) as potential predictive factors for money attitudes.

As shown in detail in Appendix A, gender is a strong predictor of money attitudes (e.g., females show a more anxious and males a more power-oriented money attitude). Further predictive biographical factors like income, education, religion, cultural background, age, and occupational background are also presented in Appendix A: For example, cultural differences occur regarding the retention-time factor (Mexican-Americans vs. Anglo-Americans), and a power orientation tends to be stronger for private sector workers (private sector workers vs. governmental employees) (Chi – Banerjee 2013; Furnham 1984; Furnham – Okamura 1999; Hanashiro et al. 2004; Medina et al. 1996; Roberts – Sepulveda 1999; Sabri et al. 2006).

Empirical results (summarized in Appendix B) indicate that personality factors are predictors of financial behavior, which – at least to a certain extent – is influenced by money attitudes (Ajzen – Fishbein 2014; Six 2009): Extraverted individuals are more liable to own shares or have credit card debt. Individuals

with a conscious-pronounced money attitude, in contrast, rather avoid credit card debt (Brown – Tailor 2014). While normal customers tend to focus on the security dimension of money, compulsive spenders show stronger power-oriented money attitudes (Belk 1985; Brown – Taylor 2014; Donnelly et al. 2012; Furnham – Okamura 1999; Hanley – Wilhelm 1992; Lau 1998; Wong – Carducci 1991). Compulsive spending has been found to be influenced by agreeableness and neuroticism (Ratnawat – Borgawe 2019). As most of the studies in this field are based on student samples, the findings are of a suggestive character for the general population (Baker – Hagedorn 2008).

Personality traits

The human personality is the result of stable patterns in the context of actions, feelings, and thoughts. These patterns remain consistent in different situations. Originating from the Big Five approach, which emerged from trait theory, personality can be quantified (McCrae – John 1992 cited after McCrae – Costa 2008). Based on this framework, the standardized NEO-FFI measures the five personality traits/dimensions neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness using a five-point Likert-scale. Furthermore, the NEO-FFI dimensions have been replicated many times in the past and the underlying concept is widely recognized in the scientific community (Borkenau – Ostendorf 2008).

METHODOLOGY

Participants

In order to identify relevant factors that allow us to predict the money attitudes of business education students in Austria, a sample group of 83 students from the Business Education Master's Program at the Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) responded to the three-part online survey in 2017. The sampling procedure was carried out on the basis of a population of 95 master students (only 83 students were available during the testing sessions) with an Austrian sociocultural background. The age of the participants ranged from 22 to 52 years (*Mean* - M_{Age} = 29.12; *Standard Deviation* - SD_{Age} = 7.60), 64 of whom were female. As the master's program represents a special track for students who work full time, employment status ranged from non-working

to fully employed with monthly net incomes (per person) of up to EUR 3,000 ($M_{NetIncome}$ = 1,090.36, $SD_{NetIncome}$ = 744.84). Additionally, the total monthly budget of respondents, including net income and other sources of income (e.g. grants, monetary parental support, or other benefits, M_{Budget} = 1,402.41, SD_{Budget} = 667.31) and household wealth (M_{Wealth} = 90,277.11, SD_{Wealth} = 80,892.18) were queried in EUR.

The sample was not representative for the Austrian population, especially due to the nature of the student sample, the majority of female respondents, and the relatively young age structure of the sample. Moreover, 2017 monthly net income in Austria was about EUR 2,200 per person based on a 12-month basis (Statistik Austria - Bundesanstalt Statistik 2017), which was approximately double the monthly net income of the student sample.

Measures

The German-language online survey was comprised of three parts:

- NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI), 60 items (Borkenau – Ostendorf 2008)
- Money Attitude Scale test (MAS), 29 items, translated from English into German (Yamauchi – Templer 1982)
- Five self-developed biographical items (gender, age, net income, total budget on a monthly basis, household wealth in total)

For this study, a five-point Likert-scale-based MAS (corresponding to the five-point Likert-scale-based NEO Five-Factor Inventory, NEO-FFI) was used for the following reasons:

- The general focus of the standardized MAS allows the broad and comprehensive measurement of individual money attitudes, since it has well-tested validity and high reliability (Blaszczynski – Nower 2010).
- This test has been used on different ethnic samples for decades, whereby its broad applicability has clearly been indicated (Medina et al. 1996; Roberts – Jones 2001). The original MAS was developed based on a sample of the ethnically mixed population in Los Angeles and Fresno (Yamauchi – Templer 1982). Testing in other countries has supported its broad applicability; e.g. in Singapore (Lim – Teo 1997), Mexico (Roberts – Sepulveda 1999), and Sweden (Engelberg – Sjöberg 2006).
- The MAS is in accordance with the Money Beliefs and Behavior Scale (MBBS); both well-recognized tests show highly comparable dimensions of money attitudes (Roberts – Sepulveda 1999).

Statistical methods

First, the sample characteristics were analyzed based on descriptive measures. Next, multiple linear regression analysis (using the ordinary least squares method) was conducted to determine potential predictive factors of money attitudes: To find the most significant relations, the group sequence was varied and regression analyses were processed for each of the four dependent MAS factors. The same test supervisor conducted the survey during five testing sessions, giving standardized instructions each time for the pretested online survey. Total Cronbach's α indicated sufficient internal consistency reliability with values of 0.69 for the MAS and 0.76 for the NEO-FFI (calculated α-values for the individual factors: $\alpha_{Power} = 0.81$, $\alpha_{Retention} = 0.78$, $\alpha_{Distrust} = 0.77$, $\alpha_{Anxiety} = 0.43$, $\alpha_{Neuroticism} = 0.74$, $\alpha_{Extraversion} = 0.68$, $\alpha_{Openness} = 0.78$, $\alpha_{Agreeableness} = 0.77$, $\alpha_{Conscientiousness} = 0.82$).

RESULTS

NEO-FFI results

Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations and minimum/maximum values of the NEO-FFI. Twelve items per dimension (60 in total) on a five-point Likert-scale generated scores ranging from 60 to 300 points maximum (12 points min./60 points max. for each dimension):

Table 1. *NEO-FFI descriptive results*

NEO-FFI Factor	*M*	*SD*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Neuroticism	17.67	6.74	6	37
Extraversion	31.57	5.04	16	40
Openness to Experience	29.42	6.67	13	44
Agreeableness	33.45	5.74	19	43
Conscientiousness	37.10	6.03	21	47

Source: Author's results.

Higher means were found for four factors ($M_{Conscientiousness} = 37.10$, $M_{Agreeableness} = 33.45$, $M_{Extraversion} = 31.57$ $M_{Openness} = 29.42$), while the mean for neuroticism ($M_{Neuroticism} = 17.67$) was significantly lower. The *SD* values of the factors were located within a relatively small range (*SD* = from 5.04 to 6.74).

MAS results

Table 2 presents the descriptive results of the MAS. Based on the five-point Likert scale, the participants could obtain scores from 29 min. to 145 points max.:

Table 2. *MAS descriptive results*

MAS Factor	*M*	*SD*	*Minimum*	*Maximum*
Power-Prestige	17.42	5.44	9	29
Retention-Time	26.23	4.60	13	35
Distrust	18.52	4.68	7	31
Anxiety	15.90	3.22	9	22

Source: Author's results.

Higher means appeared for retention-time ($M_{Retention}$ = 26.23), while lower values for the other factors ($M_{Distrust}$ = 18.52, M_{Power} = 17.42, $M_{Anxiety}$ = 15.90) were revealed. The MAS *SD* values ranged from 3.22 ($SD_{Anxiety}$) to 5.44 (SD_{Power}).

Multiple linear regression results

Multiple linear regression analysis determined the variance for the MAS factors explained by the NEO-FFI factors, gender, age, net income, total budget, and household wealth. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Shapiro-Wilk test (both with *p*-values > 0.05 in most cases) indicated normally distributed data, thus sufficient conditions for regression analysis. Table 3 shows the most significant regression models for each MAS factor:

Table 3. *Linear regression results for each MAS factor*

	Variable β weight (p-value)							
MAS Factor	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**R2**
Power-Prestige	Neurot. 0.16 (0.222)	Extrav. 0.06 (0.610)	Openn. -0.23* (0.033)	Agreea. -0.32** (0.004)	Consc. -0.03 (0.783)	Gender -0.26* (0.027)		0.24
Retention-Time	Neurot. -0.08 (0.542)	Extrav. -0.003 (0.979)	Openn. -0.02 (0.880)	Agreea. -0.07 (0.519)	Consc. 0.19 (0.138)	Gender 0.23 (0.067)		0.11

	Neurot.	Extrav.	Openn.	Agreea.	Consc.	Gender	Age	
Distrust	0.18	-0.12	-0.05	0.003	0.02	-0.21	-0,16	0.14
	(0.201)	(0.297)	(0.669)	(0.977)	(0.888)	(0.090)	(0.176)	
	Neurot.	Extrav.	Openn.	Agreea.	Consc.			
Anxiety	0.53***	0.14	0.11	0.18	0.24*			0.24
	(0.000)	(0.200)	(0.321)	(0.081)	(0.037)			

n = 83
Gender: Male = 0, Female = 1
** p < 0.05, ** p <= 0.01, *** p <0.001 (p-values in parentheses)*
Only the most significant regression model for each MAS factor is shown in the table (without excluded predictors).
Source: Author's results.

The model for power-prestige indicated a highly significant outcome (p_{Power} = 0.001) by explaining 18.4% of total variance using the independent variables openness to experience, agreeableness, and (male) gender ($\beta_{Openness}$ = 0.231*, $p_{Openness}$ = 0.033; $\beta_{Agreeableness}$ = 0.316**, $p_{Agreeableness}$ = 0.004; β_{Gender} = 0.259*, p_{Gender} = 0.027). For anxiety, a highly significant model ($p_{Anxiety}$ = 0.001) explaining 19.3% of the total variance through neuroticism and conscientiousness was found ($\beta_{Neuroticism}$ = 0.530***, $p_{Neuroticism}$ = 0.000; $\beta_{Conscientiousness}$ = 0.237*, $p_{Conscientiousness}$ = 0.037). None of the tested regression models for the dependent retention-time and distrust dimensions indicated significant relationships (lowest $p_{Retention}$ = 0.149, $R^2_{Retention}$ = 4.4 %; lowest $p_{Distrust}$ = 0.110, $R^2_{Distrust}$ = 6.0 %). Extraversion, age, net income, total budget, and household wealth did not show any predictive power in relation to money attitudes either.

Comparison of Results

Table 4 compares the NEO-FFI results (means) with the German population-representative NEO-FFI-sample (n = 871) and a comparable sample group (n = 77) of Austrian business education graduates (Borkenau – Ostendorf 2008; Nowak – Pani 2013):

Table 4. *NEO-FFI comparison of results (with NEO-FFI-sample and Austrian study)*

NEO-FFI Factor	Austrian Study 2017 *M*	Austrian Study 2013 *M*	German NEO-FFI-sample 2008 (Population-representative) *M*
Neuroticism	17.67	12.12	20.99
Extraversion	31.57	32.22	26.88
Openness to Experience	29.42	30.35	29.47
Agreeableness	33.45	35.91	30.45
Conscientiousness	37.10	40.04	32.61

Source: Author's results and data adapted from Borkenau – Ostendorf 2008; Nowak – Pani 2013.

In the German population-representative sample, participants showed more neurotic personalities (+ 3.32 points) and lower values for extraversion (-4.69), agreeableness (-3.00), and conscientiousness (-4.49). Only slight differences were found in comparison with the Austrian study of 2013 with the exception of the neuroticism mean values (-5.55 lower in the comparison study).

In addition, the MAS results of this study were compared to an US-study (n = 224) that used a sample of bicultural college students (Chi – Banerjee 2013) in Table 5:

Table 5. *MAS results comparison (with US-study)*

MAS Factor	Austrian Study 2017 *M*	US Study 2013 *M*
Power-Prestige	17.42	18.58
Retention-Time	26.23	22.89
Distrust	18.52	20.47
Anxiety	15.90	18.07

Source: Author's results and data adapted from Chi – Banerjee 2013.

The results in this study agree well with those of the comparable study; yet it is remarkable that the Austrian students in this sample were more strongly focused on future-oriented retention-time (+ 3.34) and less on anxiety-oriented (-2.17) money attitudes, possibly as a result of the different sample compositions and cultural backgrounds.

DISCUSSION

The aim of this article was to investigate if personality traits or biographical variables predict money attitudes. In Figure 1, the significant multiple linear regression results are summarized.

The results for power-prestige suggest that experience-opened and agreeableness-oriented personalities focus less on the power-prestige dimension of money. Those individuals tend less to use money to influence and impress other people. Moreover, males (in contrast to females) rather perceive money as an instrument for showing power-prestige, a finding which is well supported by past studies (Chi – Banerjee 2013; Furnham 1984; Furnham – Okamura 1999; Medina et al. 1996).

Regarding anxiety, the results indicate that individuals with a neurotic and a conscientious personality structure rather recognize money as a source of

anxiety as well as a source of anxiety protection, supporting the results of an earlier study about credit card debt (Brown – Taylor 2014). Certain MAS items measure the function of money as a source of anxiety protection (Blaszczynski – Nower 2010): For example, one MAS item asks if a participant becomes nervous in the case of a lack of money (Yamauchi – Templer 1982). Thus, having enough money at their disposal reduces anxiety-related feelings (like nervousness) for such individuals.

Figure 1. *Multiple linear regression results - overview*



Two partially conflicting perspectives (consumer and business) can be derived from the study results. One consumer implication concerns awareness about individually harmful financial behavior: Pronounced openness to experience and low anxiety personalities, as well as male gender, suggest a power-prestige-oriented money attitude. The presence of these predictors indicates a perception of money that could lead to problematic financial behavior like purchasing unaffordable luxury goods or excessive indebtedness. Also, less pronounced money dimensions, particularly retention-time, might potentially lead to problematic behavior such as not starting an adequate private pension. Therefore, developing awareness about individual risk factors (through an evaluation of predictors of money attitude from an individual viewpoint) and people's own money attitude framework could lead to more sustainable individual financial behavior.

For business purposes, sales and marketing strategies could be developed based on customer-specific money attitudes or on relevant predictors of money attitudes. This, most obviously, already seems to be the case in the finance

industry. For example, marketing activities related to consumer credit or investment products are oriented towards individuals with different money attitudes. Additionally, predictive factors (e.g. gender, certain personality traits) could be included in marketing strategies.

An unexpected implication of this study may be the characterization of a business-education-teacher personality, which is less neurotic and more extrovert, agreeable and conscientious compared to that of the average citizen.

There exist, however, some limitations of this study. Even though well-tested and broadly accepted scientific tests were used, the instruments have limited explanatory power. The factor analysis indicated that about one-third of a personality can be explained through the NEO-FFI factors (Borkenau – Ostendorf 2008). Additionally, the MAS factors comprise about 33.60 % of the explanatory power of total variance (Yamauchi – Templer 1982). The relatively homogeneous business education student sample cannot be considered representative of the Austrian population. Student samples (of different study directions) were used in most comparable studies (Baker – Hagedorn 2008), which allow comparison to a certain extent. The relatively small sample size might affect the robustness of the multiple linear regression results, as power analysis results suggest a minimum sample size of about 90 to 100 participants for this study design (Hemmerich 2020). Moreover, all significant multiple linear regression models (adjusted R^2 values) explain less than 20.0 % of the total variance of the particular dependent variable (power-prestige, anxiety), leaving about 80.0 % of the influence unverified. Other empirical evidence suggests the existence of additional independent factors such as work background, socio-economic- and educational level, geographical origin, as well as social, political and religious values (Medina et al. 1996).

CONCLUSION

Studies in various countries show the influence of personality traits and biographical variables on money attitude factors, while comparable research results for Austria are scarce. In this Austrian study, individuals who high scored in the power-prestige dimension tended to recognize money as an instrument for impressing and influencing other people; for them, money embodies a symbol of success (Yamauchi – Templer 1982). Males and individuals with a less experience-opened and less agreeable personality focused more strongly on the power-prestige dimension of money. In contrast, neurotic and high conscientious personalities showed distinct anxiety-oriented money attitudes.

The Austrian study results partly confirm outcomes from other parts of the world; i.e. that males tend to focus more strongly on the power-prestige dimension than females (Chi – Banerjee 2013; Furnham 1984; Furnham – Okamura 1999; Medina et al. 1996), and conscientious individuals tend to show anxiety-related money attitudes (Brown – Taylor 2014). Causal relationships between finance-related independent factors (i.e. net income, total budget, household wealth) and money attitudes, in contrast to other study results (Furnham 1984; Roberts – Sepulveda 1999), could not be verified.

Future research should examine the role of the additional money attitude predictors which have been identified in other studies, or which are still unidentified. Replicating the study in Austria using larger and different sample groups (e.g. employees from different sectors or retirees) could strengthen the results of this study and uncover additional causal relationships. Further longitudinal studies could provide insights into changes in individual money attitudes over time.

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APPENDIX A

Table 6. *Biographical factors as predictors of money attitudes*

Study	Results
Furnham 1984 Great Britain (n = 256) MBBS	Gender and Protestant work ethic beliefs influence money obsession and beliefs regarding effort/ability in relation to obtaining money. Females who display a Protestant work ethic beliefs tend to show higher money obsession and higher ability/effort scores. Low-income individuals relate money accumulation less to effort/ability. Those individuals tend also not to perceive money as a tool for influencing others and they are less obsessed with money. Better educated females show a more conservative and retentive money attitude.
Furnham – Okamura 1999 *Great Britain* *(n = 267)* *Money Pathology Scales (among other scales)*	Women avoid moral risks regarding money. Also, women tend to believe that money is not made only through chance. Men perceive money in a more materialistic way and less negatively than women. Religious people believe that money is obtained through hard work and ability. Furthermore, they avoid moral risks regarding money.
Chi – Banerjee 2013 *United States* *(n = 224)* *MAS*	Females show a more anxious and worrisome attitude to money. Moreover, for female study participants it was harder to pass up a sale. Differences were found between department store shopping (influenced by anxiety) and online shopping (influenced by power-prestige).
Roberts – Sepulveda 1999 Mexico (n = 274), MAS	The money attitude factor power-prestige is influenced by age and occupation. Younger people and unemployed study participants tend to perceive money as a tool for influencing and impressing others. High-income individuals and better educated individuals rather concentrate on financial future planning. Older study participants show more money anxiety.
Hanashiro et al. 2004 United States/Japan (n = 208 + 170) MBBS	Cultural differences (between Asian American and Japanese people) and gender differences were found: Money attitudes are formed in relation to other people and money is closely linked to personality and power (Asian Americans). Japanese study participants showed a stronger saving attitude. Males focus on the power dimension of money and they value money more. Females rather concentrate on the saving dimension of money.
Medina et al. 2004 United States (n = 6,863), MAS	Cultural differences (between Mexican-Americans and Anglo-Americans) were investigated: Anglo-Americans show higher values regarding the retention-time and quality factors. No differences were identified regarding the power-prestige, distrust, and anxiety factors.

Sabri et al. 2006 Malaysia (n = 120) MBBS	Differences between gender and government/private work sector were analyzed: Private sector workers connect money with power and high social status. Governmental employees score higher in the retention dimension. Furthermore, they showed a more cautious money attitude. Males tend to focus on the power dimension of money attitude.

Source: Adapted from Chi – Banerjee 2013; Furnham 1984; Furnham – Okamura 1999; Hanashiro et al. 2004; Medina et al. 1996; Roberts – Sepulveda 1999; Sabri et al. 2006.

APPENDIX B

Table 7. *Personality factors as predictors of money attitudes*

Study	Results
Lau 1998 China (3 studies) (n = 378, n = 467, n = 1463)	Money attitudes are developed through socialization. Children of a young age (five or six years old) do not yet connect money to attitudes. Later, moralistic and evaluative components are linked to money. Personal characteristics (especially values) influence the money attitudes of an individual.
Hanley – Wilhelm 1992 *United States* *(n = 100 + 43)*	Differences between normal customers and compulsive spenders were analyzed: Normal customers show higher self-esteem values and they focus on the security dimension of money. On the contrary, compulsive spenders score higher in the money obsession, power, retention, and inadequacy dimensions.
Brown – Taylor 2014 *Great Britain* *(n = 2595 + 1966)*	The relationship between personality traits and household finances was investigated between a group of single- and a group of couple households: Extraverted persons rather tend to hold shares. Also, extraverted people in the sample group showed a tendency to hold credit card debt. On the contrary, money-conscious people rather avoid credit card debt. A high agreeableness personality score is linked with a higher probability of owning shares.
Wong – Carducci 1991 United States (n = 233)	The general personal risk attitude was investigated in this study: High-risk seekers also show high-risk behavior in relation to everyday money matters.
Furnham – Okamura 1999 Great Britain (n = 256)	Especially negative emotions (helplessness, depression, fear, anxiety) are linked with money. Negative money emotions tend to cause money pathologies.

Belk 1985 United States (2 studies) (n = 338, n = 99)	A negative relationship exists between a materialistic attitude and happiness in life.
Donnelly et al. 2012 United States (2 studies)	Low conscientiousness as well as a strong belief in the relationship between material things and happiness are linked to poor money management in the sample group.

Source: Adapted from Belk 1985; Brown – Taylor 2014; Donnelly et al. 2012; Furnham – Okamura 1999; Hanley 1992; Lau 1998; Wong – Carducci 1991.

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WHAT DO BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS DO?

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ABSTRACT *This article provides a review of the literature on business associations (BAs) in line with the following questions: (1) What are the economic roles of BAs, (2) How are BAs institutionalized, and (3) What drives BAs to engage in socially beneficial or harmful activities? Challenging the popular distinction between beneficial, market-supporting and harmful, rent-seeking (lobbying) goals of BAs, we demonstrate that there are three major economic roles of BAs, all of which can involve activities linked to the private order and the public order, and all of which can be socially beneficial or harmful. We also challenge the proposition that institutional strength is needed for BAs to fulfil beneficial economic roles, highlighting that BAs have three main institutional functions, and the level of institutionalization of each of the functions can be different in relation to their beneficial economic roles. We suggest that whether BAs tend toward engage in in socially beneficial or harmful activities depends on their private-order and public-order institutional limitations.*

KEYWORDS: *business associations, institutional order, collective action, trade associations, industry associations*

INTRODUCTION

What do business associations do? For a long time, economists viewed BAs as "interest groups" engaged in rent-seeking by influencing public decisions (Ekelund − Tollison, 2001). As for their functioning, the crucial question

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appeared to be whether they could develop appropriate internal incentives for overcoming free-riding and promoting collective action. As Olson famously argued (Olson, 1971), for larger groups this typically meant the introduction of "selective incentives" for participation by a "political entrepreneur." In the 1990s, scholars in the "new institutional" tradition started to challenge this received view (Greif, 2008), leading to the explicit attack mounted in a pair of articles by Doner and Schneider (Doner − Schneider, 2000; Schneider − Doner, 2000). The former authors argued and illustrated using several examples that business associations pursue many other goals besides "rent-seeking."

What do BAs actually do? Empirical studies based on the subjective evaluations of stakeholders have demonstrated the importance of several distinct activities of BAs in different contexts, but have not led to clear conclusions (Battisti − Perry, 2015; Bennett, 1998; Bennett − Ramsden, 2007; McCormick et al., 2008; Rochlitz, 2016; Yakovlev et al., 2014). We suggest that the contradictory nature of such empirical results is explained by business associations fulfilling various economic roles that are relevant to a different extent in different contexts. Furthermore, the same activity may fulfil different economic roles at the same time, such as is the case with providing information to policy makers to obtain benefits for an industry. There can also be significant differences between the economic roles observed by those participating in collective action, and the actual effects of collective action (Ville, 2007).

The standard approach of most studies has been to look at the *presence of certain activities* or the *presence of certain outcomes related to these activities.* Our goal is not to argue for any specific theory of BA functionality. Instead, we employ a model approach, in which we suggest starting with an analysis of the institution and its main goals, and then structuring the manifold activities that are identifiable along these lines. This article provides a review of the literature on BAs within a new conceptual framework. Its goals are twofold: (1) to highlight the common features of these diverse institutions and what we know about them, and (2) to challenge two widespread propositions about their economic roles.

Our starting point is that the main research question should be divided into three further sub-questions:

1. What are the economic roles of BAs?
2. How are BAs institutionalized in order to fulfil their economic roles?
3. What drives BAs to engage in socially beneficial or harmful activities?

Following these lines of questioning, we provide some structure for our knowledge about the subject, point out the gaps therein, and identify potentially fruitful directions for future research, while challenging two widespread propositions about the economic roles of BAs.

In section two, we provide a conceptualization of BAs as an umbrella term for private, formalized, non-commercial organizations that are intended to further the business interests of their members. We highlight the position of BAs as planned, private-order institutions positioned in-between spontaneous and public-order institutions.

In section three we deal with our first question by providing a typology of the many economic roles of BAs based on how they contribute to fulfilling their basic goals. Following a review of the literature in this area, we seek to challenge the widespread distinction between the beneficial-, market-supporting- and the harmful-, rent-seeking/lobbying goals of BAs by demonstrating that *(1) all of the studied economic roles of BAs can involve activities linked to the private-order and the public-order*, and that *(2) all of the studied economic roles can be linked to both socially beneficial and harmful activities*.

Section four reviews our knowledge in relation to the second question concerning institutionalization. We suggest that BAs have three basic institutional functions in relation to solving collective action problems: (1) information-sharing, (2) rule-articulation, and (3) incentivizing compliance. These institutional functions can be institutionalized at different levels, constituting four distinct ideal types of institutional forms of BAs: (1) intermediary, (2) associational governance, (3) self-regulation, and (4) co-regulation. Reviewing the literature from this perspective, we challenge Doner − Schneider's (2000) claim that a business association needs a certain level of institutional strength to be able to fulfil beneficial, "market-supporting" economic roles by demonstrating that *beneficial contributions are possible at each of the different levels of institutionalization in relation to each of the economic roles of BAs*.

Section five structures our rather limited knowledge about the topic of the third question. We propose that whether BAs institutionalize socially beneficial economic roles depends on the institutional incentives by which they are affected. Five main drivers of the beneficial roles of BAs emerge from the scarce evidence. Private-order constraints on BAs include (1) market pressure on the membership of BAs, (2) internal governance solutions to principal-agent problems, and (3) the competition between BAs and other similar institutions. Public-order constraints of BAs depend on (4) political accountability, and (5) the monitoring capabilities of public-order institutions.

Section six concludes and points out what we consider the most important avenues for further research on BAs.

THE NATURE OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

The main features of BAs

There are many related concepts used in political economy for the institutionalized collective action of businesspeople: business-, professional-, sectoral-, and industrial associations, all sorts of entrepreneurial and rotary clubs, as well as chambers of commerce belong to this group. We adopt Prüfer's (2016) synthesis of earlier definitions, whereby *business associations are [considered] private, formalized, non-commercial organizations, intended to further the business interests of their members*. BAs are private institutions, based at least partially on the voluntary cooperation of their members. They include semi-voluntary or mandatory membership organizations if these also institutionalize voluntary cooperation, and thus are not entirely public-order, governmental institutions. BAs are formalized institutions, which means that they have their own rules about membership and decision-making, and are long-term structures in contrast to ad-hoc coalitions of business collective action (Doner − Schneider, 2000, p. 280).

Since BAs are intended to further the business interests of certain groups of businesses, they are distinctive in relation to the business communities that exist behind these organized interests (Saitgalina et al., 2016). Business communities can be defined by their common knowledge base, common interests or common values, and goals. The former can result from (1) being engaged in similar occupations or in similar markets and industries, (2) being embedded in similar institutional orders due to geographical proximity, or by (3) belonging to similar communities outside of business, such as religious or political groups. The three dimensions can intersect in various ways, defining various forms of associations. Associations can be linked to specific occupations (professional associations), industries and interests (industry, trade and cluster associations), or the broad occupational group of entrepreneurship (entrepreneurial associations and business clubs). They might involve underlying value-based communities, such as Christian business clubs or Lions clubs. They can be local clubs, regional or national associations, or even international or global associational confederations. In our review, we use the term *business association* for all the above institutions insofar as they fit our criteria.

BAs as planned private-order institutions

Business associations are planned, private-order institutions positioned somewhere between spontaneous and planned public-order institutions (Greif, 2008). This means that BAs build upon the spontaneous private order of markets and communities, but are also able to overcome some of the limitations of the former due to their planned nature. They also differ from public-order institutions in that they are private, voluntary institutions. This position means that BAs are bridging organizations that connect informal community structures to the formal public-order. Their economic roles are determined by the limitations of each alternative, but they can also build upon the resources of their informal base or their public-order relations. The distinguishing feature of BAs among planned, private institutions is that they feature a separate, non-commercial form of central organization and multilateral relations, instead of bilateral relations structured by a profit-oriented central actor (Lindberg et al., 1991).

THE ECONOMIC ROLES OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

Business associations as rent-seeking

A widespread approach in the literature distinguishes between the beneficial, market-supporting and the harmful, rent-seeking role of BAs, the latter which is often associated with lobbying (Battisti − Perry, 2015; Duvanova, 2013; Marques, 2017; Sukiassyan − Nugent, 2011; Ville, 2007). We suggest that it is perhaps better to approach the issue starting with the understanding of BAs as institutions intended to further the goals of a business community. This means that BAs are inherently "rent-seeking" institutions in the broad sense that their basic goal is to increase the economic rent of a community of firms.

In the broader economic sense, rents are returns in excess of the opportunity costs of resources spent on an activity (Tollison, 1982). Rent-seeking as the pursuit of economic rent thus understood is the essential driving force behind all economic activity. In this sense, rent-seeking is not necessarily a negative term, as rents can be obtained by value-creating activities such as developing a new product or reducing production costs. Such innovative rent-seeking activities lead to increased market power and higher returns or lower opportunity costs, increasing the innovator's economic rent.

Rent-seeking in its public-choice sense generally refers to non-value-creating, redistributive ways of obtaining economic rent. Classic examples include

increasing market power through reducing competition through entry barriers, and seeking transfers from other groups by influencing public decisions (Tollison, 2012). These activities redistribute rents from other individuals instead of creating new value, and are therefore harmful to society in that they lead to wasted economic effort. We can associate the socially beneficial economic roles of BAs with value-creating, rent-seeking activities, while their socially harmful activities are those aimed at redistributive rent-seeking.

By reviewing the economic roles that business associations fulfil from this perspective, we seek to illustrate that *it is possible for both "market-supporting" and "lobbying" types of activities to represent beneficial, value-creating and harmful, redistributive rent-seeking.* In order to do this, we demonstrate – based on previous studies – that *(1) all of the studied economic roles of BAs can involve activities linked to the private-order and the public-order*, and that *(2) all of their economic roles can contribute to both value-creating and redistributive rent-seeking.*

There are three main types of economic role, defined by the three ways through which BAs can contribute to value-creating rent-seeking. The first type may be called the *vertical economic role,* because it is mainly concerned with transactions along the value chain. This economic role enables more value-creating transactions by reducing transaction costs and protecting the rents obtained from those transactions. The second type may be called a *horizontal economic role*, because it concerns the cooperation that occurs within business communities aimed at securing public goods for themselves. These public goods contribute to value-creating rent-seeking by lowering costs and enabling innovative economic activities. The third type is that of the *external economic role,* as it is concerned with the relations of business communities to other social groups. By contributing to the resolution of social conflict, it enables the community to protect its economic rent. We do not consider redistributive rent-seeking to be a separate economic role of BAs, but instead propose that any of the economic roles of the latter can involve redistributive elements, if the institutional context allows this.

Vertical economic role: enabling more value-creating transactions

BA activities in the first group are defined by their economic role in improving the transactional order of the business community. These concern vertical relationships along value chains that may be found inside or outside the community. While the other economic roles of BAs also contribute to better

functioning markets, in the former cases collective action directly enables value-creating transactional solutions.

Protecting property rights

BAs have an economic role as private, planned, coercion-constraining institutions (Greif, 2008). By sanctioning breaches of property rights, such as public expropriation or violent takeover of assets, these activities increase the incentive of private actors to invest in economic activities, thus enabling more complex forms of cooperation (Duvanova, 2007, 2013; Hedberg, 2011; Pyle, 2011; Rochlitz, 2016; Yakovlev et al., 2014). Association activities related to this economic role include spreading information about violations of rights, coordinating sanctions against violators through suspending transactions (Kazun, 2015), and pressuring the government to guarantee property rights (Mikamo, 2013).

Reducing transaction costs

The other basic transaction-enabling role of BAs involves reducing transaction costs. Business associations may help lower transaction costs in a variety of ways (Recanatini − Ryterman, 2001), resulting in more value-creating transactions. These can include lowering search costs by providing information about potential partners, lowering bargaining costs by coordinating common contractual frameworks, or lowering enforcement costs by improving existing contract enforcement mechanisms or institutionalizing new ones.

By providing platforms for information-sharing and the development of informal ties, associations reduce the cost associated with finding business partners, as well as the cost of contracting (De Clercq et al., 2010). Associations contribute to increasing credible commitment in contractual relationships by both improving the spread of information about rule-breakers and helping coordinate sanctions against them (McMillan − Woodruff, 2000). These institutions can enable decentralized, reputation-based contract enforcement (Prüfer, 2016; Pyle, 2005, 2006b), as well as reduce the costs associated with formal contract enforcement through offering arbitration services. Sanctioning opportunism can be expected to increase the credibility of both members' promises and promises made to members (Johnson et al., 2002). BAs can also institutionalize professional and ethical regulations for dealing with reputation commons (Barnett, 2006). Similarly to the case of credible commitments, business

associations contribute to the latter through facilitating information sharing, which enables third-party or community enforcement, or by institutionalizing this enforcement themselves (Lenox − Nash, 2003).

Horizontal economic roles: providing public goods

BAs can facilitate the provision of public goods, enabling more value-creating transactions through reducing costs and encouraging innovative business activity.

Maintaining the knowledge base of the community

Associations can play various economic roles in relation to the provision of knowledge required for a business community. Firms can organize and co-fund training and certification activities through business associations (Maennig et al., 2015; McCormick et al., 2008). This helps to overcome the free-rider problem inherent in the spread of on-the-job training and non-specific, transferable knowledge, as firms can funnel-in employees from other companies who have invested in knowledge, leading to low-effort equilibrium. An important aspect of business associations' capacity for spurring innovation is their ability to foster information sharing, whether through channeling scientific results into the professional community (Luna − Tirado, 2008) or through developing networks (Schwartz − Bar-El, 2015). Due to knowledge spillover effects, participants in these networks have positive external effects on each other (De La Maza-Y-Aramburu et al., 2012).

The successful participation of professionals in the exploratory processes of innovation and governance requires more than gathering and applying information. Business associations can create the institutional settings for the development of professional identities, shared intellectual foundations, and professional solutions, all of which are required for the successful adaptation of an industry to changing conditions (Greenwood et al., 2002; Nordqvist et al., 2010). Mike (2017) applies Michael Polányi's (1951) concept of *intellectual order* to conceptualize the underlying institutionalized communities behind an industry or profession. An intellectual order entails more than information sharing, as it institutionalizes a shared search for truth in the form of professional solutions, new ideas, and the ethos of professionalism, as well as mediating between industry and related intellectual fields of science and technology.

Joint provision of infrastructure

By collectively developing and maintaining infrastructure, BAs can take advantage of external economies of scale without having to give up their autonomy (Kingsbury − Hayter, 2006). This allows them to reduce their costs, leading to higher economic rent. Examples include jointly organized, capital-intensive R&D activities (Lamberg et al., 2017), as well as maintaining shared sales infrastructure (Hashino − Kurosawa, 2013; McNamara, 1993).

External economic roles: Coordinating solutions to social conflicts

In such cases, collective action goes beyond the direct goals of the business community and involves coordinating relations with other groups in order to protect rent, or to obtain external resources. Social conflicts arise from differences between the economic rationality of the business community and the goals of other social groups. Conflicts can be resolved by engaging with the other stakeholders directly or through government policy.

Resolving social conflicts

BAs can be used for resolving conflicts that arise from the external effects of the business community's activities on other social groups. Marques (2017) provides a recent review of the social-responsibility-related activities of BAs. These might allow for structured engagement and bargaining with stakeholders (Dickson − Arcodia, 2010), defining and enforcing professional standards for dealing with external effects (Font et al., 2019; King − Lenox, 2000), or generating self-regulation that helps maintain a shared social reputation (King et al., 2002; Tucker, 2008).

Coordinating involvement in (development-, economic-, social-, etc.) policies

Business associations can be involved in the formulation and implementation of various government policies. Areas such as development policy (Hashino − Kurosawa, 2013) and economic stabilization policies (Schneider − Doner, 2000) may benefit from the involvement of private institutions. Associations can also aggregate the opinions of their members and transmit them to policymakers. This contributes to the public good of having more informed, higher quality

policies (Chappin et al., 2008). Business associations can help with overcoming horizontal coordination problems associated with economic development, such as the acceptance of technological and quality standards (Schneider − Doner, 2000). These coordination activities do not necessarily replace market competition, but are able to elevate it to new levels (Berk − Schneiberg, 2005).

Redistributive rent-seeking

There are four ways for BAs to engage in redistributive rent-seeking, none of which necessarily involve lobbying or even engaging with the public-order, as they can also rely on the private-order.

BAs can be platforms for (1) *collusive practices,* whereby firms reduce competition through agreements (McMillan − Woodruff, 2000, pp. 3, 38). Reduced competition leads to redistribution from potential entrants and consumers. Collusive practices can be organized under the pretense of any joint activities, but they are most relevant for economic roles that involve horizontal coordination, whether for providing public goods or for resolving external conflict. Collusion can also result from the coordination of contractual rules, which belongs to the transaction cost-reducing role. These arrangements can only be stable if entry barriers are present or entrants are incentivized to join such agreements. (2) *Entry barriers* are mainly related to ethical and professional self-regulation, which are elements of vertical and external economic roles.

Both collusion and self-regulation require selective benefits to become stabilized, while these benefits themselves can lead to (3) *exclusive institutional orders* (Johansson − Elg, 2002). When property rights or contracts are only selectively enforced, or access to public goods and external mediation is selectively provided, this can lead to entry barriers for agents external to BAs, therefore lessening competition. The intellectual orders of business communities can also be barriers to change if they are closed in nature (Mike, 2017), thereby protecting the entrenched interests of incumbents, instead of supporting more efficient solutions. Selective access to resources can be based on any of the listed economic roles, if they are allowed to become exclusive in their institutionalization.

The textbook case of redistribution involves (4) *coercion* in relation to obtaining resources from other groups, which in contemporary polities is exercised through the state. In the absence of an effective public order, mafia-like BAs can extract resources directly from other groups through private-order coercion. Redistribution through coercion is mostly related to the external economic roles of BAs, but it can also involve activities linked to protecting property rights.

HOW ARE BAs INSTITUTIONALIZED?

Doner − Schneider (2000) propose that there is a relationship between the beneficial contributions of BAs and their institutional strength, claiming that a certain level of institutionalization is needed for a business association to be able to fulfil beneficial, "market-supporting" economic roles. While it is true that associations at different levels of institutionalization contribute in different ways, the relationship does not seem to be that straightforward. It is perhaps better to approach the question from the perspective of the institutional functions underlying the economic roles of BAs. We distinguish three institutional functions of BAs, and propose that each of them can be institutionalized at different levels, constituting four typical institutional forms. From a review of the literature regarding this approach, we seek to demonstrate that *beneficial contributions related to each of the economic roles of BAs are possible at each of the different levels of institutionalization.*

How can BAs contribute?

How can BAs contribute to solving the various collective-action problems in which they are involved? Collective-action problems generally require institutional solutions, and different levels of the former require different levels of institutional arrangements to support stable cooperative solutions. Pure coordination problems only require the institutionalization of common knowledge that is created among actors. Coordination problems with a conflictual element require some form of institutionalized rules of compensation. Rules in this context can be defined as *"shared understandings by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions or outcomes are required, prohibited, or permitted"* (Ostrom, 2005, p. 18). Prisoner's-dilemma type problems require the institutionalization of rules and sanctions in order to overcome free-riding concerns.

BAs can contribute to each of these institutional solutions by supporting any of the three main institutional functions that are involved: information-sharing for the creation of common knowledge, rule-articulation for defining compensatory institutions and creating focal points which increase commitment to solutions, and institutionalizing sanctions for incentivizing compliance with rules.

Information-sharing

BAs can institutionalize information-sharing by (1) providing a forum for their community, (2) sharing information themselves as central intermediaries, (3) structuring and formalizing information-sharing, and (4) incentivizing structured information sharing by community members. These activities allow community members to become aware of collective action problems, the actors involved in collective problems, and the goals of stakeholders who are involved. This institutional function does not change the set of stable solutions that are available, but reduces the costs associated with coordinating solutions and incentivizing compliance through other institutional mechanisms through equalizing the information available to each actor.

Rule-articulation

BAs can contribute to rule-articulation at various levels. They can (1) provide a common platform for members to articulate rules, (2) institutionalize rule-articulation to provide common processes, or (3) provide formalized ways of defining rules. These functions allow community members to better coordinate solutions to collective problems without changing the set of stable solutions itself, and by institutionalizing focal points for harmonizing expectations about what others are going to do.

Incentivizing compliance

To incentivize compliance with rules, BAs can either (1) improve the functioning of sanctions provided by other institutions, or (2) institutionalize their own associational sanctions. By incentivizing compliance, BAs can modify the set of stable solutions that is available for managing collective action problems.

Levels of BA institutionalization

Based on the analysis of institutional functions in the previous section, we can derive four distinct institutional forms of BA. These theorized forms are ideal types. Although subsequent levels build on each other, the order reflects the level of institutionalized collective action, not a development path. Several

different forms might co-exist within the same community. The following subsections describe each ideal type in terms of the institutionalization of each of the three institutional functions, while Table 1 provides an overview of the four institutional forms.

Intermediary association

The first level of institutionalization corresponds roughly to what Galambos (1966) in his theory of BA institutionalization called a "dinner-club association." An information intermediary BA provides a platform for sharing information that "greases the gears" of other institutional mechanisms. It provides no formal rules or incentives at the BA level, instead relying on those provided by other institutions. It is useful for harmonizing beliefs and expectations within and around the business community that foster spontaneous contract enforcement mechanisms based on ethics, social norms, and reputation, or for facilitating information to and from public-order institutions in order to improve their functioning. Information intermediaries do not create stable solutions to collective action problems themselves, but might reduce the transaction costs of coming up with and maintaining solutions.

Associational governance

In addition to sharing information, associational governance means that common rules are articulated at the BA level. Associational governance is exercised through a process of structured bargaining (Ville, 2007), which means that it is not self-regulation yet, as at this level the BA itself does not institutionalize sanctions related to compliance. It rather contributes to harmonizing expectations about what actions are considered right within the community, and providing focal points for solving collective action problems, without changing the incentive structure of a situation itself. Its economic role as a rule-setting platform provides a BA with a natural central position as an information-sharing institution as well.

Self-regulation

The term "self-regulation" is often used to mean solutions at any of the first three levels of institutionalization. For our purposes, we define a self-

regulatory association as one in which, in addition to information-sharing and rule-articulation, incentivizing compliance with the rules of the community is also institutionalized at the associational level. This requires the BA not only to articulate but also to formalize common rules and create sanctions at the BA level that are backed by their own selective incentives. These incentives are tied either directly to rule-compliance or to membership itself, with membership being tied to rule-compliance. This allows the self-regulatory BA to change the payoff structure of collective action problems, changing the set of feasible stable solutions at the community level. Sanctioning at the associational level also tends to require BAs to formalize some information sharing in order to fulfil their monitoring function, while it also provides them with the tools to incentivize compliance with the procedures of information sharing.

Self-regulation does not necessarily imply a lack of public-order regulatory mechanisms, but merely that privately designed regulation mechanisms operate without direct reliance on the former. Nor does self-regulation mean a lack of reliance on informal mechanisms. The dividing line is the existence of institutionalized sanctioning mechanisms at the collective level.

Co-regulation

The final institutional form is co-regulation, which represents an alternative solution to the problem of institutionalizing selective incentives. A co-regulatory association receives the backing of the public-order in the form of the legal sanctions or resources on which its sanctions are based (Muraközy − Valentiny, 2015). These often include mandatory membership or participation, or granting official legal status to rules and decisions of the association. These additional resources might provide co-regulatory BAs with even greater capacity to restructure problems of collective action. Co-regulation is also expected to institutionalize information-sharing and rule-articulation, even if it tends to include public-order rules and information sources. Co-regulation often blurs the line between voluntary and mandatory association, as related activities are not necessarily all backed by public legal sanctions.

Table 1 *Level of institutionalization of the three main institutional functions for the four typical forms of institutionalization*

Level of collective action	***Information-sharing***	***Rule-articulation***	***Incentivizing compliance***
Intermediary association	Platform + (possibly central) information intermediary	Provided by other institutions	Provided by other institutions
Associational governance	Platform + Central information intermediary	Articulated (and formalized) at the association level	Provided by other institutions
Self-regulation	Platform + Central information intermediary + Formalized, possibly compulsory information-sharing	Articulated and formalized at the association level	Associational sanctions based on membership benefits and services
Co-regulation	Platform + Central information intermediary + Formalized, possibly compulsory information-sharing	Articulated and formalized at the association level + some have official public status	Associational sanctions based on membership benefits and services + formal legal sanctions or state-provided incentives

Levels of institutionalization and the economic roles of BAs

Doner − Schneider (2000) propose that a certain level of institutionalization is needed for a business association to be able to fulfil market-supporting economic roles. We suggest that each of the four levels of institutionalization is relevant for each of the proposed economic roles, as BAs with different levels of institutional strength can contribute in different ways. In the following sections we provide an overview of the economic roles which BAs at different levels of institutionalization are able to fulfil, attempting to highlight that *(1) all institutional levels, even including simple information intermediaries, can be beneficial*, and that *(2) higher levels of institutionalization can enable harmful forms of rent-seeking, not only beneficial coordination.*

If *intermediary BAs* can rely on spontaneous or public-order sanctions, they are able to coordinate various forms of collective action. They can enable value-creating transactions by spreading information about business partners and regulations (Betton et al., 2018; Cai − Szeidl, 2018; Johnson et al., 2002; Leonidou − Katsikeas, 1997; Pyle, 2005, 2006b; Recanatini − Ryterman, 2001), and about breaches of property rights (Pyle, 2011; Rochlitz, 2016). They can improve

knowledge-sharing (Costa et al., 2017; Kirby, 1988; Luna − Tirado, 2008; Pyle, 2006a; Qiao et al., 2014) and reduce the transaction costs of coordinating shared infrastructural projects (McNamara, 1993). They can also reduce the cost of engagement with stakeholders in relation to externalities (Dickson − Arcodia, 2010) and on developing and implementing public policies (Schneider, 2010; Stolz − Schrammel, 2014).

BAs at the level of *associational governance* can articulate common goals and rules, which enable them to orient collective action in various cases if they can connect these to other institutional incentives. They can coordinate contracts and knowledge-sharing to reduce transaction costs (Herrigel, 1993; Lane − Bachmann, 1997; Rademakers, 2000), to facilitate joint investment in public goods (Berk − Schneiberg, 2005) and innovation (Faulconbridge, 2007; McCormick et al., 2008; Nordqvist et al., 2010; Perez-Aleman, 2003). They can enable community reputational mechanisms in contract enforcement (Masten − Prüfer, 2014; Prüfer, 2016), the protection of property rights (Dixit, 2015; Hedberg, 2011; Nugent − Sukiassyan, 2009), and in dealing with social conflicts (Font et al., 2019; King − Lenox, 2000). They can also articulate community-level interests to improve policymaking.

The presence of formal sanctioning and monitoring capacities enable *self-regulatory BAs* to institutionalize solutions to the problems of free-riding and preference heterogeneity. They can help enforce the self-regulation of ethical and professional standards for contract enforcement (Bernstein, 1992, 2001; Dentoni et al., 2012; Gehrig − Jost, 1995; Gunningham − Rees, 1997; McMillan − Woodruff, 2000; Ville, 2007), the protection of property rights (Larrain − Prüfer, 2015) and resolving external conflicts (Christiansen − Kroezen, 2016; King − Berchicci, 2007; Tucker, 2008). They are able to institutionalize the community provision of public goods by incentivizing contributions (Kingsbury − Hayter, 2006; Lamberg et al., 2017), and to formalize knowledge networks for innovation (Greenwood et al., 2002; Kahl, 2018; Schwartz − Bar-El, 2015). They are also able to enforce community-level deals with external stakeholders and policymakers.

Public-order incentives allow *co-regulatory BAs* to tackle most conflictual prisoner's-dilemma types of collective action problems. They can institutionalize even stronger sanctions to support quality and ethical regulations, contributing to contract enforcement (Coleman, 1989; Muraközy − Valentiny, 2015), property rights protection (Mikamo, 2013; Yakovlev et al., 2014) and the management of social conflicts (Bartle − Vass, 2007; Héritier − Eckert, 2009; Marques, 2017; Rees, 1997). They can combine public and private resources to provide public goods related to infrastructure and knowledge provision (Athreye − Chaturvedi, 2007; Hashino − Kurosawa, 2013). They can also enable the implementation and

enforcement of even contentious policies to improve outcomes (Schneider, 2010; Schneider − Doner, 2000).

This review, along with Section 3.5, demonstrates that stronger institutionalization does not necessarily lead to more beneficial (or less harmful) activities, while BAs with simpler institutional forms are also able to fulfil beneficial roles, depending on the collective problems and contexts at hand.

WHAT DRIVES BAs TO ENGAGE IN SOCIALLY BENEFICIAL OR HARMFUL ACTIVITIES?

We have suggested that the beneficial or harmful nature of the activities of BAs in relation to economic development is not explained by the presence of specific, non-market-oriented activities, nor by the institutional strength of BAs. *What then, does explain the beneficial or harmful orientation of BA activity?* We agree with the proposition of Reveley and Ville (2010) that whether the institutional capacity of BAs is used for beneficial or for harmful purposes mainly depends on the institutional constraints of the latter and the BAs' own institutional governance solutions. It is possible to classify institutional constraints by their sources. Here, the starting point that BAs are positioned between private-order and public-order is once again helpful, as the former constraints stem from the private-order of the community underlying the BA, or the public-order in which a BA is embedded. We provide an overview of the scarce literature on the institutionalization of BAs that goes beyond the issue of selective incentives, highlighting what we consider the four most important questions and the gaps in our knowledge about them.

Community (membership) constraints on rent-seeking

As a BA is constituted by its membership, the goals of the underlying business community are expected to influence its goals. The first question related to this is (1) "*when is the underlying business community incentivized to pursue value-creating transactions?"* The members of a BA are expected to opt for redistributive rent-seeking instead of value-creating transactions if doing so increases their economic rent. Competitive pressures can create oversight and encourage productivity (Doner − Schneider, 2000), as less productive rent-seekers might fall behind in market competition.

It is not enough for members to be motivated to pursue value-creating activities; the issue of control is also involved. The second question is thus

(2) "*when is the business community able to incentivize the BA to pursue its activities in line with the community's goals?"* Without some control, BA officials can pursue their own goals (Moore − Hamalai, 1993), or become coopted by powerful subgroups. The first way for members to control BAs is hierarchically, which depends on the success of the internal governance solutions of the BA at resolving principal-agent problems. Several elements of institutional strength identified by Doner and Schneider (2000) are related to this issue. To avoid being controlled by narrow interest groups, BAs need to be able to mediate between members with different interests, for which they need transparency and institutionalized forms of internal discourse. Studies about the failure of self-regulation also call our attention to how business associations need to find institutional balance in representing different member groups in order to avoid their capture by the most influential group for their own rent-seeking purposes (Aldrich, 2018; Barnett, 2013; Yue et al., 2013).

The second way for members to control BAs is indirectly through inter-association competition. Ville (2007) demonstrates that competition between BAs encourages productive roles instead of redistributive, rent-seeking efforts. Hock and Gomtsian (2018) propose that a lack of competition was a major factor in the development of harmful rent-seeking practices in the case of FIFA. Control by other associations can also emerge through the counter-organization of affected stakeholder groups (Reveley − Ville, 2010; Schneiberg, 1999).

Public-order constraints on rent-seeking

The other source of institutional constraints on harmful rent-seeking is the public-order (Doner − Schneider, 2000; Reveley − Ville, 2010). This constraint depends on the willingness and the capacity of the public-order to steer BAs toward productive activities. Therefore, the third question is (3) "*when are the agents of the public order incentivized to be responsive to the interests of the broader community?"* This is a question of political accountability, which is outside of the scope of this review. We have some evidence in the Russian case that political competition and political accountability incentivize policy-makers to pay more attention to more encompassing interests (Govorun et al., 2016).

The final question is (4) "*when are agents of the public order able to control the activity of the BA?"* There is a fundamental problem of information asymmetry here, as a business community inevitably knows more about its workings than any regulatory agency. There is a further issue of regulatory capture here: as government agents develop closer relationships and more capacity to understand and monitor business communities, they become increasingly

likely to internalize their goals instead of enforcing the interests of the broader political community (Dal Bó, 2006; Levine − Forrence, 1990). If the interests of the business community and the polity do not align, multiple layers of principal-agent problems can result, whereby the relative successes of private and public-order actors determine the activities of BAs (Mattli − Büthe, 2005). We suggest that further research is needed about all four issues.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE WAY FORWARD

In this article we suggest that, in order to understand what business associations really do, we need to approach them not in terms of observable activities, but rather in terms of their underlying institutional rationality. We formulated three questions stemming from our main research question. (1) What are the economic roles of Bas, (2) How are BAs institutionalized in order to fulfil their economic roles, and (3) What drives BAs to engaging in socially beneficial or harmful activities?

We claim that BAs are "rent-seeking" institutions broadly understood, as their main goal is to increase the economic rent of a community of businesses. There are three main economic roles through which they can enable value-creating rent-seeking: (1) vertical economic roles, which enable more value-creating transactions along the value chain, (2) horizontal economic roles, which enable the provision of public goods which can contribute to economic rents, and (3) external economic roles, which allow for coordinating the goals of business communities with those of other social groups in order to protect economic rent. We challenge the widespread approach in the literature which distinguishes between the beneficial, market-supporting, and the harmful, rent-seeking / lobbying roles of BAs by demonstrating that *(1) all of the proposed economic roles of BAs can involve activities linked to the private-order and the public-order*, and that *(2) all of the economic roles can contribute to both value-creating and redistributive rent-seeking.*

Regarding the institutionalization of BAs, we suggest that they have three basic institutional functions in relation to solving collective action problems: (1) information-sharing, (2) rule-articulation, and (3) incentivizing compliance. These institutional functions can be institutionalized at different levels, with four distinct ideal types of BA institutionalization emerging: (1) intermediary BAs, (2) associational governance, (3) self-regulation, and (4) co-regulation. We challenge the proposition by Doner − Schneider (2000) that a certain level of institutional strength is needed for a business association to be able to fulfil

beneficial, "market-supporting" economic roles, by highlighting that *beneficial contributions from each of the economic roles of BAs are possible at each of the different levels of institutionalization*.

After proposing that the socially beneficial role of BAs is not explained by the presence of specific, non-market-oriented activities, nor by the institutional strength of BAs, we give an overview of our limited knowledge concerning what drives BAs to engage in socially beneficial or harmful activities. We suggest that *the institutional incentives created by the private-order and public-order context explain the orientation of BAs.* We hypothesize five main drivers of productive orientation: (1) market pressures on the membership of BAs, (2) internal governance solutions to principal-agent problems, (3) the competition between BAs and other similar institutions, (4) political accountability, and (5) the monitoring capabilities of public-order institutions.

We cannot claim that the typologies of our literature review are exhaustive or sufficiently detailed for in-depth empirical analysis. The main contribution of this study is to highlight that economic roles, institutional functions, and drivers of social productivity are distinct, and that instead of conflating them in our theories, we should approach them at the level of underlying institutional logics in order to link them.

How does distinguishing between the three questions contribute to addressing the original puzzle about the nature of BAs? Distinguishing roles allows us to go beyond observed activities and to analyze the functional requirements for each role in its specific institutional context. Distinguishing functions allows us to analyze the institutionalization of each function and then link them to the requirements of each role. The issue of social benefit also needs to be tackled separately for each economic role by linking them to the general institutional constraints of BA activities.

BAs are positioned between the private-order institutions of business communities and public-order institutions of governance, and can complement or compete with either. Private-order institutions such as firms, alliances, and contractual solutions determine the kinds of collective problems facing BAs, as well as their resources for dealing with them. We can also expect different BA features to be relevant in neo-corporatist versus pluralist systems, and at the supranational, national, and local level, mainly due to the resources and constraints provided by the relevant public-order institutions. This means that empirical analyses of functionality and institutionalization must deal with both the external institutional context and the private-order contexts of business communities. Any comparative or natural experiment-based analysis of BAs needs to focus on either specific roles (such as contract enforcement), specific business communities (industries or professions), or specific systems of

governance (policy areas or polities) to deal with the problems of embeddedness and multifunctionality.

For a comprehensive understanding of BAs, we need to go beyond specific functions and theorize about the relations between the different functions: do their underlying institutional logics complement each other, or do they result in organizational tensions and trade-offs? Answering these questions can shed light on the institutional dynamics, development paths, and institutional equilibria for BAs. There has unfortunately been little progress on this topic since Schmitter − Streeck's (1999) pioneering work on the logics of association. The institutionalization typology of this paper presents ideal types for structuring our review and challenging some of the claims in the literature, but we invite scholars to come up with more nuanced theories about the levels of BA institutionalization and the factors underlying its processes. Doing this will require more in-depth, interdisciplinary studies about the institutionalization of business communities and their associational systems that draw on economics, business history, and political science, following the steps of Galambos (1966), Greif (2006), and Reveley − Ville (2010).

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FORUM

NATURAL RESOURCES, FUEL EXPORTS AND CORRUPTION POLICY IN AFRICA

Vincent A Onodugo, David Olufemi Isijola[1]

ABSTRACT *Theoretical explanations of corruption in Africa are inconclusive. Economic downturn and poverty are the effects of poor resource management in Africa. Yet, neopatrimonialism also stands as an alternative explanation. This survey differentiates these two theoretical alternatives to understanding corruption in Africa. It examines 54 African countries using the corruption perception index of 2017, finding that fuel-exporting countries in Africa are more corrupt than non-fuel exporting countries, with a large associated effect size (Cohen's d =.94). The situation of fuel-exporting countries may be linked with resource-curse theory (poor resource management) and the extractive theory of corruption (neopatrimonialism), while that of non-fuel-exporting countries only with the extractive theory of corruption (neopatrimonialism). African nations involved in the exportation of fuel resources are 94% more likely to be more corrupt than those that are not.*

KEYWORDS: *Natural resources, Dutch disease, fossil fuels, oil price, embezzlement*

INTRODUCTION

A natural resource endowment provides a valuable flow of income to a country, helps economies to grow rapidly and prosper, and supports a high standard of living (Pendergast – Clarke – van Kooten, 2008; Li, 2013; Cronin – Pandya,

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2009). Despite these benefits, countries endowed with natural resources are often outperformed in terms of economic development, long-term economic growth, and poverty reduction by countries that are not naturally rich in the former (Li, 2013; Sachs − Warner, 1995;1997). The situation of Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, is an example of how natural resource endowments can suffocate development and distract the government from the central task of ensuring long-term prosperity (Timms, 2016).

Resource Curse theory gives a possible explanation for this paradox; it suggests that economies that produce mineral resources may become distorted due to their vulnerability to shocks from additional and unforeseen profits that are generated by exports (Weeks, 2012). It explains that public expenditure is more effectively used for development in countries that lack natural resources because their citizens (who are directly responsible for generating these funds) scrutinize government spending. In contrast, government spending is not scrutinized the same way by citizens of resource-rich countries because extractive industries rather than citizens pay taxes, royalties, and other payments to generate the public funds needed for development (Silje, 2007; Kelley, 2012). This laxity on the part of the citizenry makes an economy vulnerable to the exploitation of extractive industries by governments through rent-seeking behaviour and the prodigal use of public funds which, when exchanged via foreign platforms, deplete national wealth (NRGI Reader, 2015; Ades − Di, 1999; Azfar − Lee − Swamy, 2001; Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008). Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Angola are examples of such economies that experience conflict, inefficient spending, and borrowing, "Dutch disease," weak institutional development, and social/environmental problems due to the resource curse (Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Durovic, 2016; Basedau, 2005; Arazki − van der Ploeg, 2010). Regardless of this, Botswana sets the stage for a debate about whether natural resources represent a blessing or a curse (Basedau, 2005). Even though it is the largest producer of diamonds in the world, Botswana has used its earnings to promote economic growth, address social needs, and stabilize its economy (Li, 2013; Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010). Because of this, the example of Botswana puts the spotlight on African economies that are naturally endowed but unable to improve the national standard of living. This suggests that the relationship between natural endowment and living standards remains extremely complicated (Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008).

In recent times, research scientists have become intrigued by natural-resource-related questions such as (Stijns, 2005; Basedau, 2005) whether countries with natural resources are blessed or cursed, why do resource-rich countries like Nigeria and Angola suffer from the resource curse, whereas Botswana, the world's largest producer of diamonds, enjoys the benefits of its resources, and

is there any explanation for the resource curse. Pendergast – Clarken − van Kooten (2008), Kelley (2012) and Li (2013) advocate, amongst other things, that corruption, defined as the abnormal use of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2018; Nye, 1967), is the primal reason for the resource curse. They show that having a natural resource endowment is not inherently a curse, but the resource curse transpires due to corrupt government officials who reside in resource-rich countries because the latter fail to account for the transparent expenditure of public funds and to protect their citizens from theft. Consequently, countries that entertain corrupt governments suffer from stunted economic growth, mass poverty, poor development, and weak institutions (Li, 2013).

Natural resources do not inevitably represent a curse to countries that are resource rich (Basedau, 2005). However, the type of natural resource can affect a nation's vulnerability to corruption and validate resource curse theory (Sala-i-Martin − Subramanian, 2003; Collier − Hoeffler, 2005). Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten (2008) found that the existence of fuel resources increases potential corruption as opposed to ore resources (e.g. diamonds), which appear to reduce corruption. Therefore, they consider a fuel resource as a "curse" and ore resources as a "blessing." Their finding explains why Botswana and Nigeria are at opposite ends of the scale regarding living standards and economic growth (Humphreys – Sachs − Stiglitz, 2007).

FUEL EXPORTATION IN AFRICA

Two-thirds of fuel products are traded across international borders (Ruta − Venables, 2012). Fuel-exporting countries enjoy the receipt of tax on fuel exports, fuel subsidies, and a lower domestic fuel price relative to the world price (Ruta − Venables, 2012). Ironically, as a country's oil-resource wealth increases, so does its inducement to corruption, instability, and patronage-driven politics (Gillies, 2009; Timms, 2016). Studies show that the vulnerability of oil resource-rich countries to price instability and government exploitation are associated with higher levels of rent-seeking behavior, corruption, and internal conflict (Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008; Fearon, 2005; Leite − Weidmann, 1999; Van der Ploeg − Poelhekke, 2009). For instance, the removal of fuel subsidies in 2012 by the federal government of Nigeria led to internal conflict and public protests characterized by strikes by oil and non-oil workers, which invariably threatened the shutdown of all oil production in the country (EIA, 2012; Agbon, 2016). Furthermore, a court case involving the Vice

President of Equatorial Guinea in 2017 was related to corruption, as he was convicted of plundering public money from his oil-rich resource country to fund a jet-set lifestyle in Paris (Chrisafis, 2017). Similarly, the luxurious lifestyle and prodigal spending of government funds by a top government official from the oil-rich republic of Congo instigated bribery-related investigations involving an Australian company and corrupt officials from the Republic of Congo (McKenzie – Freudenthal – Bachelard − Baker, 2016). These instances illustrate some of the fundamental reasons for a country's negative economic performance, particularly when political elites perceive resource booms as temporal and become avaricious of benefitting from them (Robinson – Torvik − Verdier, 2006). There are three fundamental elements of the resource curse: resource abundance, oil and gas resource dominance, and poor economic performance (Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Basedau, 2005).

The effect of the resource curse is detrimental because it influences a country's socioeconomic development, quality of institutions, governance, and prospects for democracy and human rights, as well as peace and security (Basedau, 2005; Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Li, 2013). These effects are contingent on three simultaneous factors that occur due to the resource curse (Kelley, 2012; Aghion − Banerjee, 2005; Mehlum − Moene − Torvik, 2005; Deacon − Rode, 2015): 1) Dutch disease, 2) vulnerability due to price volatility related to commodity dependence, and 3) weak governance and poor institutional quality.

So-called Dutch disease manifests when a country that is naturally resource rich tries to raise the value of its currency by diverting the majority of its production factors towards the uncompetitive exportation of a natural resource. Consequently, Dutch disease is contingent on two situations. The first is a reduced revenue flow due to subsequently higher prices of a country's natural resource in the global market that invariably decrease international demand (Kelley, 2012). The second is the inflation of local sales of other commodities in an economy due to the limited supply of production factors needed to create an abundant flow of goods at above the level of demand. Wit & Crookes (2013) illustrated the Nigerian case of Dutch disease. They explain, supported by Amadeo (2017), that the country's over-dependence on its oil-resource revenue prompted a rise in oil prices in the international market that benefited government spending and fuel subsidy rates. In 2011, over 70 percent of Nigeria's revenues came from oil exports (worth $ 99 billion), but the country failed to invest in other areas of its economy such as agricultural production (Ohuocha − Akwagyiram, 2016; BusinessNews, 2015; News Editor, 2014). Thus, agricultural products were locally sold by oligopolies at inflated rates since they could not compete globally due to weak investment in agricultural infrastructure (Ohuocha − Akwagyiram, 2016). In December 2014, the country's inflexibly high oil prices presented

the nation with a revenue crisis due to its inability to sell 35 million barrels of oil to international markets (Okere, 2015; Okumagba, 2014; BusinessNews, 2015). At the same time, the production of crude oil declined by 17,300 and 700,000 barrel per day in 2014 and 2016, respectively (Okere, 2015; Ohuocha − Akwagyiram, 2016). In 2016, Nigeria was officially reported to have slid into economic recession caused by Dutch disease due to an increase in the price of food and a revenue crisis (Ohuocha − Akwagyiram, 2016). Nigeria's experience shows that the internal inflation of local sales and a simultaneous decline in revenue flow threatens the long-term economic sustainability of countries that face the resource curse.

Another element of the resource curse manifests when a significant proportion of a country's revenue is derived from the exportation of a single commodity that is vulnerable to price fluctuation. An empirical study by Van der Ploeg − Poelhekke (2009) found that most commodity-dependent countries experience economic underdevelopment due to price volatility. For resource exporters, price volatility is another major factor that increases the resource curse (Ruta − Venables, 2012). For instance, a fall in the global oil price of more than 60 percent between June 2014 and January 2015 resulted in a decline in the revenue of oil-exporting countries (BusinessNews, 2015). Records show that the net oil export revenue of members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), excluding Iran, declined by 11 percent (from $824 billion to $730 billion) in 2013 (BusinessNews, 2015). This price shock made these oil-dependent countries vulnerable to threats, which reduced their revenue flow and drove away foreign investors (News Editor, 2014; Okere, 2015).

The quality of institutions and governance is another widely hypothesized driver of the resource curse (Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010; Silje, 2007). The way a government manages its revenue determines the future state of its economy (Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008). Arguably, a country's petrodollar earnings can be responsible for weakening the social contract between citizenry and the government (Kuzu − Nantogmah, 2010). Evidence from pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 showed that oil wealth constrains democratization (Ross, 2001). Natural-resource-dependent countries are more likely to be dictatorial, exhibit higher levels of government spending, poor governance, and are more prone to a breakdown in democracy (Silje, 2007). For oil-exporting countries, Kurecic – Lulic − Kozina (2015) and Tsui (2010) showed that a development in governance and institutional frameworks is essential at the time petrodollar earnings significantly increase, because the absence of the latter can intensify the negative effects of oil discovery on democratization. Without appropriate institutional frameworks, economies can become overwhelmed with lawlessness and corruption due to rent-seeking

behaviour (Anderson − Hill, 2005). Scholars have explained that the existence of the oil-resource curse is contingent on bad political governance (Arezki − Gylfason, 2011; Mehlum − Moene − Torvik, 2005). For example, countries in the Gulf of Guinea that found oil at a time when their democratic institutions were undeveloped were plagued with corruption and repression. Furthermore, Kurecic – Lulic − Kozina (2015) have explained how ruling elites, who failed to govern their countries properly, stole a considerable proportion of oil revenue from countries in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, the resource curse arose due to the misappropriation of revenue by corrupt leaders and officials (Li, 2013). Corruption and rent on fuel resources have been proven to negatively affect overall standards of living across countries (Sala-i-Martin − Subramanian, 2003; Azfar − Lee − Swamy, 2001). However, improving institutional quality can help reduce this negative consequence (Pendergast – Clarke − van Kooten, 2008).

CORRUPTION IN AFRICA

In Africa, corruption is largely a governance issue, resulting from failed institutions and inadequacy of the use of capital to manage society through a framework of social, judicial, political, and economic authorizations (Gbetnkom, 2012). The increasing desire to transcend impoverishment through private wealth-seeking behavior has made corruption pervasive (Gbetnkom, 2012; Eke − Monoji, 2016). Despite being a notable symptom of the resource curse, corruption still presents itself when individuals with the discretion to make decisions fail to account for their use of monopolized power over gainful resources (Klitgaard, 1988). In such instances, corruption occurs through bribery, fraud, nepotism, favoritism, cronyism, and tribalism in the form of the deceitful accumulation and abuse of entrusted wealth or power for selfish interests (Eke − Monoji, 2016). This brand of corruption has its roots in poverty and power, not in countries' natural resources (Stuckelberger, 2003).

Corruption takes the form of a state-society relationship whereby public officials seek ways to bypass legal competition and obstruct the rules of normal societal functioning in order to generate a flow of resources from society to state (Gbetnkom, 2012). The corruption of public officials involves two activities (Gbetnkom, 2012): the first is influencing the choice of products that are supplied to the state and the contract modalities of suppliers at the economic level. The second is using the power of office to indulge in financial fraud and take advantage of segregated amenities, such as access to privileged schools,

sound medical attention, good housing and lodging, or access to the shares of enterprises undergoing privatization. For instance, reports have illustrated cases of the corruption of African presidents using their offices to influence political appointments and win lucrative state contracts in favor of close relatives and friends (Cotterill, 2018; Nnanna, 2017; Dentlinger, 2018; Magubane, 2018; Calland − Law, 2018). Reports have elucidated how the African continent lost $ 850 billion between 1970 and 2008 due to fraudulent schemes by governments and multinational companies (Anderson, 2015; Hassan, 2017; Mosselmans, 2014). Estimates revealed that a total of $ 217.7 billion, $ 105.2 billion, and $ 81.8 billion was illegally transferred out of Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa (respectively) during that same period (Anderson, 2015). These practices create poverty and reduce the national standard of living because they deplete fiscal revenue and alter the composition of public expenses (Tanzi − Davoodi, 1998; Gbetnkom, 2012).

The theory of extractive corruption provides a potential explanation for this form of corruption by re-emphasizing the observation that "all power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (Amundsen, 1999). This elucidates the situation in which a state becomes the strongest force in society, the ruling elite acquires dominant control over state powers, and the apparatus of the state is used as an instrument to extract resources from society for the benefit of rulers (Amundsen, 1999). This theory is derived from the political science notion of authoritarianism, which describes how rulers use the power capabilities of the state to attain, retain, and increase their power in order to accumulate resources from the nation for personal benefit (Amundsen, 1999). It can also be traced back to the neo-patrimonial political systems found in Africa, whereby rulers maintain authority through personal patronage rather than ideology or law (Amundsen, 1999). This neo-patrimonial political system undermines economic reform because it involves a life-threatening struggle (at all levels of society) to obtain access to state resources through patronage, clienteles, and rent-seeking (Van de Walle, 2005; Bayart, 2009; Dawson − Kelsall, 2011; Medard, 2002; Soest, 2007). As a result, the theory of extractive corruption defines corruption as an obstinate symptom of neopatrimonialism that plagues African states (Medard, 2002; Kratt, 2015; Beresford, 2014).

Despite being an obstinate plague, corruption has further advanced in most African states (Kratt, 2015). African political elites now use anti-corruption campaigns as legal-rational justification to discredit their opposition and legitimize their corrupt practices (Soest, 2007; Edwards, 2017). A classic example, as reported by Paget (2017), is the Tanzanian anti-corruption crusade. According to Paget's report, after the fifth president of Tanzania

was sworn into office on 5 November 2015, an anti-corruption campaign was ushered in against civil servants and highly positioned elites of the then opposition party to win the admiration of the world. However, in 2016, after discrediting the opposition and gaining international approval, the president legitimized corruption. The president's legislature undermined legal and parliamentary freedom, actualized fractional bans on open rallies, badgered mobile police authorities, shut down online political spaces, and indicted whistle-blowers under new maligning and dissidence laws. Consequently, the case of the fifth president of Tanzania validates the neo-patrimonial explanation of corruption.

Neopatrimonialism provides the best explanation for corruption in African politics and governance (Mkandawire, 2015), and is characterized by three elements (Ganahl, 2013). The first is presidentialism – a situation where leaders, particularly in Africa, go beyond the narrow sense of political control to portray themselves as "fathers of the nation" by retaining the presidency for decades in other to authenticate the idea that a president is not a mere placeholder in office, but rather a founding father with the ability to make key decisions without the agreement of the legislature or courts (Ganahl, 2013). Prominent followers of this strategy include heads of states in Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Uganda (Hanna, 2017). Second, clientelism – an exchange relationship between unequal parties that politically benefits the agent that is more powerful and offers them material advantage in relation to the less powerful agent (Eisenstadt − Lemarchand, 1981). Predominant in resource-poor African states, most state agents feel they have the right to subvert the rule of law by strategically allocating state revenues to their supporters, co-religionists, and members of their own ethnic groups in exchange for political patronage (Brun − Diamond, 2014; van de Walle, 2007). Gebreluel − Bedasso (2018) have reported how party and state structures in Ethiopia used state resources to maintain and increase party membership from around 700,000 in 2005 to 7,000,000 in 2015. They also showed how state rents were tied to political and bureaucratic appointments through ethnic-based patronage structures, explaining that party officials and political elites mobilize the support of their ethnic constituencies through the assurance of treaty maintenance centered on promoting ethnic interests and the power to oppress the opposition. The third factor is state resource control – i.e. authority and discretion over the use of states' economic resources (Ganahl, 2013). This factor has been cited as one of the primary causes of the failure of growth in the developing world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Arguably, African state agents often use state resources to maintain personal control over the government rather than investing in basic infrastructure that would create the

critical conditions for accelerated development (Paget, 2017). Perhaps this is the reason why the forty-fourth President of the United States criticized African leaders in his address to the African Union in 2015 (Manson, 2015). Although neopatrimonal corruption is widespread in Africa, Botswana has proven to be an exception. Despite being influenced by elements of neopatrimonialism (Pitcher − Moran − Johnston, 2009; Soest, 2009), the country has avoided the major pitfalls that led to the demise of other African countries (Meyns − Musamba, 2010). Botswana has maintained a high level of transparency and accountability to keep levels of corruption low and to achieve its development objectives within a democratic system governed by neopatrimonial exchanges of trust (Pitcher – Moran − Johnston, 2009). Consequently, in 2018, Botswana was ranked by the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index as the least corrupt country in Africa (Aljazeera, 2018). Botswana's triumph over corruption may provide other African states with the framework that is needed to combat corruption. However, success at replicating Botswana's anti-corruption framework in other African countries may be problematic due to contextual differences. On this note, Ganahl (2013) opines that anti-corruption policies should be tailored to the peculiarities of corruption in each African state.

FUEL EXPORTS AND CORRUPTION

Malfunctioning government institutions have been found to severely harm economic performance by reducing both incentives and opportunities to invest and innovate (North, 1990; Shleifer − Vishny, 1993). Among the different aspects of governance, corruption has received particular attention from both policymakers and researchers. Thus, understanding the role that various types of exports have on corruption has been the fundamental rationale for empirical studies on resource exports and corruption. Scholars have argued that the severity of the resource curse in malfunctioning government institutions depends on the kinds of resources that are valuable in relation to a country's revenue. The former have suggested that point-source resources such as minerals and fuels are more problematic because their centralized control can generate rents that are easily appropriable (Sala-i-Martin − Subramanian, 2003; Boschini – Petterson − Roine, 2007). One such study, conducted by Leite and Weidmann (1999), argued that natural resource abundance is an important factor in determining a country's level of corruption because it creates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior. With the help of a corruption regression equation,

their study established that capital-intensive natural resources (such as fuel and ores) tend to induce higher levels of corruption compared to labor-intensive resources. Their study constituted the first step toward investigating natural resources and corruption. In context, their results create a model with which to guide government anti-corruption policies.

A more recent study by Goel − Korhonen (2011) examined the relationship between export structure and corruption across nations. The study used ordinary least squares, quantile regression, and two-stage least squares methods to derive a model estimate for corruption across nations. The model showed that economic prosperity, political freedom, economic freedom, government size, fractionalization, and exports are all factors that determine the level of corruption. It also demonstrated that fuel exports and corruption in the most corrupt nations are statistically positively related. The authors argue that the varied direction and magnitude of the effects of various resource types on corruption, such as anti-corruption policies, must be tailored to fit the specific resource types. Though bad management of fuel-resource-related gains may signal a clear danger to economic prosperity and poverty reduction, theoretical explanations are inconclusive. Therefore, by proposing that fuel-exporting countries are more corrupt than non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa, the current study provides empirical evidence in support of the extractive theory of corruption and the resource curse theory. Such evidence also offers potential insights into the formulation of effective policies that could help control the level of corruption in fuel resource-rich countries, particularly Africa, and offers support for theoretical frameworks that best explain corruption in the African context.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Participants

Corruption was used as the dependent variable of the study because it has been identified as widespread in Africa (Pitcher − Moran − Johnston, 2009; Shleifer − Vishny, 1993). A total population of 54 African nations participated in the study. Study participants were classified into fuel-exporting countries and non-fuel-exporting countries, as identified by the United Nations (2017). Out of the 54 countries that participated in the study, 12 were major exporters of fuel. The sampling frame for fuel-exporting and non-fuel-exporting countries is illustrated in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.

Procedure

The study employed an independent samples *t*-test to answer the question whether fuel-exporting countries differ significantly in the prevalence of corruption compared to non-fuel exporting countries. Secondary data was obtained from Transparency International (2018) to measure the prevalence of corruption. The study hypothesized that the prevalence of corruption in fuel-exporting countries is not equal to that in non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa (H_1) against the null hypothesis that corruption is equal in the two groups of countries. More precisely, due to the inverse coding of the corruption perception index (CPI) used to assess corruption, it is expected that fuel-exporting countries are associated with statistically significantly higher corruption (more negative CPI scores) than non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa.

Measures

Corruption was measured using scores for 2017 from the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The CPI was established in 1995 as a composite indicator for measuring the level of corruption perceived in the public sector worldwide. CPI ranks corruption on the scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) based on the assumption that all countries are corrupt to varying degrees. Lower-ranked countries are plagued with higher levels of corruption and suffer from untrustworthy and badly functioning public institutions such as police and judiciary. Higher-ranked countries tend to have lower levels of corruption and enjoy greater press freedom, access to information about public expenditure, stronger standards of integrity for public officials, and independent judicial systems, but may still engage in closed-door deals, illicit financing, and unreliable law enforcement that can distort public policy and exacerbate many forms of corruption at home and abroad. For more information on the methodology and reliability of CPI, see Transparency International (2017). CPI has been validated by Wilhelm (2002) through correlational studies that find strong significant connections between two measures of corruption and real gross domestic product per capita (RGDP/Cap).

Statistical Analysis

The parameters of the study were described using frequency distributions, means, standard deviations, skew, kurtosis, and a bar chart. Furthermore,

inferences were drawn using the independent samples t-test, Levene's *F* test, and Cohen's *d*. Descriptive and inferential statistical analysis was undertaken with the use of Microsoft Excel 2016 and SPSS version 21.

RESULTS

Fuel-exporting countries (N = 12) are associated with a corruption perception index M = 24.58 (SD = 7.20). By comparison, non-fuel-exporting countries (N = 42) are associated with a numerically greater corruption perception index M = 34.23 (SD = 12.26). To test the hypothesis that fuel-exporting countries are associated with statistically significant more negative corruption perception index scores than non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa, an independent samples t-test was performed. As can be seen in Table 4, the fuel-exporting and non-fuel exporting distributions were sufficiently normal to permit the implementation of a *t*-test (i.e., skew < |2.0| and kurtosis < |9.0|; Schmider − Ziegler − Danay − Beyer − Buhner, 2010). Additionally, the assumption that variances were homogenous was tested and satisfied via Levene's *F* test, $F(1,52) = 2.95$, $p = .092$. The independent samples t-test was associated with a statistically significant effect, $t(1,52) = -2.59$, $p = .006$ (one-tailed). Cohen's *d* was estimated at .85, which is a large effect based on Cohen's (1992) guidelines. A graphical representation of the means and the 95% confidence intervals is contained in Figure 1. The study found that there is a 95% chance that the mean difference lies between -17.13 and -2.18, which does not include zero. Thus, the study did not support the null hypothesis that the prevalence of corruption in fuel-exporting countries is the same as non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa. Thus, H_1 is supported. The study found that there is a significant difference in the prevalence of corruption between fuel-exporting and non-fuel exporting countries (a mean difference of 0).

DISCUSSION

Fuel-exporting countries were found to be more corrupt than non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa. This proposition supports resource curse theory and gives insights into the implication of fuel exportation and corruption levels.

The results clearly indicate that fuel exportation is positively associated with significant levels of corruption. By implication, increases in fuel exportation

also translate into a significant increase in corruption. Prior to this study, Goel − Korhonen (2011) established a model to estimate the relationship between resource exports and corruption. Furthermore, Leite − Weidmann (1999) evaluated the relationship between capital- and labour-intensive natural resources (such as fuel, ores, food, and agriculture) on corruption. Their studies enumerated various factors that have statistical effects on corruption. However, their studies did not compare significant differences in corruption between fuel- and non-fuel exporting countries. Research from Leite − Weidmann (1999) categorized fuel and ores as capital-intensive natural resources that play a role in increasing corruption, but the findings were unable to determine the unique contributions of fuel exportation to corruption. The current study represents a unique contribution to the corruption literature by determining that fuel-exporting countries are significantly more likely to be associated with corruption compared with non-fuel exporting ones. However, the study did not establish causality between fuel-exportation and corruption. The study has also contributed to the literature by providing evidence within the African context that helps distinguish theoretical explanation of corruption. It identifies poor resource management as a distinguishing element of the difference in corruption between fuel-exporting countries and non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa. Theoretically, African countries that export fuel do badly in terms of resource management because of the kind of resource that dominates their export portfolio. To reduce corruption levels, fuel-exporting parts of Africa must formulate fuel-specific policies that address poor resource management (the extractive theory of corruption). Perhaps a more diversified export portfolio characterized by a significant proportion of non-fuel exports may reduce the presence of corruption and restrict the manifestation of the resource curse. Contingent on the limitations of this study, future studies are advised to focus on a wider sample of developing economies.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1 *Mean Corruption Perception Index scores for fuel-exporting countries in Africa*

Countries[a]	Corruption[b]
Algeria	33
Angola	19
Cameroon	25
Chad	20
Congo, Rep.	21
Côte d'Ivoire	36
Egypt	32
Equatorial Guinea	17
Gabon	32
Libya	17
Nigeria	27
Sudan	16

[a] *Fuel-exporting countries based on United Nations categorization (United Nations, 2017)*
[b] *Corruption score based on the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2018)*

Table 2 *Mean Corruption Perception Index scores for non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa*

Countries[a]	Corruption[b]
Benin	39
Botswana	61
Burkina Faso	42
Burundi	22
Cabo Verde	55
Central African Republic	23
Comoros	27
Democratic Republic of Congo	21
Djibouti	31
Eritrea	20
Ethiopia	35
Gambia	30
Ghana	40
Guinea	27
Guinea Bissau	17
Kenya	28
Lesotho	42
Liberia	31

[a] *Fuel-exporting countries based on United Nations categorization (United Nations, 2017)*
[b] *Corruption score based on the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2018)*

Table 3 *(Continued) Mean Corruption Perception Index scores for non-fuel-exporting countries in Africa*

Countries[a]	Corruption[b]
Madagascar	24
Malawi	31
Mali	31
Mauritania	28
Mauritius	50
Morocco	40
Mozambique	25
Namibia	51
Niger	33
Rwanda	55
Seo Tome and Principe	46
Senegal	45
Seychelles	60
Sierra Leone	30
Somalia	9
South Africa	43
South Sudan	12
Swaziland	39
Tanzania	36
Togo	32
Tunisia	42
Uganda	26
Zambia	37
Zimbabwe	22

[a] *Fuel-exporting countries based on United Nations categorization (United Nations, 2017)*
[b] *Corruption score based on the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2018)*

Table 4 *Descriptive statistics associated with the samples of the study*

	N	*M*	*SD*	Skew	Kurtosis
Fuel-exporting Countries	12	24.58	7.20	.32	-1.59
Non-fuel exporting Countries	42	34.23	12.26	.30	-.21

Figure 1 *Corruption Perception Index bar graph (with 95% CIs)*



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ALCOHOLISM AND THE POLITICS OF TOTAL PROHIBITION IN TAMIL NADU STATE, INDIA: A HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

Gopalakrishnan Karunanithi[1]

ABSTRACT *The consumption of alcohol in one form or other has prevailed throughout the history of the world. The first half of this paper deals with the socio-cultural roots of alcoholism and drinking habits in ancient India, besides discussing its socioeconomic implications and impact on several areas of life. In the second half, it presents the history of the implementation and repeal of total prohibition in Tamil Nadu state against the backdrop of incumbent Dravidian political parties and a series of statewide anti-liquor protests during 2016 –2017.*

KEYWORDS: Alcohol, alcoholism, prohibition, anti-liquor protest.

INTRODUCTION

The main aim of this paper is to explain drinking practices in ancient India and the socio-economic implications of these in contemporary times, and to justify how the former is an alarming social problem. It also aims to present the relationship between prohibition and politics in Tamil Nadu during the incumbency of Dravidian political parties[2] and the consequent anti-liquor protests. It is based on a review of some relevant literature on alcoholism and prohibition related to some states in India in general, and Tamil Nadu state in particular. Therefore, this is not an empirical but a descriptive paper, prepared

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2 Dravidian political parties include an array of regional political parties in Tamil Nadu state in India, which trace their origins and ideologies either directly or indirectly to the Dravidian movement patronized by Periyar E. V. Ramasamy.

based on quantitative as well as qualitative methods of analyzing data collected from various pieces of literature, reports, national dailies, and personal interviews.

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL ROOTS OF DRINKING IN INDIA

From time immemorial, drinking has been associated with the socio-cultural life of people in India. Even now, it is noticeable, especially during cultural events, ceremonies, and dinner parties. However, Pratima Murthy (2015) says that the cultural contexts of alcohol use are associated with socio-political contexts. In ancient India, religion was a determinant of abstinence, whereas the social order was a determinant of drinking. Later on, socio-political contexts became a decisive factor in terms of drinking. However, drinking practices vary according to cultural differences among castes and ethnic groups. For this reason, there are different cultural expressions for drinking at social gatherings. The ancient epics of India, *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*, and other literary works, including *Sangam* (Tamil) Literature,[3] include references to drinking, indicating that the habit of drinking was common in Indian society at the time.

Nevertheless, in hierarchically stratified Indian society, drinking in the past was forbidden mostly by high caste groups, whereas it was allowed by middle- and low-caste groups. Accordingly, as indicated by various religious texts, drinking was not associated with the rituals of "great tradition" that have their roots in Vedic rituals mostly practiced by the priestly caste group, i.e., the Brahmins. On the other hand, Robert Redfield (1947) claims that drinking became a part of the rituals of "little tradition" that are rooted in non-Vedic rituals, predominantly practiced by people on the lower rungs of the caste hierarchy.[4] It can be observed that the practice of offering alcohol to local deities

3 Sangam literature refers to the ancient Tamil literature of South India compiled during the Sangam Age, which was a period of history of ancient parts of Tamil Nadu and Kerala and parts of Sri Lanka approximately spanning the sixth century BCE to the third century CE. It was named after the famous Sangam (organization) academies of poets and scholars centered in Madurai, the second largest city in Tamil Nadu state.

4 Robert Redfield (1947), an American anthropologist, conceived of civilizations in cultural terms as systems of coexisting and interdependent "Great Tradition and Little Tradition". The former is a part of the idea systems – the sciences, philosophy, and fine arts – of the critical and reflective elite, and the latter is a part of the folk arts, lore, and religion of common people. Mckim Marriott and Beals (1955) and Milton Singer (1972), American anthropologists influenced by the studies of Redfield, conducted studies in Indian villages and elaborated the original model of Redfield in the light of data generated from those villages.

of "little tradition," particularly during festivals in southern districts of Tamil Nadu state, continues to exit even today. It is thus evident that the culture of "little tradition" was generally approving of alcohol consumption, which may therefore be considered a socio-cultural phenomenon or obligation rather than a personal act. This obligation may perhaps be an important factor as regards influencing individual drinking behavior.

However, from the individual point of view, drinking alcohol involves a personal act, because the decision to drink comes from personal choice, not socio-cultural obligations. But, it is also a fact that, one's socio-cultural ties play a significant role in encouraging drinking habits, as well as determining one's stand in relation to an ethical framework. Anthropological accounts of many cultures highlight the congruence of drinking with cultural values such as hospitality, reciprocity, and kinship relations. As regards hospitality, alcohol serves as a means of promoting reciprocal relationships (an important trait of culture) predominantly in folk and tribal societies, but in modern societies as well.

David G. Mandelbaum (1965) considers alcohol to be a cultural relic, because the forms and meanings of drinking alcoholic beverages are culturally defined. Such forms are explicitly stipulated, including the kinds of drink, quantity of intake, times and places of drinking accompanying a ritual, sex and age of drinkers, roles involved in drinking, and role behavior suitable in relation to drinking. However, the meaning of drinking and its relation to other aspects of culture and society are very much implicit. Therefore, drinking habits in a particular society may or may not be a ritualistic act, depending on the context.

MIXED VIEWS ON DRINKING IN ANCIENT INDIA

There is an indication in an ancient Indian epic, *Ramayana*, of wine drinking by royal people, as well as a description of heavy drinking in Ayodhya, the birthplace of Rama, hero of the epic. In another ancient Indian epic, *Mahabharata*, drinking is mentioned in several passages, including a description of the *Yadav* (shepherd) clan whose downfall was due to in-group fighting while its members were intoxicated by alcohol. The *Kshatriyas* (kings/warriors) in particular were reported to drink alcohol quite liberally. However, it is also pointed out in *Mahabharata* that drinking is sinful (Singh and Lal 1979).

In the Vedic period of India (around 1500-1000 BC), the Aryans (this term was used as a self-designation by Indo-Iranians) used to consume *soma*, a kind of liquor that is referred to in several passages of the Rig Veda (Samhita: 4, 9 and 54). This was served while performing *yajna* (ritual sacrifice undertaken in

front of a sacred fire for a specific purpose). Mitra (2016) mentions the drinking of Lord Krishna along with his brother, brother-in-law, and some other family members. Somasundaram and others (2016) indicate that, as presented in *Mahabharata*, Bharadvaja (a sage in ancient India) offered wine to Bharata (a legendary emperor of India) and his soldiers as a mark of hospitality. In contrast, Manu, the Hindu lawgiver (around 500 BC), prescribed in his work *Manusmriti* (11: 55) that drinking should be considered an evil and hence be rooted out. Hassan (1922) states that stronger prohibitions regarding the use of alcohol were laid down in the treatises of Hinduism on dharma composed by Apastamba and Gautama. Nevertheless, Courson (2008) says that the *Shastras* (treatises on the applied sciences), literary works, wall paintings, inscriptions and the like bear witness to the fact that drinking was a very ordinary affair for lower caste groups in India.

It is relevant to learn from *Sangam* literature how intoxicants were used in ancient Tamil society. For instance, *Puranaanooru* (56, 216, 235, 290 and 298), an anthology in *Sangam* literature, describes how drinks formed a part of cuisine and were freely used by all classes of people, irrespective of sex. They were often supplied during social intercourse, and were offered to special visitors and guests by kings and chieftains. In contrast, Thiruvalluvar, a *sangam* poet and a protagonist of abstinence, expressed the evils of drinking in his universal work *Thirukkural* (*Kallunnaamai*: 93). Thus, ancient Tamil and Sanskrit literature in India include both the sanctioning and prohibition of drinking.

It is known that drinking was not a uniform practice among the four *varnas* (broader divisions of ancient Hindu society). For instance, Sharma (1996) indicates that (as prescribed by some Hindu religious texts with regard to drinking addressed to the four *varnas*) the *Brahmans* (priestly class) should abstain from drinking, while the *Kshatriyas* (king/warrior class) were allowed to drink on certain occasions as part of their military ethos. Relatively fewer restrictions seemed to apply to the *Vaisyas* (agriculture and trading class) and *Shudras* (serving class) concerning drinking. Thus, as regards the drinking of different classes of people in ancient India, lenience and abstinence co-existed.

Boesche (2003) refers to the prescription of *Arthasastra* (an ancient Indian Sanskrit treatise of Kautilya from the fourth century BCE that deals with statecraft, economic policy, and military strategy) in relation to the regulation of alcohol production and sale, including directions for establishing drinking shops. During his time, the Mauryan Empire in India (descendants of mighty rulers who dominated the Indian subcontinent between 322 and 185 BCE) exercised tight control over the production of alcoholic drinks, and controlled alcohol distribution through government-owned distribution points at which citizens could drink legally.

Singh and Lal (1979) state that during the Post-Vedic period (between 1400 B.C and 600 B.C) the best known medical treatises written by Charaka and Susruta describe alcohol as a medicine and as a social drink as well. While making a distinction between moderate and excessive drinking, Charaka notes that moderate drinking is "pleasing, digestive, nourishing, and preserves intelligence." He also mentions about alcohol abuse and related problems, including social ones, besides elaborating a specific treatment for alcoholics. It is, however, understood that both the sanctioning and prohibition of drinking have coexisted since Vedic times. This is perhaps the reason why there were no organized Temperance movements in ancient or pre-independence India.

ALCOHOLISM: AN ALARMING SOCIAL PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA

Setting aside the socio-cultural backdrop and ethical issues related to alcohol, the multiple problems caused by drinking pose a great threat to present and future Indian society. In contemporary times, alcoholism is one of the more alarming social problems both from a personal as well as societal point of view. Alcoholics in India, like their counterparts all over the world, face a series of socioeconomic consequences and health hazards. Civilians in contemporary India are coming to know about various alcohol-related social problems. Although alcoholics understand that drinking is an unhealthy habit from a medical point of view, their attitude to it remains positive. Most manual workers, including sweepers and scavengers in organized as well as unorganized sectors, drink alcohol as a form of relief from fatigue caused by day-long hard work. Moreover, at present, the habit of social drinking is catching up in popularity with drinking coffee or tea. Globally, India is one of the largest markets for alcoholic beverages.

FACTS ABOUT DRINKING AND CONSEQUENT DEATHS IN INDIA

According to the third National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3, 2005–2006), close to one-third of Indians (mostly adolescents and adults) consume alcohol, and of these, 4–13 per cent of people are regular drinkers. However, a distressing trend amongst boys and girls is emerging: that their initiation to drinking starts

in late childhood. The WHO Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health (2014) states that, in India, the proportion of those consuming alcohol increased substantially during 2008–2012. It also discloses that, in 2010, over one-third (11 per cent) of the 30 per cent of alcohol consumers were heavy drinkers. The per capita consumption of alcohol by persons over 15 years of age increased from 1.6 liters during 2003–2005 to 2.2 liters during 2010–2012. In comparison, total alcohol per capita consumption in the world's population of over 15 years of age rose from 5.5 liters of pure alcohol in 2005 to 6.4 liters in 2010 (Global status report on alcohol and health 2018). It is thus evident that heavy drinking has been rising at an alarming rate for years.

Another report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2015 reveals that, during 1992–2012, per capita consumption of alcohol in India increased by 55 per cent. This is the third highest increase in the world after Russian Federation and Estonia. Globally, out of 2.3 billion drinkers in 2016, more than a quarter of adolescents (26.5 per cent) were consuming alcohol, with only a small difference between boys and girls (Global status report on alcohol and health 2018). Surprisingly, the proportion of women who drink is also on the rise. According to All Indian Institute of Medical Sciences report (Hindustan Times, 20.02.2019), the proportion of women who drink in India (1.6 per cent) is much less than that of their male counterparts (27.3 per cent). Relatively more school-going boys than girls in the age group of 14–18 engage in drinking on some occasions. Globally, at the present, the proportion of women who drink is also on the increase (Global status report on alcohol and health 2018).

The proportion of teenagers who drink in India is increasing, mainly due to their increasing positive attitude to drinking. For instance, seeing their parents, relatives, and friends drinking, they get the impression that if drinking is good for the former, it will also be for them. Factors such as association with a family who use alcoholic substances (for instance, "family drinking" in Kerala state in India), surplus pocket money, an absence of parental control, a lack of parent-children interaction, depression due to academic problems, peer group pressure and the like may lead teenagers to drink alcohol. In changing contemporary Indian society, most drinkers, whether adolescents or adults, are neither concerned about ethical issues related to alcohol nor do they attribute importance to the guiding values of their culture.

The WHO Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health (2018) discloses that, worldwide, about three million deaths (5.3 per cent of all deaths) and about 133 million disability-adjusted life years (5.1 per cent of all DALYs) in 2016 were attributable to alcohol consumption. In relation to these data, the proportion of males was twice as great as that of their female counterparts, and victims

were mostly from the economically productive age group of 25–55. Therefore, the death of millions of alcoholics all over the world has serious economic implications for the years to come. This fact is corroborated by an OECD report (2015) that states that alcohol abuse is the fifth leading cause of death and disability across the world.

The distillers of illicit alcohol in several villages in Tamil Nadu and other states of India are not concerned with the harmful effects of their chemicals on consumers. The spirit brewed illegally by local crude distillers kills some consumers immediately after drinking. For instance, in Kerala state, several people have died on different occasions after drinking *hooch*, an inferior alcoholic beverage illegally brewed mostly in villages and sold by bootleggers. Similarly, in Tamil Nadu and other states, several deaths have been reported at different times due to the consumption of illicit liquor. As many as 1,699 people died in India in 2014 after consuming harmful/illicit liquor, a notable increase compared to 2013 data. In 2015, the consumption of illegally brewed liquor claimed more than 100 lives in the Malwani area in Mumbai city. According to figures compiled from the National Crime Record Bureau (2013), during the last decade (2005–2014) Tamil Nadu state registered 1,509 deaths due to the consumption of harmful liquor. In the same period, for the same reason, Karnataka and Punjab states witnessed 1421 and 1364 deaths respectively, while 843 deaths occurred in Gujarat state.

Further, in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Utterkand in India, over 100 people died due to toxic alcohol (The Hindu, 13. 02. 2019). Similarly, in Assam state, the recent death toll due to hooch touched 155 (The Hindu, 25. 02. 2019). It is reported in The Hindu (13. 02. 2019) that "India remains among the countries with a high number of alcohol-related deaths, with poor governance, corruption and distorted policies contributing to such periodic tragedies." Numerous instances of toxic alcohol poisoning have been mainly due to the lack of affordable liquor for the poor, and an increase in the cheap brews controlled by criminal gangs.

SOCIOECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Habitual drinkers of the working class in India may have serious economic problems because more or less half of their earnings often go to wine/arrack shops. Their ability and vigor are reduced significantly, to the extent of decreasing their productivity (Institute of Alcohol Studies, 2014). For instance, in Nairobi, most employees demonstrate irregular work attendance, low productivity, poor health, and safety risks because of alcoholism (Kaithuru – Stephen 2015).

Consequently, their low earnings do not provide their family members with one full meal a day. In such a situation, their wives and children are often forced to do low paid and mostly hazardous jobs to sustain their livelihoods. The early employment of millions of children as full-time workers is a violation of their right to education.

Moreover, heavy drinkers are subject to personal disorganization. This may lead to the disregard of families and their succumbing to health-related problems. Ultimately, this will result in the disintegration of families, leading to the situation in which helpless wives and children will be forced to struggle for their survival. In the absence of parental control, children may turn into juvenile delinquents and later on become criminals. Once they are absorbed into criminal gangs, they become oriented around a criminal sub-culture, which operates counter to the dominant culture of society. As drinking is one of the traits of this sub-culture, they may become habitual drinkers sooner or later.

Alcohol and violence

According to the WHO Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health (2004), most violent incidents occur owing to the influence of alcohol. The association between the two factors has been confirmed by various studies outside India (Shepherd 1998; Budd 2003; Richardson et al. 2003; Finney 2004). Similarly, some studies conducted in India disclose that a majority of violent incidents inside or outside the home are attributable to habitual drinking (Vijayanath – Tarachand 2011; International Center for Research on Women 2000; Begum et al., 2015). In the same way, there is a close correlation between alcohol use and domestic violence in terms of wife battering, sexual harassment, child abuse, and the like. The WHO (Intimate Partner Violence and Alcohol Fact Sheet Website) reports that alcohol drinking increases the occurrence and severity of domestic violence. Collins and Spencer (2002) find that an increase in domestic violence is often related to the fact that both spouses are habitual drinkers. According to a WHO study (2004), every third violent husband is a drinker who is responsible for most of the violent incidences that occur when partners are under the influence of alcohol. McClelland and Teplin (2001) disclose that, in the United States, close to 40 per cent of police calls are due to domestic violence caused by alcoholic husbands. Studies on partner violence indicate that this sort of violence is more severe when men are intoxicated by alcohol (Leonard 2005; McKinney et al. 2010). Some other studies point out that partner violence is typically severe when both partners happen to be habitual drinkers (Thompson – Kingree 2006; Stanley 2008). Another study (Marlene Berg et al. 2010) claims

that alcoholic husbands are responsible for causing domestic violence. Men play a predominant role in this (Fazonne et al. 1997), while women's role is relatively smaller (Kaufman – Strauss, 1987). The alcohol-related death of husbands turns many young women into widows. Many women of the working class are subject to physical harassment at the hands of their drunkard husbands, and hence they invariably support a ban on liquor. There is, therefore, a strong correlation between drinking on the one hand and physical violence between life partners on the other that eventually results in the cessation of marital bonds.

The following episode, based on a case study conducted in the west of Tirunelveli district in Southern Tamil Nadu state in 2007, describes wife battering under the influence of alcohol (Karunanithi, 2010).

> In a village situated in the west of the Tirunelveli District of Tamil Nadu state, a drunkard husband used to quarrel with his wife almost every day for trivial reasons, but her refusal to give him money for drinking seemed to have been the main cause. He never cared about the presence of his young son and daughter while beating her. They were unable to do anything except to sympathize with their helpless mother. One night, in their absence, the drunkard husband hit her brutally with a strong wooden pole. As she received severe head injuries, she had heavy blood loss and ultimately succumbed to her injuries. In order to escape responsibility for this murder, he poured kerosene on her body and burnt it beyond recognition. As a pretext, he shouted that she had committed suicide. Afterwards, he was remanded in custody, charged with the murder of his wife. After a trial of some months, the court ordered him to undergo a double sentence of life imprisonment. Though the children were then placed under the care of their maternal grandparents, the loss of their mother affected them very much.

In support of this, a recent analysis by the National Family Health Survey-3 reveals that there is an association between violence against women and the drinking habits of their husbands.

Other effects of alcohol

In workplaces, the negative impact of alcohol consumption on workers includes early death, injuries, fatal road accidents, damage to equipment, frequent absenteeism, a lack of punctuality, a loss of efficiency, loss of production, low morale, weak productive relations, and the like. For instance, according to

Indian industry association sources, 15–20 per cent of absenteeism and about 40 per cent of accidents at workplaces are due to alcohol consumption (Saxena, et al., 2003). Moreover, most road accidents that result in casualties are due to drinking (Cherpitel et al., 2009).

Similarly, customary drinking is one of the major causes of suicide, which is increasing. A study by Maurizio Pompili et al. (2010) shows that drinking consistently precipitates suicidal tendencies. Hence, alcoholics are at increased risk of suicide while drinking (Frances et al., 1987; Richardson et al., 2003; Brady, 2006). Some other studies claim that Alcohol Use Disorder (AUD) significantly increases the risk of suicidal thoughts, suicide attempts, and ultimately, successful attempts at suicide by alcoholics. The association between alcohol use on the one hand and suicide and homicide on the other is evident (Lester, 1995; Gruenewald et al., 1995). Thus alcoholism is an important predictor of suicide and greatly responsible for premature deaths.

In one way or another, excessive drinkers are typically associated with criminal behavior. The U.S. Department of Justice claims that a majority of criminal offenders are under the influence of alcohol while committing crimes. The Federal Research Program authorized by the U.S. Congress confirms that alcoholism is an important factor in about 40 per cent of homicides.

Alcohol-related problems confronting women

In millions of laboring families in India, due to the presence of drunkard husbands, women have become the main breadwinners and started attempting to maintain the balance between household income and expenditure. A majority of marginalized women in rural India are members of Self-Help Groups (SHGs) organized mostly with the support of local NGOs to develop and empower women. These groups orient them in terms of financial management, particularly in relation to saving for the future and accomplishing economic empowerment, which is a prerequisite of their social and political empowerment. A case study about a poor rural woman engaged in *beedi* (local cigarette) making conducted in the west of Tirunelveli district in Southern Tamil Nadu state in 2009 explains how a drunkard husband created challenges for his wife and how she overcame those challenges with the support of a SHG (Karunanithi, 2010).

> I was primarily a *beedi* worker and a mother of three girl children aged from 10–18. Since my husband was addicted to alcohol, he was in no way helpful to us economically or morally. My earnings were the major source for sustaining the livelihood of my family. However, by force,

he often used to get a sizeable portion of my earnings for drinking. At one point in time, from compulsion, I borrowed money from a local moneylender at a high interest rate. After some time, I found it very difficult to pay back the interest.

In this circumstance, I necessarily had to compel my first daughter, who was studying at secondary school, to roll *beedis* to increase our income in order to meet our basic needs, besides repaying the interest. Subsequently, my second daughter, who was studying at primary school, also fell into the same line of work. Unfortunately, both of them were denied education due to no fault of their own. But, fortunately, I joined a SHG formed in my village by a local NGO. Over a short period, all members were able to mobilize a sizeable corpus fund for the group by making a weekly contribution.

As a result, I availed myself of financial support in terms of a few thousand INR at nominal interest from the group corpus fund, besides receiving my share of bank microcredit taken out by my group for entrepreneurial activities. With this, I cleared my debt and was relieved from the fetters of the moneylender. Although I had deprived the right of my two daughters to education, I decided to allow my third daughter to pursue collegiate education. Meanwhile, I managed to get my first daughter married, and to guide my second one to join other SHG. With the help and support of the members of my group and the NGO, I somehow set right the behavior of my husband and also made him assume several family responsibilities. Moreover, I am now heading my household and making decisions relating to all our domestic affairs in consultation with my group members.

At present, in Tamil Nadu state, the proportion of women-headed households in rural areas is increasing. This is perhaps due to the fact that their husbands are drunkards and reckless. As the former earn more than their husbands do, the household economy is mostly based on the earnings of their wives. Consequently, they become the main breadwinners in their households. However, in many households a day-to-day problem that the former face is none other than the fact that their husbands assault them to get money for drinking. In rural areas, women, in spite of their major contribution to household income, are often subject to physical harassment by their drunkard husbands. However, it is the moral responsibility of the government to tackle alcohol-related problems in order to solve the numerous problems caused by drinking and restore harmony to millions of families. It is therefore relevant here to discuss the stand of the Tamil Nadu government over the years as regards the introduction of a total ban on liquor.

PROHIBITION AND POLITICS IN TAMIL NADU STATE

Prohibition and its relation to public elections have been a part of Tamil Nadu state politics over several decades, while Tamil Nadu state continues to be a significant market for liquor in India. The logic and hypocrisy of prohibition lies in the fact that it significantly helps politicians obtain the electoral support of women. Moreover, prohibition has become the moral responsibility of the government in terms of saving people from drink-related tragedy. However, the huge revenue required by the government from liquor sales is equally important. Therefore, the immediate task is how to moderate the socioeconomic consequences of alcoholism.

In Tamil Nadu state, the demand for prohibition dates back to the late 1930s. The Madras Presidency's Chief Minister, C. Rajagopalachari, introduced total prohibition in Salem (a city situated in western Tamil Nadu) in 1937 on an experimental basis, which was enforced later across the state. In 1948, the then chief minister of Madras State, Omandur Ramasamy Reddiyar, introduced total prohibition, which remained in force until 1970. In 1971, the ruling *Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (DMK, an offshoot of the Dravidian Movement in Tamil Nadu started in 1916) lifted the ban, but in the same year Rajagopalachari met the then chief minister, M. Karunanidhi, to plead against lifting prohibition on the grounds that drinking would adversely affect future generations (The Hindu, 22. 07. 2015). Consequently, the same government enforced total prohibition in 1974. Later on, the government of the ruling *All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (AIADMK, an offshoot of DMK) lifted the ban in 1981, allowing the sale of arrack and toddy as well. In 1983, it created the Tamil Nadu State Marketing Corporation (TASMAC) to sell liquor throughout the state. This corporation has ironclad control over the distribution of liquor in the state. Subsequently, the government moved further to tighten TASMAC's grip over liquor sales (through 6,798 retail outlets) in the state due to its potential to bring in huge revenue. As a result of this, during 2010–2011 it earned 180,000 million INR (Prabhakar, The Economics Times, 2013).

Again in 1987, the ruling AIADMK government introduced a ban on liquor because of a series of deaths caused by the consumption of illicit liquor. After returning to power in 1989, the DMK government reinstated the policy of selling arrack and toddy in 1990. In this period, liquor in polythene packets was sold at cheaper prices. But the AIADMK government overturned this after coming to power again in 1991 in order to fulfill an election promise to ban the sale of arrack and toddy. However, in 2002, the AIADMK government permitted the sale of cheap liquor through TASMAC for the reason that Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) was beyond the reach of poor people. This change brought the

government huge revenue during 2014–2015 (The Indian Express, 19. 04. 2016). When AIADMK started their election campaign on April 9, 2016, the then Tamil Nadu chief minister announced that the government would implement prohibition in a phased manner if the party were voted into power. On the other hand, DMK in its election manifesto promised to introduce total prohibition to the state. When AIADMK came to power in 2016, the then chief minister, as announced during election time, ordered the closing down of 500 TASMAC outlets in the first phase. Later on, the newly appointed chief minister from the same party ordered the closing down of 500 more liquor outlets in February 2017. Even after the closure of 1000 outlets, 5262 outlets are in operation at present. This is perhaps why, during *Diwali* festival time in November 2018, TASMAC earned 33 million INR, which shows that alcohol consumption in the state is increasing. Nevertheless, the government has promised to implement total prohibition in a phased manner.

The sequential attempts of the Tamil Nadu government to enforce as well as lift prohibition show one thing clearly: that the ruling Dravidian Parties (DMK and AIDMK) have drawn prohibition into politics. These two parties have alternated between a policy of total prohibition and total indulgence for over half a century. Consequently, a large section of population, mostly poor and low-income groups have become addicts to alcohol, besides spreading this addiction to a sizeable number of adolescents. Although both parties have already promised to introduce total prohibition, both of them are equally interested in generating revenue from the liquor business. The TASMAC happens to be an especially useful tool for influencing their potential voting bloc in terms of permitting free access to alcohol. Therefore, permanent and total prohibition in Tamil Nadu state is doubtful in future.

PROHIBITION IN SOME OTHER STATES OF INDIA

Alcohol consumption was prohibited in Gujarat state in 1958 to honor Mahatma Gandhi, who made repeated appeals to the people of India to abstain from trading and drinking alcohol. Considering his appeal, the Constitution of India included Article 47 in the Directive Principles of State Policy, which gives the right to states to introduce prohibition. But, in contemporary Gujarat state, alcohol consumption has been rampant. Rahi Gaikwad (The Hindu 31.08.2014) says that, according to a police source, a "bootlegging modus operandi" has technically been developed in such a way as to supply illicit alcohol clandestinely. Accordingly, illicit liquor from some states is being supplied to

Gujarat state surreptitiously. It is thus clear that total prohibition in this state has proven to be unsuccessful. Additionally, total prohibition is presently in operation in three states in India (Bihar, Nagaland and Manipur) and an island (Lakshadweep). Though these states and a few more states (Kerala and Andhra Pradesh) have banned alcohol either totally or partially, they continue to face the problem of the illegal and secret supply of alcohol. For instance, after the proclamation of a total ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol on 1 April 2016 by the Bihar government, over 71,000 people in the state were arrested under the new liquor law. The authorities concerned had seized 852,452 liters of India Made Foreign Liquor, 560,770 liters of domestic brew, and 11,617 liters of beer by the first quarter of 2017 (Firstpost, 02. 02. 2019).

It is important to mention that several states in India have been experiencing anti-liquor protests in the recent past. Tamil Nadu state in particular has been witnessing similar protests since July 2015 associated with a demand for total prohibition.

ANTI-LIQUOR PROTESTS IN CONTEMPORARY TAMIL NADU STATE

This sort of protest, or Temperance movement, was not reported in earlier periods of Tamil Nadu state because the proportion of alcohol-related crimes and violent incidents including domestic violence were insignificant. In contrast, since independence, such sorts of crimes and incidents in the state have multiplied disproportionately, necessitating anti-liquor protests all over the state. Here the aim is to focus on a selection of such protests in contemporary Tamil Nadu state. In August 2015, there were a series of demonstrations against alcohol by civilians, including students, across the state. During these anti-liquor protests, several opposition parties united to call for a statewide *bandh* (a general strike) to press the AIADMK ruling party to implement total prohibition. Local parties in the state such as the *Paattali Makkal Katchi* (PMK) and the *Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam* (MDMK, an offshoot of DMK) were consistent in demanding total prohibition. They often protested against the setting up of new TASMAC outlets, as well as new Elite TASMAC shops (exclusive outlets for imported liquor). Here three anti-alcohol protests in the state are worth describing.

First, in August 2015 the residents of Kalingapatti (a village in Tirunelveli district of southern Tamil Nadu state) tried to lock down a TASMAC outlet situated in the village. A protest aimed at closing down the outlet was led by the

aging mother of MDMK party president. When villagers and workers from this party and *Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi* (VCK- Liberation Panther Party) were trying to ransack an outlet, police resorted to a lathi charge and fired tear gas.

Second, the situation became acute when Sasi Perumal, a Gandhian activist, died on 31 July 2015 during a protest in the Kanyakumari district of southern Tamil Nadu state while demanding the closure of a liquor shop (The Indian Express, 01. 08. 2015). Consequently, protests erupted across the state targeting TASMAC shops. Protesters forced the owners to shut down their shops in many parts of the state, and in some places they ransacked and vandalized.

Third, during this protest, police arrested Kovan, a folk singer and a member of *Makkal Kalai Iyakkam* (People's Arts Movement) on 30 October 2015, who through his songs criticized the government for its way of earning revenue through liquor. He was arrested on sedition charges, with the claim that his songs criticized the state government. Most of the opposition party leaders rallied behind him and sought his immediate release. Anti-liquor protests in Tamil Nadu state are also, in one way or another, influenced by a similar protest in the 1990s spearheaded by rural women in Andhra Pradesh, which stunned the government as well as the ruling party (Kancha Ilaiah, 1992: 2406-2408).

In addition to this, similar protests have been organized in several parts of the state. However, women are typically at the forefront of protests against alcohol consumption, as they have experienced its dreadful consequences over the years. For instance, a group of women in Anaikatty village in Coimbatore district of western Tamil Nadu state organized an anti-liquor agitation on 1 April 2017 in a Gandhian way (non-violent), demanding the closure of a TASMAC shop located there. After three month of peaceful agitation, they succeeded (Sudhir, Firstpost, 27. 04. 2017). On 4 April 2017 there was a grave scuffle between protesters and owners of a TASMAC outlet in Serinchamalai village in the same district. When a higher police official tried to intervene, he was assaulted by the protesters (Rakesh Mehar, The News Minute, 26. 04. 2017). On 23 April 2017, a group of 28 persons, including 17 women, vandalized a newly opened TASMAC shop in Mecheri town in Salem city in Tamil Nadu state. For a week, they protested against the move to shift the location of the shop even after the issuance of a court order. Despite their peaceful agitation, the event of the shop opening turned the protesters into vandals who damaged the shop, resulting in their immediate arrest (Sudhir, Firstpost, 27. 04. 2017).

National and state-level political parties supported the protests by stressing the ban on liquor. Importantly, in the wake of the Tamil Nadu Assembly election in May 2016, the prohibition agenda was ranked in first place on the list of election manifestos released by all political parties. It was figured particularly prominently in DMK party's election declaration, which proclaimed that when

they came to power, the first signature of the incoming chief minister would be on a law implementing total prohibition with immediate effect. On the other hand, the AIADMK party promised to introduce total prohibition in a phased manner if elected to power.

Whichever party (either DMK or AIADMK) comes to power, it prefers to lift the ban on liquor to generate more revenue due to its facing a financial crunch. But, during election time, prohibition becomes a rightful *mantra* for these political parties that are deployed to attract the attention of women voters. Thus, prohibition becomes their seasonal game. The act of enforcing a total ban on liquor would result in the closure of most of the subsidy programs of the government. Therefore, an attempt to regulate sales of liquor may perhaps be a substitute for total prohibition. However, the application of this regulation depends on the government's stand in terms of maintaining a balance between revenue and development.

However, the question that needs to be addressed now is whether total prohibition would result in an illegal supply of hooch or illicit alcohol. Undoubtedly, the answer is yes if the state fails to define decisive as well as deterrent measures to stop this. Otherwise, the state would experience regular hooch-related tragedies, mostly involving poor sections of the population. For instance, some rural unemployed youth are likely to take to bootlegging, which is associated with two problems: corruption and smuggling. In other words, bootleggers have to pay bribes to political leaders and officials to encourage them to overlook their illicit brewing and illegal transportation of alcohol. Shiv Viswanathan (The Hindu, 11. 04. 2016) holds a similar view as regards the situation in Kerala state, where bar owners reported that they were paying huge sums of money as bribes to various political leaders to permit them to run their businesses without problems.

Presumably, total prohibition in Tamil Nadu state is not possible until the distillery units supported by the DMK and AIADMK leaders[5] are closed down. In a similar vein, Justice Sandru, a former Madras High Court Judge, points out that the release of election manifestos by the Dravidian political parties is a form of election stunt, because both parties have experienced the pros and cons of introducing as well as lifting prohibition because they have alternatively ruled Tamil Nadu state since 1967. It is, therefore, implicit that they do not want to stick to a policy of total prohibition. Venkatesh Athreya, an economist, while accepting the impossibility of implementing total prohibition, indicates that it

5 According to the TASMAC website, there are currently 11 distilleries and 7 breweries in Tamil Nadu state. Some of them are supported by the DMK party and others by the AIADMK party (Sameera Ahmed, The New Minute, 06.08. 2015).

is possible for the present ruling AIADMK party to prolong the introduction of total prohibition without end, even after having committed to introduce total prohibition in a phased manner (The Hind [Tamil], 12. 04. 2016).

Public opinion in Tamil Nadu state is that, since the government has become intoxicated by alcohol revenue, it will not implement total prohibition. Moreover, distilleries and breweries are supported by strong political leaders of DMK and AIADMK and their close relatives.

Therefore, whichever of these parties comes to power, the possibility of introducing total prohibition will remain a daydream. This may be true of other states because they also seek revenue even in difficult situations. For instance, after forty days of lockdown due to COVID-19, liquor shops across various states in India were opened from May 4 2020. Long queues marked the reopening of liquor vending outlets in all places, with no concern about social distancing. Moreover, protests were held in several places against the reopening of such liquor outlets. The question now arises, why did the government re-open liquor shops in this critical situation? The answer is that liquor sales are one of the major sources of revenue for states. As most of the states are under pressure to raise funds to deal with COVID-19, they did so with disregard for the other drawbacks.

CONCLUSION

In spite of the fact that more than one-third of tax revenue comes from the TASMAC, the present ruling AIADMK party in Tamil Nadu state has committed to enforcing total prohibition in a phased manner. Nevertheless, earlier experiments with prohibition in the state show that the quick or gradual closure of liquor shops results in the emergence of an underground trade in illicit alcohol. In such a situation, habitual drinkers visit local bootleggers or liquor shops in Pondicherry (nearby union territory) by crossing state borders. Moreover, a total ban would necessarily require the government to face an uphill task of providing alternate employment to those presently employed in more than 5200 TASMAC shops all over the state, and more importantly, generating an alternate source of revenue.

Despite these shortcomings, the ruling AIADMK appears to be determined to implement the policy it committed itself to in 2016 election manifesto with respect to total prohibition, even in consideration of the future of several million families in the state. It is perhaps the right time to enforce a total ban on liquor step by step, because the state is getting ready for elections to the assembly in 2021. In this task, all political parties, public-, civil service- and similar bodies

may extend their full support to the government. Eventually, this may save a large section of population in the state from drowning in alcohol and becoming spoiled.

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INDIGENOUS POLICING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE OKPOSI COMMUNITY IN OHAOZARA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, EBONYI STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT This study explores autochthonous methods of policing and law enforcement in the community, and the perception of indigenes of the efficacy of these methods. Qualitative methods were adopted, involving the use of in-depth interview technique with indigenes: namely, members of a youth forum, community leaders, and elders. Findings show that offences in Okposi community may be classified into two types: abominations, and torts, while the indigenous crime prevention and control structure involves *Ndi Uke* (a community male elders' council), *Unyom Okposi* (a council of female elders), *Ndi Okenye* (village elders' council), and Ndi *Okorobia* (youths). Fear of the inevitability of spiritual consequences from the gods appears to be a good source of crime deterrence. Traditional methods of policing were deemed more effective in relation to crime control. It is recommended that the Nigerian police should continue to take advantage of cordial relationships with the community to enhance peace, security, and justice.

KEYWORDS: Traditional policing, criminal justice, theory, Okposi

INTRODUCTION

Crime and deviance are global phenomena. Not all members of society conform to societal norms or laws. Policing is therefore required to secure lives and property in communities (Reiner, 2010). Though securing lives and property is the function of the government, civilians may also play a significant

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role in securing the community (Kasali − Odetola, 2016). Crime and deviance are prevented and controlled in varying ways in cultures around the world (Lambert, Jaishankar, Jiang, Pasupuleti, and Bhimarasetty, 2012). In England, during the early stages of societal development, the function of crime prevention and control was performed by members of various communities (Salter, 2014). According to Potter (2013), prior to the present formal method of policing there existed informal community-based policing (known as the "Watch"), in which volunteers were responsible for policing communities. During the precolonial period, Indian communities were also policed through informal indigenous methods (Lambert, et al 2012). In Africa, Baker (2008) affirmed the use of informal methods of crime control and sanctioning of offenders. In Nigeria, virtually all ethnic groups or communities still operate some form of traditional law enforcement and control.

Alemika (1993) observed that policing refers to coercive and ideological ways of regulating social life by the police and other state intelligence and security forces, as well as other methods put in place to inhibit behaviors that endanger social order. Violators of social norms are subjected to negative sanctions depending on the severity of the offence, and punishment/sanctions are meted out to those who violate norms (Little, 2013). This is done for the purpose of specific and general deterrence (Scharfer, 2002). Across communities, laws vary concerning who may be identified as an offender, the punishments that various offences attract, and how to restore damaged social relations (Cottino, 2008). According to Ordu − Nnam (2017), for the protection of lives and property behaviors considered harmful should be criminalized, and laws against such behaviors enforced.

Though the Nigerian police force is saddled with the constitutional power to secure the entire country, the importance of police collaborating with indigenous communities has culminated in the introduction of community policing. However, according to Gbenemene − Adishi (2017), little success has been recorded in this area due to the nature of the relationship between the police and members of the community, which is characterized by the distrust and unwillingness of police to share power with civilians. Nonetheless, indigenous communities retain informal methods of policing their communities. It is worthy of note that the introduction of a formal police force has reduced the extent of application of indigenous methods of policing. Some authors have noted that the prevention and control of crime across Nigeria by modern, government-based, law-enforcement agencies has not yielded the desired result, as the crime rate continues to rise (Ayuk − Emeka − Uyang, 2013).

Against this background, this study focuses on the indigenous approach to crime prevention and control in Okposi community. So far, studies on policing

in Nigeria have focused on the informal policing strategies adopted by other ethnic groups, as well as informal policing in some Igbo communities, and the inadequacies of the Nigerian police force, and the nature of the relationship between the police and members of the public. The objective of this study was to examine the autochthonous method of policing peculiar to the Okposi community and the perception of community members about the effectiveness of autochthonous methods of policing in the community. The focus of the paper was informed by the failure of Nigerian police to adequately create security in relation to lives and property in the country (Ayuk − Emeka − Uyang, 2013), which has made local communities uphold and prefer their autochthonous policing methods.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Historical Overview

According to Ricken (2012), issues of local crime and security in traditional communities are addressed through the informal criminal justice system. Ricken (2012) added that informal methods of policing are popular on the one hand for being accessible, inexpensive, and quick. On the other hand, they may be criticized for being biased against women and other disadvantaged groups, and their noncompliance with international standards. For Melton (1995), outside the African continent the use of indigenous methods of policing endure alongside the modern system of criminal justice administration. Aiyedun − Odor (2016) observed that the introduction of English methods of policing notwithstanding, traditional African methods of enforcing justice still persist. In Elechi's (2006) study of the coexistence of African indigenous methods of justice administration and the justice administration system introduced by colonialists, it was noted that the two systems could be characterized by a duplication of functions and competition with each other. In comparing modern and traditional methods of crime prevention and control, Ayuk − Emeka − Iyang (2013) stated that despite the sophisticated equipment used by modern security agencies, the rate of crime in modern societies is higher than that of traditional societies in which crime is controlled without such sophistication.

In African traditional communities, crime is perceived as an abomination and consequently attracts severe consequences (Igbo − Ugwoke, 2013). With the advent of customary courts in Nigeria's judicial history, many traditional laws have been recorded over the years. However, in spite of the non-documentation

of traditional laws, traditional laws that are not documented have been sustained and transmitted from generation to generation through oral traditional, and these laws nonetheless exert control over people's involvement in crime and deviant behavior (Genger, 2018; Okafor, 2006). However, Ebbe (2000) noted that colonialism and the consequent introduction of an English justice administration system have changed the prevailing customary order. Ebbe (2000) asserts that, as custodians of people's culture and the head of traditional institutions, it is the role of traditional rulers of each community in Nigeria to ensure that the norms of the community are not violated, and that those who violate them are sanctioned appropriately.

In Nigeria the police force has been mandated by the constitution to maintain law and order (Odisu, 2016).

Examples from Nigerian Communities

Abdulqadir (2016) stated that traditional rulers play a significant role in crime prevention and control across Nigerian communities. In Nigeria, one can find differing levels of confidence in traditional and community policing. For instance, Owumi − Ajayi (2013) found that due to the negative perception the Yorubas have about the police, people are advised to avoid mingling with them to forestall being assaulted. To buttress this point, Ajayi (2018) examined the indigenous methods of security maintenance in Ilogbo-Ekiti (a Yoruba community) and found that the community maintained the security of lives and property by enforcing norms through the imposition of sanctions ranging from ridicule, ostracism, excommunication, and death, depending on the offence committed. In this paper, the authors add that, with regard to capital punishment, only the state is empowered to carry out that sentence through the constitutional courts, but traditional societies rely on the judgment and discretion of deities to pass death sentences through unscientific or "spiritual" methods.

The findings of Idumwonyi − Ikhidero (2013), who studied the relevance of traditional policing in communities in Benin and in the Bini ethnic group in Nigeria, revealed that traditional methods which involve the use of the supernatural in crime control are preferred by members of communities due to the inadequacies of the modern system of policing. Zalanga (2018) noted that, with the high level of religiosity of Nigerians, Nigerians believe that the spiritual world controls the physical world. This is reflected in a study by Akubor (2016), who examined the use of masquerades in social control.

Akubor's (2016) findings showed that masquerades in various communities such as the *Erinni* (*Elimin* masquerades) among the Esan (a Benin Kingdom

ethnic group located in Edo State, Nigeria) are believed to be organic to their myth of creation and operate as the major moderators of people's destiny. As far as individuals are concerned, the former are ancestral spirits who periodically visit their living forebears in masquerade forms. The *Elimin* are believed to possess power over life and death. Consequently, serious crimes are reported to them for adjudication and pronouncement of sentence, which may be severe, depending on the offence that is committed. According to Akubor (2016), another example can be found among the Ejagham society of Cross River State, whereby the task of detecting witches and wizards rests with the *Echi-Obasi-njom* (the masquerade). *Echi-Obasi-njom* carries out this function through a wheeling, gliding dance that is organized by society.

Okoraforezeke (2003), in his study of traditional social control mechanisms in Igbo land, found that unofficial indigenous law enforcement apparatus employed by the people played a significant role in social control. According to Okoraforezeke (2003), those convicted of crimes against public morality are ostracized as a punishment to deter others from engaging in such acts, while the enforcement of norms is done by organs and groups of law enforcers created by the community. The Igbos, according to Aniche (2015), historically policed their communities using the age-grade system.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Social Control Theory

According to Jensen, (2003), this type of theory has its roots in perspectives about human society proposed by the English social philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who argued that human nature would create a perennial war of all against all were choices not constrained by inherent social contracts, agreements, and arrangements among people. Thus, such moral designations are created in the construction of social order which also assign costs and consequences to certain choices, while defining some as evil, immoral, or illegal (Jensen, 2003). Social control theory suggests that an individual's socialization and social learning process can be developed to build self-control. This eventually lessens the tendency to engage in behavior regarded as antisocial (Osisiogu, 2013). Control theory starts with the assumption that the motivation for criminal behavior is a part of human nature, and that all individuals would naturally commit crimes if left to their own devices (Haskell − Yablonsky, 1978).

Reiss (1951) argued that delinquency, for instance, was the result of a failure of personal and social control. Toby, in his explanation of behavioral control (1957), introduced the concept of having a "stake in conformity" as the basic mechanism by which tendencies toward delinquency are controlled. Nye's (1958) study focused on the family as the single most important source of social control for adolescents. For Reckless (1961), all individuals are affected by a variety of forces that drive them toward crime and delinquency, while a variety of other forces restrain them. Reckless (1961) called the driving forces "social control pressures." Sykes − Matza's (1957) study of delinquency noted that most of the time delinquents are engaged in routine law-abiding behavior, and that delinquents "age out" of delinquency when they reach late adolescence or early adulthood. The former also developed an analysis of "neutralization," a strategy adopted to rationalize deviant behavior.

Hirschi's (1969) social control theory posits that crime is a product of the weakening of bonds that connect people to society. According to Hirschi (1969), every individual is a potential law violator. What deters them from offending is the fear that violating a law would damage the relationship they have with family, friends, neighbors, colleagues, and community. Thus, the absence of social bonds predisposes people to commit illegal behavior. People become law violators when the bond they share with members of their religious, ethnic, racial, peer, and other groups become weak. Hirschi (1969) differentiated the bonds that people share with society into the following types: Attachment – this refers to a person's sensitivity and concern for others. For instance, for people's behavior to be controlled, resulting in abstinence from criminal behavior, they have to be attached to parents, peers, schools, work or community, to mention a few factors; Commitment – this refers to investing time, energy, and resources into acquiring an education, building a career, and growing business enterprises. Having invested a lot to succeed in these areas, individuals are less likely to get involved in acts that would endanger what they have toiled to build over the years, unlike those who have invested little or nothing; Involvement – people are detached from criminal activity if they are involved in legitimate or conventional activities such as business, school, religious, or any other social activity which leaves them with no time to consider committing a crime; and, Belief – which refers to shared belief in what is considered moral among members of a particular society or group. Values that are upheld in a society such as hard work, sharing, peace, abstinence from "evil," etc. are adhered to if they constitute the moral standards of that society. Those who engage in criminal or antisocial behaviors are those who lack such beliefs or those whose beliefs in the moral values of society are degraded.

In Okposi community, members are socialized to abstain from behaviors that could subject their family to shame and ridicule. Those who are attached to family and friends do not violate social norms so as not to jeopardize the bond between them. In traditional societies like that of the Okposi, there is shared knowledge of each other's background. Being attached to family and upholding the "good name" of a family can deter individuals from engaging in behaviors that would result in the family being ridiculed. In the same vein, attachment to friends could result in conformity with social norms so as to avoid attracting the stigma associated with unacceptable behavior in traditional societies. It is the collective responsibility of all members of the Okposi community to ensure that the norms and values of people are protected.

The Theory of Reintegrative Shaming

This theory is relevant for understanding traditional methods of criminal justice. The major proponent of this theory, Braithwaite (1989), stated that societies have lower crime rates if they effectively communicate shame about crime. For instance, societies will have a lot of violence if violent behavior is not shameful, or high rates of rape if rape is something men can boast about, or widespread white-collar crime if business people think law-breaking is intelligent rather than shameful (Braithwaite, 1989). Distinguishing between reintegrative shaming and stigmatization, Braithwaite (1989) stated that the former discourages deviance by treating offenders as good people who have deviated from norms whose behavior should be corrected, while stigmatization treats offenders as bad people, leaving them with permanent stigma.

Braithwaite (1989) mentions an example of research that supports this theory that was produced by an Afghan criminologist at the University of Edinburgh, A. Ali Serisht. Serisht noted that the Pushtoon, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, have an institution called Nanante that is similar to the concept of conferencing. This involves a ceremony during which a criminal offender brings flour and other food and kills a sheep for a community feast. This feast is usually held at the victim's house, and the victim will participate in cooking the food the offender brings. The offender is reminded of their injustice and reminded that they are still a member of the community (Braithwaite, 1989). Also, it has been shown that American families that confront wrongdoing while sustaining relationships of love and respect for their children are the types of families most likely to raise law-abiding citizens (Braithwaite, 1989: 71-83). Makkai − Braithwaite's (1994) study on the enforcement philosophy of nursing home inspectors in Australia, the US, and UK suggests that inspectors are

ineffective when they are tolerant and non-judgmental in the face of failures by nursing home management regarding meeting the standards of care for the elderly required by the law. Nursing home compliance with the law actually declines following inspections by tolerant and understanding inspectors.

STUDY SETTING AND METHODS

The study was conducted among indigenes of the Okposi community in the Ohaozara Local Government Area of Ebonyi State. Ebonyi State is one of the 36 states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Ohaozara has a total area of 312 km² and, according to National Population Commission projections, had a population of 165,895 in 2010 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013). The motto of Ebonyi State, *Salt of the Nation,* is derived from the salt lake located in the area. An exploratory research design and qualitative methods of data collection were adopted for the study. Data were elicited from indigenes of the community using in-depth interviews, through which respondents were engaged in face-to-face interaction. Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were employed to select respondents. In the first instance, an elderly male community leader and a youth leader were approached in respect of the research, the purpose of which was explained to them. After giving consent to participating in the research, the elderly community leader directed the researchers to other community leaders who also participated. The community leaders in turn directed the researchers to other adults who have knowledge of indigenous policing and justice administration in the community. The inclusion criteria for the selection of respondents were: indigeneship (only indigenes were selected), and age (30 years old or older). The thirty-year benchmark was adopted to select out respondents who were knowledgeable about the objective of the study. A total of 122 respondents were interviewed, as follows: 15 youths, 31 community leaders, and 76 elders holding no leadership positions. Nine (9) research assistants assisted with data collection without an honorarium. Out of the 122 respondents, 92 were males, while 30 were females. All the respondents were engaged in farming. Thirty-nine respondents combined farming with artisanship, while 83 respondents combined farming with trade. Data were recorded using field notes and thereafter subjected to manual thematic analysis. Patterns within the data were organized according to the objectives of the study. To distinguish between respondents, a coding system was adopted in which respondents were assigned pseudonyms. To elicit information from the respondents, the interviews were guided by the following questions at the start of the interviews.

i. What constitutes a criminal offence in traditional Okposi community?
ii. Who are the informal law enforcers in Okposi community?
iii. In which indigenous ways are violations of law dealt with?
iv. What is your perception about the efficacy of indigenous and formal methods of crime prevention and control?
v. To what extent do members of the community partner with the Nigerian police in dealing with offenders?

There were follow-up questions for each respondent based on the answers they provided. Prior to the interview, the purpose of the research was explained to the respondents and consent was received from each of them. No honorarium was given to participants or research assistants for participating in the research. Each interview session lasted for 45 minutes. Sample saturation was reached after the 122nd person was interviewed. At that point, no new information was elicited, and sufficient data that addressed the objective of the study had been collected. Respondents were not subjected to stress as they were allowed to choose a time and venue conducive for them for the interview after informed consent was granted.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The findings of this study are divided into four sub-themes identified from respondents' responses: Indigenous prohibitions: 1) abomination (*aruru ani*) and torts (*njo*); 2) indigenous structure in relation to social order; 3) community perception: juxtaposing autochthonous and formal crime prevention and control; and 4) involvement of the police. With reference to social control theory adopted in this study, findings fall into the second type of social control identified by Cragum and Cragum (2006), which is informal social control. To ensure social order in Okposi community, behaviors are controlled through norms and the enforcement of compliance with norms through indigenous structure. The community's methods of controlling deviant and criminal behaviors are discussed in sub-themes below.

Indigenous prohibitions: Abomination and torts

What constitutes an offence in Okposi community may be classified into two sub-groups: abomination (aruru ani), and torts (njo). Findings show that actions

that are considered and treated as abominations and torts in Okposi are not in dissonance with the criminal laws of Nigeria. However, the autochthonous methods of treating offenders differ from those of the formal criminal justice system. In the study area, abominations are actions or behaviors that community members must avoid to forestall incurring the wrath of the gods, and avoid subjecting the entire community to attendant dire consequences. In Okposi community, abominations known as *Aruru ani* are serious offences against the land and collective morality and the existence of the entire community. Offenders are therefore deemed to have committed a crime against the entire community. Such offences include suicide, murder, manslaughter, incest, and adultery. The punishment for such offences may include death, to be carried out by the gods spiritually. The reliance of the community on gods to spiritually carry out this punishment is premised on the belief of the community that the gods are powerful and just; and also due to the constitution and laws of Nigeria, which empower only the formal criminal justice system to punish offenders. Banishment can also be pronounced traditionally and enforced through isolation or disassociation, but in reality it is difficult to enforce legally. Forms of closure include material compensation and public-apology ceremonies.

The following actions were identified by respondents as abominable and torts for the Okposi:

Homicide – Spilling of blood (which is sacred) is abhorred in Okposi community. The offence of willful murder is therefore punishable by death, inflicted by the gods of the land. Upon commission of the crime, the elders of the community unanimously place a curse on the offender, and collectively pronounce judgment upon him or her. This punishment is executed by the gods of the land, as it is expected that within one year of the time the crime was committed the offender will meet his or her death mysteriously. Furthermore, everyone who comes across the offender affirms the popular belief, saying to the offender, "may the consequence of your offence befall you." Within one year, the offender will encounter an occurrence that will result in his or her death. The offence of murder is a rarity in the Okposi community. For homicide committed by unknown person(s), the elders of the community unanimously place a curse on whoever committed the crime, and ask the gods to avenge the death of the deceased. Thereafter, the deceased is buried with a cutlass and is urged to use the cutlass against whoever was responsible for their death. With regard to this, an elderly respondent stated that:

> *Shedding of blood is an abomination and the gods of the land do not spare murderers. We believe in ometara vuru (anyone who gets involved in an evil act should meet their nemesis). Therefore, we hand the*

> *killer over to the gods of the land to avenge the death of the deceased.* (Uka/M/IDI/Okposi)

Manslaughter – The offence of manslaughter is pardonable (within the community, but police involvement could involve state prosecution). The offender is usually mandated to bear all the cost of burying the deceased. Thereafter, the community makes peace between the families of the deceased and the offender to facilitate reconciliation and avoid retaliation. A respondent stated the following:

> *Taking a life is evil, and the killer cannot go unpunished. However, if the killing is unintentional, the offender would be asked to ensure that the deceased is given a befitting burial. He is the one that will pay all the bills.* (Ako/M/IDI/Okposi)

Suicide – Members of the community believe that the actions and inactions of an individual have consequences that will be inflicted by the gods (and may be dire) on the entire community if not appropriately addressed. In relation to the offence of suicide, no member of the community is expected to take their own life, as this is considered an evil and forbidden act which could subject the community to an unpleasant aftermath. Therefore, anyone who commits suicide has committed a taboo against the community. In response, the community, in a bid to avert impending "evil occurrences," performs a ritual cleansing exercise to purify the defiled land, and the family of the deceased are made to bear the cost of cleansing the land. The deceased is not given a befitting burial. A respondent explained this approach, saying:

> *Suicide is evil. How can someone take his or her own life? If anyone does that, the community has to cleanse the land and his/her family must bear the cost. If ritual cleansing is not done, then tragedy becomes imminent.* (Obodo/M/IDI/Okposi)

Incest and adultery – These offences are considered an abomination in Okposi land. Having sexual intercourse with a blood relation is an abomination. In the same vein, adultery is a forbidden act in this community. The punishment for incest and adultery is either shaming and ridicule or death. To avoid death inflicted by the gods, the offender must confess to the crime and afterwards be subjected to public shaming. Failure to confess to the crime attracts a strange sickness that may lead to the death of the offender. Such sicknesses are believed to be inflicted by the gods. For fear of incurring the wrath of the gods, those who

commit such offences confess to the crime and face public shaming and ridicule. According to a respondent:

> *How could someone have sexual intercourse with someone related to him or her by blood? It is an abomination. In the same vein, adultery is a forbidden act in this community. The punishment for engaging in such acts is a strange sickness that will lead to the death of the person if he/she refuses to confess early. But if the person confesses on time, anybody that comes in contact with him/her will say to the offender "may the consequences of your action befall you." Then the gods take over.* (Ogbo/M/IDI/Okposi)

Torts (*njo*) in the community are offences against the individual that attract the intervention of the community in the form of restorative justice. Torts attract sanctions that act as forms of specific and general deterrence. The community settles grievances and makes peace between the offender and the victim. These offences include stealing, assault, and malicious damage of property, among others. Punishments for torts include restitution, shaming, and fines. Respondents identified the following as torts in the community:

Stealing – The offence of stealing attracts restitution, fine, and shaming. The thief is paraded around the community with the stolen item. Afterwards, a fine is imposed on him or her for committing a shameful act. All this is in addition to the restitution of the stolen item, which is given back to the person from whom it was stolen. Okposi residents affirm that stealing is a shameful act, and it is against their norms and values. The parading of thieves is done to show the entire community that the offender is a thief, and this serves as a deterrent to community members. This is in consonance with Braithwaite's (1989) theory of reintegrative shaming, which holds that making certain acts shameful deters people from engaging in them. A respondent buttressed this claim, saying:

> *Stealing is a shameful act, and it is against our norms and values. If anyone steals, he/she must be paraded round the community with the stolen item to show the entire community that they are a thief. After that, they will replace the item they stole, and also pay a fine for engaging in such a shameful act. This will serve as a deterrent to them and others.* (Nath/M/IDI/Okposi)

Similarly, Akuk, Emeka, and Uyang (2013) found that apprehended thieves in Odukpani Local Governments were made to face public shaming to serve as a deterrent to other would-be thieves. This was done by rubbing the offender with

charcoal and parading them naked around the community. In the same vein, Ajayi (2018) found that subjecting violators of social norms to public disgrace and abhorrence culminated in a reduction in the rate of recidivism in Ilogbo-Ekiti.

Assault – Anyone who commits assault against another pays a fine as determined by the elders. The fine depends on the degree of assault and other circumstances surrounding the incident. In the case of physical injury, the offender bears the cost of treating the victim in hospital. However, if the assaulted person retaliates, and a fight ensues, both parties are liable to a fine as determined by the elders, and each person is asked to bear the cost of treating himself or herself for any resulting injury. An elder buttressed this approach, saying:

> *Assault attracts two punishments: a fine, and the cost of treating the assaulted person. The assaulted person must be given adequate medical treatment. If you say you do not have money to pay a fine and hospital bill, you have to sell your property to raise the money.* (Chukwu/M/IDI/Okposi)

Malicious damage – The punishment for willful destruction of another person's property is restitution within a specified period of time. Failure to replace the damaged property within the given time attracts an additional fine which must be paid in addition to restitution.

> *Destroying somebody's hard-earned property is an act of wickedness. The penalty for this is the payment of a fine and restitution.* (Amara/F/IDI/Okposi)

Defamation – The offence of character defamation is condemnable and offenders are made to restore a damaged reputation by making a public announcement while moving or walking through the four market squares or arenas on the four market days (*Eke, Orie, Afor,* and *Nkwo*). They ring a bell and proclaim that they have made false defamatory comments against the victim(s).

> *We do not tolerate defamation of character. One who defames another will be compelled to pay a fine and move around four markets, which represent the four market days, with a bell, proclaiming publicly that the defamed person is innocent of the defamatory comments made against them.* (Nkume/M/IDI/Okposi)

Autochthonous approach to the prosecution of offenders

The community has in place a decentralized jurisdictional structure to ensure social order and the prosecution of offenders. This is the council of male village elders (*ndi okenye*); the *Ndi Uke* (council of community male elders); the *Unyom Okposi* (council of selected female elders or Okposi wives drawn from the component villages); and the Village Youth Forum (*ndi okorobia*), each operating within their traditional areas or field or subject of jurisdiction. The structure of offender prosecution of the Okposi community is similar to that described in the findings of Onyeozili and Ebbe (2012) – namely, that precolonial Igbo societies ensure social order through the use of councils of elders, title-making associations, and age grades.

Village Youth Forum (ndi okorobia) – Each of the component villages has youth forums that perform the function of providing security for the village. This forum has the backing of the entire village, which also provides the necessary materials needed for policing the community. Their methods of operation involve patrolling the village at night to forestall criminal acts. They are usually divided into sub-groups who police the community on a rotational basis. While these sub-groups operate at night, daytime policing is collectively undertaken. The forum also apprehends and "tortures" criminals, and subsequently takes them to the council of elders for trial and pronouncement of an appropriate punishment. They can also perform stop-and-search operations at night in particular. It is important to note that the forums' rules and modus operandi take into consideration the rules and expectations of the Nigerian police. A respondent stated that:

> *Youth play a significant role in securing this community. They patrol the nooks and crannies of each village, especially at night, to ensure the security of lives and property. To me, they have contributed immensely to the security of this community.* (Njoku/M/IDI/Okposi)

Council of village male elders: This is the highest decision-making body in each of the villages that makes up the community. Judgments are passed by this council in cases of abominations and torts at the village level. However, judgment passed by this council related to tort offences can be appealed by the offender if they deem such judgment to be unfair. In this case, the offender or accused person can resort to *Ndi Uke* at the community level for "final" judgment.

Ndi Uke (Council of community male elders): This is the highest-level decision-making body at the community level. Criminal and other cases beyond

the resolution of village elders are referred to this body and their judgment is final. Membership of this body is based on proven integrity and members are drawn from each of the villages that make up the community. Each village is represented by two men who serve in that capacity for a lifetime. However, the membership of any member of this council who engages in any criminal or abominable act is terminated after trial and punishment. A member of the community affirmed that…

> *In Okposi community, the community's Ndi Uke is like the "Supreme Court of Nigeria" for Okposi people. Their judgment on any issue is final as far as Okposi community is concerned. Cases are referred to them only when they cannot be resolved at the village level.* (Mma/F/IDI/Okposi)

Unyom Okposi (Council of Okposi wives) – This council is composed of elderly married women of integrity, drawn from each of the component villages. Each member has or uses a staff (walking stick). They are invited to elicit a confession from accused persons or to validate statements from the accused. In doing this, they collect their staffs together and ask the accused person to climb the bundle of staffs and proclaim that their nemesis will catch up with them within one year if they are guilty of the crime they have been accused of. The nemesis could be death, sickness, or heavy loss, depending on the offence that has been committed. Due to the history of tragedies that have befallen individuals suspected of being guilty and who climbed the women's bundle of staffs and did not confess to their crimes, the *Unyom Okposi* can elicit a confession from suspects without subjecting them to torture. People know the consequences of lying when standing on those working sticks. The prescribed punishment is then applied to those who plead guilty, while those who plead not guilty are left to be punished or vindicated by the gods within a period of one year.

> *"Unwom Okposi" is a body that is resorted to when people commit a crime and deny it. The method of ascertaining guilt or innocence is simple. Just climb the pile of working sticks [staffs] and plead not guilty and see what will happen if you have actually committed a crime. People know the consequences of lying when standing on those working sticks. So, once you are invited to appear before them [the Council of Okposi wives], anybody that loves you would advise you to plead guilty of the offence if you have committed it.* (Agadi/M/IDI/Okposi)

The foregoing indicates that, in traditional Okposi community, there is no room for torture as a means of extracting confession from accused persons. This contrasts with the activity of the formal police force, which uses physical torture to elicit confessions from suspected offenders. In this autochthonous method of confession extraction, offenders plead guilty not as a result of pain inflicted on them, but as a result of unavoidable repercussions.

Involvement of the Police

There is a general belief among members of the community that all cases can be handled by the community without resorting to the police. Therefore, the police are rarely involved in dealing with criminal and other cases in the community. Anyone who reports a case to the police without first exhausting informal mechanisms and securing the approval of the community would be asked to withdraw the case and is also liable to a fine. Only cases that are beyond settlement through the informal process of criminal justice administration are referred to the police. However, at present in Okposi community, murder cases are immediately referred to the police for formal investigation and prosecution.

> *In this community, victims of criminal or other offences are not expected to report them to the police without first exhausting the options available in the community. This is because we believe any offence can be settled within the community without necessarily involving the police. You can only involve the police if you are asked to do so by the either the village council of elders or the "Uke." But these days, if an unfortunate incident of murder occurs, it would be referred to the police to handle.* (Agadi/M/IDI/Okposi)

Community perception: Juxtaposing autochthonous and formal means of crime control

The perception of a people about a phenomenon determines their disposition and action towards it (Mmahi − Usman 2019; Ulm 2018; Filteau 2012). Comparing the rate of crime in the past and present times, respondents maintained that indigenous means of crime prevention and control are more efficacious than formal, "alien" methods. According to them, the present formal means of justice administration is typified by the uncertainty of offender prosecution as a result of corruption, and

the gross inadequacy of the presence of police, which make indigenous methods a preferred choice among members of the community. On the other hand, the traditional autochthonous system is characterized by inevitable consequences unleashed by the gods of the land. Behavior in the indigenous community is not only regulated by fear of punishment by the gods, but also the certainty of prosecution. Regarding the uncertainty of offender prosecution that characterizes the formal system, respondents explained that with the present process of justice administration, the ubiquity of crime in Nigeria today is traceable to the inadequate prosecution of offenders due to corruption (among other things), which, according to them, encourages crime. Corruption was explained as the use of financial or material inducement (given to prosecutors by offenders) to evade prosecution. This, the respondents averred, was a huge setback to the formal process of crime control. The gross inadequacy of a police presence was explained by reference to the lack of numerical strength of the police, as a result of which they are not available in virtually any of the villages in the community, except at the police station and near major roads. A respondent compared the incidence of crime at the time that traditional methods of social control were solely employed with the present time, when constitutional power is vested in the criminal justice system:

> *Crime was rare in the days we solely policed ourselves in our indigenous ways. Those were the days when we had no keys because there was no need for them. In those days, we left our doors open and went to the farm and nobody entered the house to steal anything. But now, people steal both at night and in the daytime.* (Eke/F/IDI/Okposi)

Another respondent alluded to the factors that have militated against the efficacy of the formal justice system, which according to him are not typical of the autochthonous methods of crime prevention and control. He stated the following:

> *Our indigenous ways of ensuring a crime-free society are very effective. You can't compare them with those being applied by the government. With all the money that government is spending on the security agencies, crime is still ravaging the country. This tells you the system has failed.* (Uga/M/IDI/Okposi)

Responding to a follow-up question about why he thinks the formal system has failed, the above respondent stated that the system is devoid of certitude with respect to the prosecution of offenders as people can influence the outcome of their trials in material ways.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has examined traditional methods of policing in Okposi, Ohaozara Local Government Area of Ebonyi State. The significance of cultural norms and values, especially as these concern deviant behavior and criminal activity, are similar to Durkheim's (1953) concept of *collective conscience*. The acts defined as criminal offences by members of Okposi community are in consonance with Nigerian criminal law. The study therefore concludes that indigenous methods of crime prevention and control are still useful in this contemporary society.

It is therefore recommended that formal law enforcement agencies should enhance their collaboration with such communities through effective community policing. Through this, the latter could adequately assist the police in preventing and controlling crime, and the police could ensure that offenders are treated in line with the provisions of criminal law. The positive aspects of shaming (reintegrative shaming) can be employed to encourage offender-family-community integration.

The study has revealed the autochthonous structure of dealing with offenders that has effectively controlled crime in the study area. Formal law enforcement agencies can synergize their efforts with the community for crime prevention and control. For instance, confession may be elicited from suspects through the use of *unyom Okposi* without inflicting bodily harm.

Studies could be conducted to find out the factors that have led to the community's belief that the gods are prosecutors of offenders, and what these gods are. Also, studies could be undertaken to ascertain the level of awareness of, and perceptions about the formal police force in relation to indigenous methods of crime control in the study area, which this study did not examine.

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REVIEW

SITES OF RESISTANCE: GYPSIES, ROMA AND TRAVELLERS IN SCHOOLS, COMMUNITIES AND THE ACADEMY, BY ANDREW RYDER (LONDON, UCL IOE PRESS, 2017)

Alison Gilchrist[1]

This book, based on Ryder's direct experience, research, and political convictions, provides a significant contribution to the rather sparse literature on Gypsy, Traveller, and Roma (GTR) communities and campaigning. It complements and augments his previous publications on the inequalities experienced by many GTR people, and relates a history of campaigns to combat these injustices. While the book is firmly based on sound theoretical concepts, the author does not let these get in the way of a good narrative, making excellent use of examples and anecdotes to illustrate his meaning and broaden the reader's awareness of the diverse conditions and aspirations of GTR people.

Ryder has spent many years working as an activist supporter, assisting with the development of various groups and campaigns. Based in part on material gathered for his Ph.D. dissertation, the book traces recent GTR campaigns, identifying both challenges and achievements from the GTR perspective, while intertwining Ryder's particular story of growing engagement and enlightenment. The author skillfully weaves together theory, politics, and practice to develop a deep understanding of the GTR experience as one of the UK's most disadvantaged communities and, just as importantly, charts the strategies of resistance and advocacy used to champion their rights and tackle issues of stereotyping and exclusion.

For example, in one chapter he details the distressing experiences of children attending a secondary school near to their site, using the different reactions of the students and their families to illustrate his model of the varying forms of struggle that communities engage in to deal with the prejudices they encounter.

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The chapter, based on observations and interviews with parents, teachers, and pupils themselves is highly critical of the school's practices, notably the tokenistic nod towards diversity in representing "Gypsy and Traveller culture" and their outreach strategy, which "failed to grasp the importance of developing relationships with the Gypsy community" (p.52).

In another example (Chapter 7), Ryder describes how he assisted individuals in practical ways in their dealings with local authority planning procedures, while at the same time helping to organize the collective campaigns of GTR families facing hostile attitudes from local residents and threatened with eviction from unauthorized sites. In both respects, Ryder's accounts highlight the perceived unfairness of Council officers and explore the vulnerability of GTR communities to discrimination and consequent mental health difficulties. In an interesting examination of the activist role played by Gratton Puxon and his use of oppositional tactics, Ryder is disparaging of the radical "liberator" position, and uses this case to promote his own model of inclusive community development, based on GTR community strengths, assets, and traditions.

Ryder's argument consistently emphasizes the importance of respect and meaningful relationships between GTR individuals and the professionals responsible for providing decent services. I found his treatment of different forms of individual and collective capital (especially social, cultural, and symbolic) interesting. He contends that a two-way process of integration would enable GTR communities to develop, acquire, and share these different forms of capital without losing essential aspects of the Gypsy Traveller identity. The book offers a useful analysis of the ways in which different strategies evolve as a response to marginalization. Using a case study of the households on one site, Ryder demonstrates how kinship ties and social networks comprise strong bonds forged and maintained through attendance at significant "rites of passage" gatherings and annual fairs. He observes an "elaborate series of rewards and sanctions" (p.31) that hold the community together without completely suppressing emerging freedoms, especially for women and young people. Cultural capital (vital knowledge, skills, and informal qualifications) is transmitted through family socialization and traditional patterns of exchange that allow livelihoods to be pursued outside of the formal economic and labor markets. Ryder uses the term symbolic capital to consider power dynamics within the community. Honor and prestige seem to be enduringly valuable in sustaining the "Gypsy and Traveller way" and asserting status, but this can lead to intra-community strain and tends to create divisions between groups that have settled and prefer to conform to local norms, compared to those that continue to abide by GTR moral codes and customs.

For GTR communities to survive, or indeed thrive, they need to develop strategic connections that will help them gain social inclusion and access opportunities as well as tackle entrenched prejudice and discrimination. Ryder sets out how the GTR movement has adopted a range of stratagems that seek to uphold human rights and defend cultural ethnicity while simultaneously finding and working with allies in the wider political world. In the chapter on critical pedagogy, he talks of the role played by people, such as himself, who function as "outsider catalysts" (a Freirean term) or "organic intellectuals" enabling conscientization and community mobilization. Building on previous work and his experience as a paid policy officer for the Gypsy and Traveller Law Reform Coalition, he cautions against the "Gypsy industry," the network of NGOs that are dependent on state funding and therefore constrained in the extent that they can be overtly political in working on the issues raised and solutions prioritized by GTR community representatives. The Gypsy and Traveller Law Reform Coalition favored a "capabilities" and empowerment approach to securing equal rights, especially in relation to the provision of sites and changes in the law. The group enabled GTR individuals to articulate their demands directly through lobbying and by speaking to journalists about their aspirations.

Ryder explores how their avowed commitment to human rights and all forms of equality (notably around gender and sexual orientation) generated tensions with older generations of the GTR community. My own experience as a community development practitioner suggests that this is not unique to this population, and I would have welcomed a more in-depth discussion of the complex inter-play between tradition, honor, status, and livelihoods. It would have been interesting to compare how these are affected by social media and changes in public attitudes.

Ryder avoids a simplistic essentialism. This enable him to sensitively reflect different responses to oppression, and to draw out how these shape individual and collective choices made by GTR people regarding their families' welfare and for the future, especially regarding the ambitions of young people. The sections exploring different identities and living strategies are particularly illuminating, informed by Ryder's direct knowledge of the "Gypsy way" through his links with individuals and their campaign/support groups. This allows him to offer meaningful, perhaps surprising insights and to draw useful conclusions for policy and practice. His consideration of intersectionality is thought provoking, demonstrating an awareness of how identities are often situational, shifting over time in response to a series of negotiated compromises that reflect a tension between traditions and modern circumstances. In dealing with education, community, and culture, Ryder examines how the various dimensions of class, gender, and cross-generational relations produce frictions within some GTR

communities, as well as acknowledging the more familiar aspects of ethnicity and racism that lead to wider conflicts and exclusion.

I found the chapter on competing academic discourses and rivalries to be less stimulating, but no doubt it covers some important ground for those involved in this area of study. Ryder's stance comes from a position of respect and solidarity. He offers a timely reminder of the legitimacy of activist scholarship and the use of engaged research methodologies that adopt critical pedagogy and co-production as underpinning principles. The call for participative and action-oriented research is a pressing plea that deserves to be heard by all concerned with funding and policy-making, as well as the more esoteric branches of Romany studies.

Finally, it would be good to have heard more about the impact of austerity–driven public spending cuts, alongside the growing xenophobia unleashed by Brexit, and how these have affected GTR prospects and livelihoods. Perhaps this is a topic for further co-enquiry among "engaged scholars" drawn from academia and GTR communities themselves. Overall, this book offers a disarmingly self-critical account of Ryder's journey from activist-liberator mode to a more nuanced and complex understanding of the challenges facing GTR communities and the potential for community development to offer credible routes to collective empowerment and the building of alliances with those wanting to work in solidarity and hope that social justice for Gypsies and Travellers is possible.

The book is beautifully written and easy to read, tracing Ryder's personal trajectory with candor and honesty, notwithstanding occasional repetition. "Sites of resistance" is polemical, but grounded in experience and well supported by theory. It will be of interest to people working with GTR communities, policymakers, students, and researchers looking at marginalized communities. Hopefully, Gypsies, Travellers, and Roma people themselves will also find it simultaneously sympathetic and thought-provoking.

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THE DISCOURSES OF CAPITALISM: EVERYDAY ECONOMISTS AND THE PRODUCTION OF COMMON SENSE, BY CHRISTIAN W. CHUN (ABINGDON AND NEW YORK, ROUTLEDGE, 2017)

Réka Tamássy[1]

Christian W. Chun is Assistant Professor of Culture, Identity, and Language Learning in the Applied Linguistics Department at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. In his book, he analyzes the discourses of capitalism through which people understand and give meaning to the economic system they live in.

Chun's dataset consists of 312 video recordings of *everyday economists*' comments on a piece of art about capitalism that was displayed in public spaces in New York City, Boston, Cedar Rapids, Iowa (in 2012 and 2013), and London (in 2015). By *everyday economists* Chun means passersby, as the latter all have some kind of knowledge and everyday personal experience with the economy. The work of art was a sign made by Steve Lambert stating, "Capitalism works for me!" Alongside this, passersby could vote whether they found the statement to be true or false in relation to their own lives. After voting, they could also give their opinion about the topic and answer questions from Lambert's assistants, who recorded these interviews.

Chun has a strong oppositional perspective about capitalism, both for personal and political/ethical reasons. This standpoint defines the tone of the book, and the basis of the analysis. He successfully identifies neoliberal frames even within comments critical of capitalism by rejecting common assumptions made in connection with capitalism. This means that even those who oppose capitalism sometimes refer to common – although profoundly disproved (both by academics and everyday life) – *characteristic elements* of the system. These elements, or more accurately, viewpoints, more or less come to life in misleading definitions of capitalism that link the system to freedom, choice, and democracy.

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Chun aims to point out and disprove these definitions while specifying the most popular frames related to them. The book also reflects on the lack of adequate public pedagogy about the subject, and the success (as it exists) of anti-capitalist movements.

The chosen corpus and theoretical and methodological approach implies that Chun accepts the theory that discourse is affected by social institutions, politics, economics, etc., but that these institutions are affected by discourse as well. Therefore, the analysis of public and specifically economic discourse is not only important for understanding what people think about capitalism and how, but is also relevant because what they think of it and how directly affects the system.

As Chun himself states, there have been many attempts to analyze discourses on economics and politics (especially on the topic of the current Western economic system) and its relations. These research projects were all carried out by researchers from economic or political fields. Although they applied linguistic approaches in their work, Chun claims that there is a core difference between professional economists and political scientists who use linguistic methods, and linguists who analyze discourse on economics and politics.

Chun's work emphasizes how everyday people make up their minds about the economic system they live in, and how their thinking is restricted by false definitions. Without mentioning it specifically, he reflects on Habermas' public sphere theory in relation to the chosen data. In Chapter 2, Chun argues that everyday economists' opinions about the economic system are just as important as the opinions of professionals. He claims that the way that people think about the economic system that surrounds them can affect many choices of theirs, such as their votes in national elections. By this choice of corpus, Chun widens the scale of opinions about the economic system, giving voice (and by voice also power) to everyday people. According to Habermas' public sphere theory, in the democratic, critical public sphere it is not only those voices that should be heard about public issues that are considered to be those of professionals, but everybody else's too. Therefore, Chun's chosen data contributes to the democratic public sphere by democratizing the academically analyzed discourse on the Western economic climate.

Chun's main arguments are voiced in the first three chapters. In these, he gives his chosen definition of capitalism, arguing that common definitions are typically flawed and usually associate false positive properties with the phenomenon. Then, he aims to define ideology, implicitly suggesting that capitalism is indeed an ideology. Connecting ideology and discourse, he reflects on Gramsci's theory of hegemony. His final argument appears in the analysis itself, implying that the neoliberal framing of capitalism appears even in the opposing arguments of commenters.

On the definition of capitalism, Chun addresses a few – according to him – false equivalences between capitalism and the traits of the current economic climate. These equivalences mainly suggest that capitalism brought freedom to so-called Western countries. Freedom of speech, freedom of choice (democracy), free (private) enterprises, and free market are just a few examples of this discourse. In Chapter 1, Chun argues that these "freedoms" are not necessarily tied to capitalism. On the contrary, he continues using the Marxist definition of capitalism throughout his analysis: i.e. capitalism as a class structure in which capitalists make profit from the value of the surplus production of workers (p. 9). This definition affects his analysis significantly since he approaches participants' meaning-making processes from the Marxian angle, thereby delegitimizing every definition of capitalism that differs from this.

Considering the nature of ideology, Chun cites Slavoj Žižek, stating that the difficulty of the phenomenon is that it is hard to recognize when expected, but emerges immediately when one wishes to avoid it. After acknowledging the lack of scientific consensus about the definition of ideology, Chun draws on Louis Althusser and Stuart Hall in indicating that an ideology is a complex system of thoughts and ideas through which people give meaning to their everyday life; an assortment of views that are thought to drive their existence and action.

On the relation between capitalism, ideology, and discourse Chun presents Gramsci's theory of hegemony, arguing that the power relations in society are not only grounded in (physical) coercion, but also in the internalization of oppression by those who are ruled. According to this position, in order to maintain the dominance of capital over the working class, the latter must accept this dominance and give their consent to the ruling elite. This acceptance and consent are reflected through the discourses of capitalism. Chun claims that this reflection is the main *problem* (as he opposes capitalism, he frames every discourse and act favoring capitalism as a problem, either explicitly or implicitly): although people are able to see that the system is harmful in every possible way, they nonetheless think that capitalism is still the best of all possible systems, if there is any other option at all.

Elaborating on Gramsci's theory, Chun reflects on the role of intellectuals in the production and reproduction of hegemonic (and counter-hegemonic) discourses: "any hegemonic aim thus involves a dynamic ongoing process with the production of knowledge selectively framed, limited, and disseminated with the help of invested intellectuals who themselves enthusiastically embrace and legitimate any system by which the governed are ruled" (pp. 38-39). Hence, in Chun's argument, hegemonic discourse helps to protect and maintain the hegemony; the existing social (and in this case, economic) order. Counter-hegemonic discourse on the other hand, questions the existing system through

pointing out its faults and weaknesses. One of Chun's most important findings is that hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses can both appear in the same opinions about the current economic system, whether they are for or against capitalism.

In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 Chun presents his findings, which he has generated by applying a mediated discourse analysis and argumentation framework. The chosen quotations of passersby are highlighted in relation to how good an example they are of the most commonly mentioned frameworks of capitalism. In Chapters 4 and 5, one mostly gets to know about capitalism-friendly discourses, while the last chapter on participant comments concerns anti-capitalist (counter-hegemonic) opinions. In these chapters, Chun not only addresses the most popular themes and gives his own opinion about them, but also reflects on their flaws and faults.

The analysis thus reflects on found discourses while proving that even anti-capitalist commenters approach the topic through neoliberal frameworks. In the fifth chapter, one can find the opinions of commenters who recognize the flaws of the current economic system, but do not see how it could be changed, because even with its flaws it remains the best system they can think of, or because they think there is no other system at all. Chun also emphasizes utterances of *everyday economists* that suggest the system can somehow be fixed. From the researcher's perspective, these opinions strengthen the idea that even though people see the problems with the system, they are engrained so deeply in the ideological spiral that it seems more appropriate to try and fix the former than to change it. This chapter highlights how people see the economic system as something natural, with which one has to live, even if one does not benefit from it. In the last chapter, Chun connects his findings to public pedagogy.

From a critical viewpoint, I would highlight two shortcomings.

As the basis of his analysis, Chun uses the comments of passersby in the U.S. and the United Kingdom without reflecting on the differences between the countries' then-current economic climate. This is problematic if one considers that there are some important differences in the interconnection of the economic and the public sectors in the U.S. and the United Kingdom. By making this choice, Chun assumes that these differences do not matter, since both countries have a capitalist economic system. From his viewpoint, this is understandable, as he does not find capitalism acceptable at its core, and addressing the differences between the countries may suggest that there is a "better" or more acceptable version of this economic system – a message Chun would probably like to avoid transmitting.

However, such basic differences do matter, not just in people's lives, but perhaps also in their discourse about capitalism and their meaning-making of it.

For example, someone in the United Kingdom may have never had to deal with the American for-profit healthcare system. Therefore, for that person, monetized healthcare may not be part of the capitalist economic system, and nor would they be expected to understand the former as a consequence of the latter. In contrast, citizens of the United Stated have lived their whole life with such a healthcare system (one that operates wholly within the capitalist economic system), hence basic healthcare may be a part of their discourse on capitalism.

The second weakness of the analysis is the corpus, as also emphasized by Chun himself. Since the interviews were carried out by the artist's staff, the follow up questions that were asked lack a theoretical or methodological background as they were not designed to be components of scientific analysis. This not only means that the interviews missed some important points in relation to the research (the interviewers did not ask the necessary questions), but also that there were no guidelines for them. This is not the fault of the original experiment, as neither the artist nor his staff knew at the time that Chun would use their recordings in his research.

Other reviews of the book, such as those by Jan Blommaert (2018/47, Language in Society) and Elizabeth R. Miller (2018/12(2), Discourse and Communication), praised it for its surprising choice of corpus, detailed and precise definition of the concepts that were applied, identification, interpretation, and precise interrogation of definitions of capitalism, and the sophisticated, social-centered analysis, with Blommaert also connecting it to linguistic landscape analysis. All the aforementioned commendations are correct, while special emphasis may be placed on the applied methodological approaches, which – as opposed to some strongly linguistic centered analyses – concentrated mostly on the social, political, and economic context.

Christian W. Chun's analysis gives a deep and important overview of discourses on capitalism. His work is not only important for its linguistic and critical findings, but also for highlighting how *everyday economists* understand the economic system around them. The book also presents the current neoliberal frames about the economic system, which could make it interesting reading for people outside the academic field. Chun's strong condemnation of capitalism gives the book a critical tone, as well as an extra framework through which one can analyze the function and operation of discourse. Even though the researcher chose to present his findings through a counter-hegemonic discourse – an anti-capitalist standpoint –, in the book itself the anti-capitalist standpoint *becomes* the hegemonic discourse, since one receives all information through and compared to Chun's own point of view.

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THE IMPASSE OF *KHILONJIA* IDENTITY
ASSAM: THE ACCORD, THE DISCORD, BY SANGEETA BAROOAH PISHAROTY (GURGAON, PENGUIN RANDOM HOUSE INDIA, 2019)

Debajyoti Biswas[1]

Of all the boundary lines that were drawn arbitrarily for administrative convenience without taking cognizance of the socio-cultural and linguistic homogeneity of the inhabitants living therein, those drawn by the British during their rule in North-East India have proved to be some of the most problematic. They have continued to have the most debilitating effects on the lives of the people living in this region for close to two centuries. The exploitation of resources in North-East India by the British also opened the floodgates to the incessant immigration of culturally and linguistically disparate groups that pose a threat to local communities, or *khilonjia* (the lexical meaning of this Assamese word is "people living in one place for many generations." However, the writer uses it loosely to accommodate the people who lived in Assam prior to 1826). Immigrants poured in in large numbers and, since 1826, stories of loss and deprivation have represented the cornerstone of discourse on North-East India. Even after India's Independence, post-1947, social turbulence has prevailed owing to the conflict between the khilonjia and these immigrant communities. Initial sporadic protests later on galvanized the consolidation of multi-ethnic communities in a fight against the immigrant communities following 1979, and in 1985, on 15 August, the Assam Accord was signed to assuage the grievances of the khilonjia. The Accord was seen as a milestone in asserting Assamese identity and included provisions for protecting the "jati, mati, and bheti" (Community, Land, and Identity) of the khilonjia community. However, even three decades following the signing of the accord, the clauses therein have not been implemented in letter and spirit. The need for the Accord, the strife of ethnic communities, the rise of militancy as a means of resolving contention, and many more such issues have been addressed by Sangeeta

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Barooah Pisharoty, an award-winning journalist in her book entitled *Assam: The Accord, The Discord.* The book will be a useful resource for readers and researchers who are working on issues related to militancy, minority rights, immigration, and electoral politics.

Pisharoty has unearthed vital information relating to the incidents that propelled the signing of the Assam Accord by collecting data from various agencies and people who have proffered their testimony. She examines the positions of all the stakeholders engaged in bringing the Accord to life, and recounts the immediate trigger of the "six-year-long" Assam agitation and the role of Hiranya Kumar Bhattarcharyya, an Indian Police Service officer. Pisharoty's interviews of the leaders of the movement and signatories of the Assam Accord also reveal the disagreement among various leaders that prevailed regarding the cut-off date. Whereas some of the latter did not want the Accord to come into being at all, some wanted 1966 as the cut off year for immigrants, while others preferred 1971. Pisharoty also analyses the effect of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 1950 on the 1951 National Register of Citizens (NRC).

The years preceding the Assam Accord were ones of turmoil and uncertainty, with every political party wanting to fish in the murky waters. Pisharoty reveals some major findings about how Congress tried to use "illegal immigrants" as their dedicated voting bank, and how the opposition tried to exploit the opportunity in the 1977 election. The role played by Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS, a right-wing Hindu group) and Jamat-e-Islami and Jamat-E-Ulema (both right-wing Muslim groups) to woo the Hindu and Muslim immigrant population (respectively) opened up space for polarization along religious lines. The role of the Communist Party of India (CPI) and their support for Congress-I in relation to helping Anwara Timur form a government in Assam shows the ambivalent ideological stand of the political parties in India.

The book reveals the politics behind the violence and bloodshed that occurred during the period of agitation. The "Assam Agitation" that began on the basis of a peaceful "Gandhian model" turned ugly and claimed many innocent lives for political reasons. The infamous Nellie Massacre of 1983 remains a dark chapter in the history of Assamese nationalism. The inception of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) added another chapter to the infamous killings in Assam, and what started out as an ideological war ended up as killing for extortion.

On one hand, the Assam Accord does not elaborate a definition of "Assamese People"; on the other hand, Pisharoty tries to define the Assamese/Khilonjiya identity in a very flat manner by overlooking synchronic and diachronic influences on their identity formation. Different academics, politicians, and members of civil society have tried to define "Assamese" in different ways; however, one

peculiarity has never been elaborately explicated while addressing this issue. This peculiarity is that the word Assamese has three connotations: It can mean (i) a language, (ii) a community with a specific culture, or (iii) an autochthonous individual/community domiciled within the geographical space of Assam (which is gradually shrinking). Failure to distinguish between these three different significations of the term has led to irreconcilable disputes and the Balkanization of the region in the wake of Assamese nationalism. The term "*Axamiya*" is used for the language proper; a language that predated this nomenclature as the term was derived from the word Ahom. In Tai, the root *cham* means "to be undefeated." With the privative Assamese affix ā, the whole formation (Āchām) means undefeated. Nandana Dutta, in a seminal book entitled *Questions of Identity in Assam,* cites Kanaksen Deka's finding that indigenous communities existed in the area, such as the Koch, Ahom, Tiwa, Mishing and others; however, there were no "Assamese." It was only with the advent of the British that the term "Aham" became Assam, and later a standardized version of the Sibsagar dialect came to be recognized as the Assamese language. The second connotation of the word is related to the community, which has a distinct culture. The cultural specificity of the Assamese community can unequivocally be traced back to their cultural life, which subsumes all kinds of socio-cultural and religious practices. The Ahom and the Koch rulers in this region, over the course of time, accepted the Hindu deities and manner of worship, thus the origin and foundation of Assamese culture during its formative years was predominantly Hindu. At a later stage it subsumed the autochthonous tribal communities and their cultural practices and the Muslim community too, to create the present-day composite Assamese culture. However, there is overlap between the first and the second definition, which has made it necessary to create a third signification to solve this problem: i.e. the identification of the autochthonous people living within the geographical space of Assam. But this third signification of the word has created another problem: Since the definition of autochthonous, according to Levi Strauss, means being born from the earth/soil, or something that is indigenous to a place, it brings forth many unsettled questions. The various tribes (such as the Bodos, Mishings, Karbis, Rabhas, Garos and others) who have lived in this region since time immemorial may be considered autochthons and are thus some of the non-tribal communities who have settled in this valley over the past few centuries, the aggregate of which make up the Assamese people. This category excludes those immigrants who have settled there comparatively recently, and are therefore new entrants into the territory, culture, and language. In order to accommodate these later entrants into the fold of Assamese identity, many cultural icons such as Bhupen Hazarika, Bishnu Rabha, and Jyoti Prasad Aggarwala have played a decisive role, according to Pisharoty, which she elaborates on in a chapter entitled *The Discord*. It can

be surmised that a culture is not a fixed entity, but a dynamic and ever evolving process.

However, Pisharoty's definition of khilonjia has serious political implications because one organization in Assam, called *Mahasangha,* is demanding a quota of eighty percent of all assembly seats and government jobs for the Khilonjia population. People whose descendants entered the territory of Ahom Kingdom (excluding the Goalpara district) after 1826 are not considered khilonjia by the author, as she conveniently overlooks the annexation of Goalpara District which was earlier under the suzerainty of the Koch kingdom (1515), then the Muhammadans, and finally the British (1793). Technically, it would be erroneous to identify a group of people as khilonjia by excluding the population that lived in Goalpara region because the present-day Assam also includes Goalpara. Neither the khilonjia nor the Assamese identity should be seen through this monolithic perspective, as Assamese identity is a composite identity to which all communities have contributed to varying degrees. As Suniti Kumar Chatterji pointed out in his book *The Place of Assam in the History and Civilisation of India,"*Bodo and Austric and Dravidian with Aryan-speaking elements from Bengal and Bihar, and with [the]Siamese-Chinese section of […] mongoloids in their Thai tribe of the Ahoms [are] finally becoming transformed [into] the Aryan-Assamese-speaking masses of the valley...This can be looked upon as Assam's great contribution to the synthesis of cultures and fusion of races that took place in India." In such circumstances, pushing for a Khilonjia identity on the basis of 1826 will forever represent discrimination.

The efficacy of the Assam Accord seemed to have tapered off with the passage of time, and the central issue has been hijacked by the right-wing forces of proponents of both the major religions, Hindu and Muslim. In contrast, politicians have drawn rich dividends over the years by delaying the implementation of the accord; with the updating of NRC, the same politicians are now trying – or rather, have tried successfully to some extent –to stoke religious sentiment, thereby attempting to cloak the entire NRC/Assam Accord exercise in a religious hue. Pisharoty examines how the fault lines of the NRC process, the victims trapped in "paper identities," the introduction of the controversial Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB), and the flow of illegal immigrants have proved disastrous. She further narrates the ordeals of people who have been left out of the draft NRC. The heart-wrenching stories of these people show the failure of the state mechanism, as there are many people whose cases have been cleared by the Foreign Tribunal Court (FT Court) and are eligible to be included into the NRC, but who, because of a lack of adequate knowledge, have repeatedly become victims. Pisharoty does not deny the presence of illegal immigrants, as the study reveals that there is a well-organized cartel involved

in helping illegal immigrants to enter India. However, with the BJP government pitching in to support the CAB, the Hindus of Bangladesh may find an excuse to infiltrate into Assam that would not only be debilitating for Assamese language and culture, but will also seriously impair the economic condition of the state.

The strength of the book lies in the unbiased approach of the author in representing the facts as they are. She appeals for social cohesion by citing examples of Hemanga Biswas and Bhupen Hazarika and rejects partisan politics. Although there are also some omissions on the part of the author, the book will nevertheless remain an important research document that brings out much vital information that was hitherto unknown. The strength of the work lies in its unbiased and unprejudiced analysis of the historical incidents, and in its proposal of a solution to the cankerous problem in Assam.

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